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 The research presented here examines the assessment of the reliability of a 
system or product utilizing multiple data sources available throughout the different 
stages of its development.  The assessment of the reliability as it changes throughout 
the development of a system is traditionally referred to as reliability growth, which 
refers to the discovery and mitigation of failure modes within the system, thereby 
improving the underlying reliability.  Traditional models for assessing reliability 
growth work with test data from individual test events to assess the system reliability 
at the current stage of development.  These models track or project the reliability of 
the system as it matures subject to the specific assumptions of the models.   
 The contributions of this research are as follows.  A new Bayesian reliability 
growth assessment technique is introduced for continuous-use systems under general 
corrective action strategies.  The technique differs from those currently in the 
literature due to the allowance for arbitrary times for corrective actions.  It also 
provides a probabilistic treatment of the various parameters within the model, 
accounting for the uncertainty present in the assessment.  The Bayesian reliability 
 
 
growth assessment model is then extended to include results from operational testing.  
The approach considers the posterior distribution from the reliability growth 
assessment of the prior for the operational reliability assessment.  The developmental 
and operational testing environments are not a priori assumed to be equivalent, and 
the change in environments is accounted for in a probabilistic manner within the 
model.  A Bayesian reliability growth planning model is also presented that takes 
advantage of the reduced uncertainty in the combined operational assessment.  The 
approach allows for reductions in the amount of demonstration testing necessary for a 
given level of uncertainty in the assessment, and it can also be used to reduce high 
design goals that often result from traditional operating characteristic curve 
applications.  The final part of this research involves combining various sources of 
reliability information to obtain prior distributions on the system reliability.  The 
approach presents a general framework for utilizing information such as 
component/subsystem testing, historical component reliability data, and physics-
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1 INTRODUCTION, RESEARCH OBJECTIVES, AND OVERVIEW OF 
DISSERTATION 
1.1 Introduction 
 Reliability growth in complex systems has been widely studied for many 
years, and it continues to be an area of great interest.  A recent Defense Science 
Board Task Force report [1] cited a significant increase in the number of military 
systems that are being rated as not operationally suitable, and the main reason cited in 
the report is poor reliability.  Many systems are simply failing to achieve required 
levels of reliability, and nearly half of U.S. Army systems over a ten-year period 
failed to meet operational reliability requirements.  A major recommendation from 
the task force was to implement a robust reliability growth program, including 
periodic reporting on reliability growth program progress.  This is due in part to the 
lack of reliability growth programs on most developmental systems, but also in part to 
the realization that traditional DFR principles [2],[3] alone are simply not sufficient 
when designing highly complex systems. 
 In response to this recommendation, the U.S. Department of Defense has 
recently implemented guidance to address this problem.  Directive Type 
Memorandum 11-0003 [4] calls for military programs to establish comprehensive 
reliability programs, to include DFR techniques along with a reliability growth 
strategy.  Reliability growth curves are to be documented in the Systems Engineering 
Plan at early milestones, and reliability growth should be tracked against planned 
thresholds.  Additional requirements include reporting on the improvement necessary 
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to achieve the desired reliability requirement during Operational Testing (OT).  The 
U.S. Army has also implemented policy [5] to more specifically address the reliability 
problem, with language speaking to the importance of DFR techniques, an early 
reliability threshold report, and contractual requirements for reliability growth 
planning curves.  These recent advances highlight not only the importance of 
achieving reliability in modern defense systems, but also the inherent connection 
between DFR and traditional system-level reliability growth. 
 Reliability growth is generally divided into the three areas of planning, 
tracking, and projection [6].  Reliability growth tracking and projection models have 
typically been developed to assess the system reliability under specific assumptions 
regarding testing, data collection, and corrective action implementation.  The 
differences between tracking and projection lie in the information that is used to 
develop the model.  Tracking models generally use only failure data collected during 
Developmental Testing (DT) to estimate the reliability improvement during the test, 
whereas projection models use engineering assessments of the effectiveness of 
planned corrective actions to observed failure modes, also known as fix effectiveness 
factors (FEF).  This allows for more flexibility in the projection framework, as the 
models can project the anticipated improvement that will result from corrective 
actions that may not yet be implemented.  The use of FEFs has also been shown to 
provide very reasonable estimates of reliability improvement when they are assigned 
correctly [7].  Reliability growth planning models are then typically transformed 
versions of the assessment models that can be used to plan an appropriate reliability 
growth program before system level reliability are available.  Historically a number 
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of models have been developed for both continuous and discrete complex systems, 
with particular emphasis on reliability growth tracking.  Continuous systems are those 
whose test durations are measured over continuous time periods such as hours or 
miles.  Discrete systems are those whose test durations are measured in discrete 
demands such as trials or shots.  A review of a number of reliability growth models is 
presented in Chapter 2. 
Reliability is defined as the ability of an item to function under given 
conditions for a period of time [8].   Concurrent with the development of the system, 
a number of reliability tests are conducted, with the purpose of discovering and 
mitigating failure modes within the system and thereby improving the underlying 
reliability.  The system design is continually evolving throughout these tests, such 
that combination of the data for overall reliability assessment is generally not 
practical.  The testing environment also tends to be more benign than actual 
operational usage conditions, with resulting reliability estimates that are overly 
optimistic when compared to operational failure rates.  This process is intended to 
mature the reliability of the system to a sufficient level for operational use, which is 
termed the reliability requirement.  Proper specification of the reliability requirement 
is vitally important to the overall reliability program, and factors such as operational 
effectiveness and life-cycle operating costs should be considered in this process.  The 
requirement will be assumed to be appropriate for the purposes of the research 
presented here.  The reliability growth models discussed above are intended to assess 
the reliability as it evolves throughout the DT program.   
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Many systems under development are then subject to a reliability 
demonstration test [6] in which the assessed reliability from the test results is 
compared to the original reliability requirement for the system.  The demonstration 
test can be performed in a number of ways [9], but within the United States 
Department of Defense (DoD) it is generally a full system test with a fixed 
configuration that is meant to mimic the intended operational environment of the 
system to the maximum extent possible.  The fixed configuration testing allows for 
application of the exponential distribution and its associated estimators to assess the 
system reliability.  For planning the appropriate resources and test lengths, an 
Operating Characteristic (OC) curve [6],[10] is typically used to manage the overall 
test approach.  This allows for the consideration of not only statistical confidence, but 
also the power or probability of acceptance of the test. 
 The OC Curve for the demonstration test determines the probability of 
“passing” the demonstration test as a function of the true reliability of the system, 
where passing is defined by observing less than or equal to the maximum number of 
allowable failures.  The maximum number of allowable failures is chosen such that 
the desired lower statistical confidence bound on the reliability estimate is greater 
than or equal to the requirement.  For continuously operating systems this is defined 






















∑ ≤ α                                         (1) 
For the inequality in (1), T is the total demonstration test length, MR the reliability 
requirement of the system, and α is the significance of the test.  The underlying 
 4 
- CHAPTER 1 - 
assumption of the approach is that the system failures occur according to a 
Homogeneous Poisson Process (HPP).  The times between successive failures are 
then exponentially distributed, which is generally justified by the constant 
configuration of the system.  As such, the reliability requirement of the system is 
commonly specified as a “mean time between failure” metric.  The OC curve itself is 





















∑ ,                                        (2) 
where M is the true but unknown reliability of the system and c is the maximum 
number of allowable failures in the test determined using (1).  An example of the 
curve is shown in Figure 1.1. 
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In order to have a high probability of successfully passing the demonstration test, it is 
necessary to enter the test with a value of M that is above the value of MR. The value 
of M is then treated as the design goal for the system.  A drawback of this approach is 
that the higher design goals resulting from the statistical confidence measures may be 
unrealistic, cost-prohibitive, or technologically unachievable.  The issue is further 
exacerbated when considering an increased emphasis to place new systems into 
operational usage faster while under tighter budget constraints.  As seen in (1), when 
T is not much larger than MR, the number of maximum allowable failures will also be 
small.  This often results in test plans in which no failures or a single failure are 
allowable.  Because of the difficulty of achieving this result, the value of M in (2) 
must then be significantly larger than MR, which again results in the previously 
mentioned problems with high reliability design goals. 
 As seen in (2), the reliability information available from the developmental 
test program and reliability growth models is not utilized in the OC curve 
calculations.  Other sources of information related to the reliability of the system are 
also available throughout its development.  Modeling and simulation in the form of 
Physics-of-Failure analysis is generally conducted on important or high cost 
components, and component or subsystem level testing is also often conducted prior 
to beginning system level testing.  Historical information on the failure rate of certain 
components within the system may also be available.  Use of these data, along with 
the demonstration test results, could serve to lower the reliability design goals and 
result in more efficient and cost effective reliability development programs. 
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 The research proposed here examines the assessment of the reliability of a 
system or product utilizing multiple data sources available throughout the different 
stages of its development.  The various stages of development involve maturation of 
the design through the discovery and mitigation of failure modes that are initially 
present in the system.  The result is a constantly evolving design with concurrently 
evolving reliability.  The assessment of the reliability as it changes throughout the 
development of a system is traditionally referred to as reliability growth, which refers 
to the discovery and mitigation of failure modes within the system, thereby improving 
the underlying reliability.  A number of approaches have historically been developed 
to model the growth in reliability throughout system development, each with their 
own applications, assumptions and limitations. 
 Traditional models for assessing reliability growth, such as those found in 
Chapter 2, work with test data from individual test events to assess the system 
reliability at the current stage of development.  Depending on the specific technique 
and associated assumptions, they track or project the reliability of the system as it 
matures.  Tracking involves the estimation of the reliability of a system during its 
development based on test data alone, similar to standard parametric estimation 
techniques.  Projection provides the expected improvement that will be realized when 
corrective actions for observed failure modes are implemented.  A more in-depth 
review of some selected reliability growth models is provided in Chapter 2 along with 
review of more general system reliability assessment approaches.   
1.2 Research Objective 
 The objective of this research is to develop a model framework for assessing 
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reliability and reliability growth utilizing data from a variety of potential sources.  
The model and methodology utilizes data collected throughout the development of 
the system.  It also addresses any differences that may exist in the test environments 
in which the data are collected, while also providing a probabilistic result that 
indicates the amount of uncertainty in the assessed values.  Additional data sources, 
such as historical information, component level test data, and modeling and 
simulation results will also be leveraged in the methodology.  The general 
performance of the model is compared to current techniques, and the relative merits 
of the approach are discussed. 
1.3 Research Goals 
 There are three main goals of the research presented here.  These goals 
directly address the limitations of the current reliability growth paradigm discussed in 
Section 2.  They are as follows: 
1. Provide a reliability growth assessment methodology that utilizes data from 
throughout the development of the system while rigorously accounting for 
differences in the test environments that may exist. 
2. Provide additional management metrics that will provide additional 
information beyond the assessed reliability to program managers in order to 
better inform decision-making. 
3. Provide a methodology for combining early design activities such as modeling 
and simulation and component/subsystem testing to provide a prior 
distribution on the reliability of a system.  The prior distribution can then be 
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updated when reliability growth testing and reliability demonstration testing 
are completed. 
1.4 Research Contributions 
 The contributions of this research are as follows.  A new Bayesian reliability 
growth assessment technique is introduced for continuous-use systems under general 
corrective action strategies utilizing data from reliability growth testing throughout 
the development and maturation of the system.  These techniques differ from those 
currently in the literature due to their allowance for arbitrary times for corrective 
actions.  They also provide a probabilistic treatment of the various parameters within 
the model, accounting for the uncertainty present in the assessment.  The Bayesian 
formulation also allows for sequential updating as additional phases of developmental 
reliability growth testing are completed.  The capability to combine data across 
multiple test phases is also a significant enhancement to currently available reliability 
growth techniques.  To date, many reliability growth models are limited to utilizing 
data from a single test phase.  An additional feature unique to Bayesian models that 
consider multiple failure modes is the capability to account for the failure rate of 
unobserved failure modes.  The model allows practitioners to model complex systems 
that are comprised of large numbers of failure modes, recognizing that only a 
relatively small number of failure modes can be observed during system testing.   
 The Bayesian reliability growth assessment model is then extended to include 
results from operational testing.  The approach considers the posterior distribution 
from the reliability growth assessment of the prior for the operational reliability 
assessment.  The DT and OT environments are not a priori assumed to be equivalent 
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though.  System reliability generally degrades when transitioning from a 
developmental test environment to an operational test environment, and a degradation 
factor is added to the model to account for this difference.  The degradation factor is 
treated probabilistically within the Bayesian framework, and the resulting marginal 
posterior distribution on the system failure intensity is used to provide an assessment 
of the operational reliability.  The approach reduces the uncertainty in the operational 
reliability assessment when compared to the classical approach using the HPP while 
still accounting for the uncertainty in both the prior failure intensity and the 
degradation between test environments.  New statistical risks for reliability 
demonstration are also developed which serve as alternatives to those traditionally 
available through OC curve analysis. 
 A Bayesian reliability growth planning model is also presented that takes 
advantage of the reduced uncertainty in the operational assessment.  The approach 
allows for reductions in the amount of demonstration testing necessary for a given 
level of “confidence” in the assessment, and it can also be used to reduce high design 
goals that often result from traditional OC curve applications.   
 The final part of this research involves combining various sources of reliability 
information to obtain prior distributions on the system reliability to aid in later 
reliability growth modeling.  The approach presents a general framework for utilizing 
information such as component/subsystem testing, historical component reliability 
data, and physics-based modeling of specific component failure mechanisms. 
 The methods presented here also allow for estimation of various management 
metrics such as initial system failure intensity, projected failure intensity after failure 
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mode mitigation, growth potential failure intensity, and the rate of occurrence of 
unobserved failure modes.  These types of metrics provide reliability program 
managers additional information with which to assess the maturity of the system 
under development.  At the same time they can also aid in quantifying the risk that 
may exist in achieving the reliability goals of the development program.   
 It should also be noted that the techniques proposed here could serve more 
generally to assess the reliability of a system even when reliability growth is not 
being realized through a corrective action process.  The model framework is also 
flexible enough to use as a general data fusion process for assessing the overall 
system reliability even when reliability growth is not present.    
1.5 Research Overview 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 provides a literature 
review of reliability growth models and system reliability approaches that are 
available in the literature.  Chapter 3 presents a Bayesian reliability growth projection 
model for continuous-type systems that can be applied to multiple systems under test 
with arbitrary corrective action strategies.  Chapter 4 develops a Bayesian method for 
assessing reliability using a combination of developmental reliability growth test data 
and operational reliability demonstration data.  Chapter 5 provides a Bayesian 
approach for reliability growth planning using the modeling concepts developed in 
Chapters 3 and 4.  Chapter 6 presents a Bayesian framework for developing prior 
distributions for system level reliability growth testing using a combination of 
historical data, component/subsystem testing, and physics-based modeling.  Chapter 7 
presents a case study that applies the assessment approaches in Chapters 3, 4 and 6 to 
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a complex system.  Chapter 8 discusses areas for future work involving extensions of 
the research presented here to discrete or one-shot systems.  Chapter 9 provides 
conclusions regarding the research conducted.  A brief overview of each chapter is 
presented below. 
1.5.1 Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
 A number of reliability growth models and reliability assessment techniques 
have been developed and presented in the literature.  Each has been developed for the 
purpose of providing reliability practitioners with the capability to estimate and 
manage an overall reliability program for a specific situation of concern.  This 
research covers not only the development of new reliability growth models, but also 
the more general probabilistic modeling of reliability.  For this reason the literature 
review in Chapter 2 is divided into three major components, the first involving 
reliability growth models, the second discussing reliability demonstration testing, and 
the third involving more general reliability assessment techniques.  The first section 
on reliability growth is further divided into sections on reliability growth planning, 
tracking, and projection.  The second section covers reliability testing, and the third 
section focuses on data combination techniques for reliability assessment.  
1.5.2 Chapter 3 – A Bayesian Model for Complex System Reliability Growth Under 
Arbitrary Corrective Actions 
 Chapter 3 presents a new method for projecting the reliability growth of a 
complex continuously operating system.  The model allows for arbitrary corrective 
action strategies, and it differs from other models of this type by using all available 
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data rather than failure mode first occurrence times only.  It also differs from other 
reliability growth projection models, in that it provides a complete inference 
framework via the posterior distribution on the system failure intensity.  A unique 
feature of this approach relative to other Bayesian techniques is the analytic 
expression for the failure intensity contribution from unobserved failure modes.  
Expressions for the estimating the initial failure intensity, growth potential failure 
intensity, and the cumulative number of failure modes expected in future testing are 
also developed.  Extensions to the basic framework are also developed.  The first 
accounts for multiple systems under test, and the second develops the posterior 
distribution while allowing for uncertainty on the FEF values that are assessed. Two 
separate goodness-of-fit procedures are presented for assessing the appropriateness of 
the underlying model assumptions.   
 The main assumptions of the approach are: 
1. The system is comprised of a large number of failure modes that are serial in 
nature; the occurrence of any failure mode results in failure of the system. 
2. Failure modes generate failures independently of one another. 
3. The failure intensity, or rate of occurrence of failure, for each mode is 
constant both before and after a corrective action is implemented.   
4. The resulting failure intensity after corrective action will be reduced from the 
initial value according to the assigned FEF. 
5. Corrective actions to failure modes do not introduce new failure modes into 
the system. 
6. Failure mode failure intensities have a common Gamma prior distribution. 
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7. Reliability testing will stress the system in an operationally relevant manner. 
1.5.3 Chapter 4 - Assessing Reliability Growth Using Developmental and 
Operational Test Data 
 Chapter 4 presents a new Bayesian reliability assessment model to mitigate 
the problem of reliability demonstration with fixed configuration testing alone.  The 
approach allows for the combination of developmental reliability growth test data 
with operational reliability test data within a Bayesian probabilistic framework.  The 
reliability data available throughout DT can provide a substantial amount of 
reliability information that can inform the assessment of reliability in OT.  The result 
is less uncertainty in the assessed reliability than would be present with operational 
test data alone.  Previous data combination methods do not explicitly model 
traditional reliability growth, which refers to the discovery and mitigation of failure 
modes within the system.  This process ultimately improves the underlying reliability 
of the system.  These models generally work with test data from individual test events 
to assess the system reliability at the current stage of development.  They do not 
generally consider information that may be available from previous testing, which is 
particularly useful when individual test events are limited in size.  Differences in the 
test environments and stressors must always be considered when combining data 
from different test events, and the model explicitly accounts for the degradation that 
usually exists when moving from developmental to OT.    Interval procedures and 
model assessment techniques are also presented to aid in practical application of the 
proposed method.  Analogous OC curve results are also developed, which can be 
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used to help plan reliability demonstration testing.  The approach developed in this 
chapter is used as the basis for the reliability growth planning model in Chapter 5. 
1.5.4 Chapter 5 – Reliability Growth Planning Using Combined Developmental and 
Operational Test Data for Reliability Demonstration 
  Reliability growth planning is a specific subset of reliability growth modeling 
that is useful for designing reliability test programs.  The models are developed and 
used before actual test data are available, but they are generally based on a 
corresponding assessment technique.  More recent planning models require the user 
to provide certain inputs that are important to the overall reliability growth program.  
These inputs include parameters such as the Management Strategy (MS), FEF, initial 
Mean Time between Failure (MTBF) value, and MTBF requirement. 
 System level reliability growth planning culminates in a reliability 
demonstration test to assess whether or not a new acquisition system has met its 
reliability requirement.  This demonstration is statistical in nature, and therefore 
requires management and understanding of the associated statistical risks of the 
planned test.  Traditional models consider the reliability demonstration event 
separately from the reliability growth, using an OC curve to manage these risks.  This 
often results in reliability design goals that are significantly higher than the reliability 
requirements themselves.  In many practical cases these goals are more than double 
the actual requirements, but they are purely a result of the statistical estimator being 
employed to assess the reliability.   
 This chapter presents a new reliability growth planning model that explicitly 
combines developmental and operational data from different test events for reliability 
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demonstration.  The model is a natural extension to the traditional reliability growth 
planning models that are currently used.  Differences in the test environments and 
stressors must always be considered when combining data from different test events, 
and the model explicitly accounts for the degradation that usually exists when moving 
from developmental to OT.  The proposed approach explicitly models the uncertainty 
in both the system failure intensity and the degradation between test environments 
within a Bayesian framework, allowing for narrower uncertainty intervals and 
reduced reliability goals for statistical demonstration.  The approach directly 
addresses many of the existing issues with the traditional OC curve based reliability 
growth planning.   
1.5.5 Chapter 6 – Development of Prior Information Using Lower-Level Data 
Sources 
 Chapter 6 presents a general methodology for developing prior information on 
the system reliability by combining lower level information that may be available 
before full system-level testing has been conducted.  System level data collected 
under operationally relevant testing is the most desirable information source for 
assessing system reliability, but during early stages of development this type of 
information may be unavailable.  There are often other sources of reliability related 
information that are available in the early stages of development of the system 
though, and in these cases it is possible to utilize these information sources to develop 
an early assessment of the system reliability.  When viewing the process of reliability 
assessment across the various stages of development of the system, assessment in this 
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manner serves as prior information that can be updated with the reliability growth 
models in Chapters 3 and 4 when system-level test data are available.  
 The reliability growth models are developed for complex repairable systems, 
where components and/or subsystems fail and are replaced throughout the life of the 
system.  The process of component failure and replacement is assumed to result from 
renewal processes across multiple potential failure mechanisms, which can then be 
used to develop estimates of component failure intensities via a Homogeneous 
Poisson Process.  A system level representation of the reliability structure, such as a 
reliability block diagram or fault tree, is then used as a means of combining the 
information on the components and subsystems.  The approach reduces the complex 
system structure into an equivalent series representation of failure modes, which 
aligns with the model assumptions in Chapters 3 and 4.  The connection between 
component or redundant block failures and their corresponding failure modes is also 
developed. 
 Uncertainty distributions are developed for each failure mode using data for 
the individual components or those within a redundant block.  Bayesian posterior 
distributions are used when component data are available, and a more general 
uncertainty distribution is developed when only physics-of-failure model results are 
available.   When the component information that is available does not accurately 
represent the reliability of the component within the new system (e.g. benign testing, 
historical data from similar system, etc.), a probabilistic technique is provided to 
account for the degraded reliability and additional uncertainty that is present due to 
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additional failure modes or mechanisms that are not accounted for in the data or 
modeling. 
1.5.6 Chapter 7 – Reliability Assessment Throughout Development: A Case Study  
 Chapter 7 presents a case study that combines the techniques of Chapters 3, 4, 
and 6 for a military system.  The approach in Chapter 6 is first used to develop the 
prior distribution on the system reliability before system-level testing is conducted.  
Historical data on the subsystems and components of the system are used along with 
stress-life modeling of fatigue on the driveshaft within the driveline of the system.   
 The prior distribution is then updated with test results from developmental 
reliability growth testing.  The posterior distribution after DT is developed using the 
model in Chapter 3.  The model in Chapter 4 is then used to update the DT posterior 
distribution with results from a limited operational test.  The case study demonstrates 
the practical use of the reliability assessment technique throughout development that 
is the major intent of this research. 
1.5.7 Chapter 8 – Future Work 
 Chapter 8 presents opportunities for future work in this area.  A discussion of 
the approach as applied to discrete-type (i.e. one shot devices) is presented.  A Beta 
prior distribution is used as the discrete analogue to the Gamma distribution, and a 
potential discrete extension to the reliability growth model in Chapter 3 is provided.  
A brief discussion of the analogous approach for combining developmental and 
operational test data in Chapter 4 is also provided, although analytic results are not 
developed.  The chapter closes by briefly discussing areas for further research 
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involving probabilistic modeling of failure mechanisms using information theory 
concepts. 
1.5.8 Chapter 9 - Conclusion 
 Chapter 9 provides a general discussion and conclusions for the work 
presented throughout the thesis.  The contributions of the research are restated and 
compared to the original objectives.  A summary of each chapter is also provided. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 A number of reliability growth models have been developed and presented in 
the past.  Each has been developed for the purpose of providing reliability 
practitioners with the capability to estimate and manage an overall reliability program 
for a specific situation of concern.  This research covers not only the development of 
new reliability growth models, but also the more general probabilistic assessment of 
system reliability.  For this reason the literature review is divided into three main 
sections.  The first reviews various reliability growth models in the literature, the 
second provides an overview of some recent papers on reliability demonstration 
testing, and the third discusses some recent system reliability assessment techniques.  
The first section on reliability growth is also further divided into sections on 
reliability growth planning, tracking, and projection.   
2.1 Reliability Growth planning Models 
2.1.1 Duane Model (1964) 
 The Duane Model [11] was developed based on the observation that changes 
to a system design to improve reliability resulted in a specific functional relationship 
when examining the cumulative failure rate of the system with respect to cumulative 
test time.  This relationship was seen to be linear when examined on a Log-Log scale, 
and is commonly known as the Duane Postulate.  The negative of the slope of the line 
is referred to as the “growth rate”, as it provides an indication of the rate at which the 
system reliability is improving.  The functional form underlying the Duane Model is 
utilized as a fundamental assumption in a number of reliability growth models that 
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are discussed later in this chapter.  The original intent of the model was for reliability 
growth tracking, but it is included under planning due to its importance in the 
development of a number of other reliability growth planning and tracking models.   
2.1.2 Selby and Miller’s Reliability Planning Management Model (1970) 
 Selby and Miller developed the Reliability Planning Management Model [12] 
in 1970.   The model provides an approach for planning and managing reliability 
programs for complex systems, and the basic concept behind the model is that the 
reliability growth of the system follows the Duane Postulate.  The Duane Postulate is 
a common assumption underlying many reliability growth models in the literature, 
but the model is the first known use of the Duane postulate for reliability growth 
planning. 
2.1.3 Military Handbook 189 Model (1982) 
 The reliability growth planning model presented in MIL-HDBK 189 [13] is 
based on the Power Law Non-Homogeneous Poisson Process (NHPP) Model first 
presented by Crow [14] in 1974.  As discussed below in the section on reliability 
growth tracking, the Power Law NHPP was the first stochastic application of the 
Duane Model.  The MIL-HDBK 189 Model is the second reliability growth planning 
model to be based on the Duane Postulate, and its purpose is to provide a plan for 
reliability improvement over a period of multiple phases of DT.  The model is one of 
the earliest to outline an approach for reliability growth management during a system 
reliability growth program, where the achieved reliability growth can be compared to 
the planned values from the model. 
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 The model develops an idealized reliability growth curve for a test-analyze-
fix-test (TAFT) process.  This process depicts the pattern of reliability improvement 
when corrective actions are applied to observed failure modes when the failure modes 
are discovered during the test.  The idealized growth curve is defined by a number of 
parameters that are common in reliability growth planning models.  These include the 
initial Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF), the length of the initial test phase, the 
goal MTBF at the end of the test program, the growth rate, and the total amount of 
testing in the entire reliability growth program.  The model also provides incremental 
reliability steps that depict the planned reliability targets for the various phases of the 
developmental test program.  The steps are taken as the average value of the idealized 
curve over the developmental test phases. 
 The AMSAA System Planning Model (SPLAN) [6] is a later extension of the 
MIL-HDBK 189 Model.  The SPLAN model requires only four of the five input 
parameters mentioned above, solving automatically for the remaining input. 
2.1.4 AMSAA Subsystem Planning Model (1992) 
 The AMSAA Subsystem Planning Model (SSPLAN) [15] developed 
reliability growth planning curves at the system or subsystem level, where the MTBF 
requirement is to be demonstrated with a desired level of statistical confidence.  The 
model determines testing and MTBF requirements for the subsystems of interest in 
order to have the system MTBF meet the desired requirement with confidence.  OC 
curve analysis is also provided [16], where the consumer and producer risks are 
developed in terms of the model parameters. 
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2.1.5 AMSAA Planning Model Based on Projection Methodology (2006) 
 The AMSAA Planning Model Based on Projection Methodology (PM2) [17] 
is the most recent reliability growth planning model to be developed through work at 
AMSAA.  The model was developed with the purpose of providing a reliability 
growth plan to aid in the management of developmental reliability programs for 
complex systems.  The main difference of this model the other planning models 
previously discussed is that it is independent of the NHPP assumption.  The model is 
instead based upon the “doubly-stochastic” process developed in the AMSAA 
Maturity Projection Model (AMPM) [18], and it uses parameters that can be directly 
influenced by reliability program management.  These include parameters such as the 
initial MTBF, MS, goal MTBF, total test time, average FEF, the number and 
placement of Corrective Action Periods (CAPs), and the planned developmental test 
hours. An additional input metric is the average lag-time associated with 
implementing corrective actions for observed failure modes.  PM2 is thought to be the 
first planning model to consider the impact of this lag time, which can significantly 
impact the reliability improvement that is actually realized during system 
development.  
 As with other planning models, PM2 also provides an idealized curve along 
with incremental reliability steps for specific test phases.  An additional difference 
with PM2 is that the incremental steps are developed while applying the corrective 
action lag time, which results in them falling entirely below the idealized reliability 
growth curve.  These steps are based on the realization that a majority of corrective 
actions to failure modes observed during test events are made during CAPs between 
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the test phases.  United States Army Policy [5] has recently specified PM2 as the 
preferred reliability growth planning model for developmental reliability programs 
for complex military systems.   
2.1.6 Crow Extended Model for Reliability Growth Planning (2010) 
 The Crow Extended Planning Model [19] is a modified and improved version 
of the MIL-HDBK 189 model, and is based on the projection model of the same name 
[20].  It utilizes many of the advancements first developed in the PM2 model, and the 
input parameters are mainly the same.  These include parameters such as the initial 
MTBF, MS, goal MTBF, total test time, average FEF, the number and placement of 
CAPs, the planned developmental test hours, and the average lag-time associated with 
implementing corrective actions for observed failure modes.  An additional input 
known as the discovery Beta is also required, which describes the rate at which new 
correctable modes will be discovered during testing.  Because of the inherent 
connection to the NHPP associated with the MIL-HDBK 189 Model, a discovery 
Beta values less than one indicates reliability growth is occurring. 
2.1.7 Hall Discrete Planning Model Based on Projection Methodology (2011) 
 The Planning Model Based on Projection Methodology – Discrete (PM2-
Discrete) [21] was developed as an analogue to the PM2 model developed for 
continuous systems.  The model is based on underlying reliability growth projection 
methodology developed by Hall [22] to address the lack of projection models for 
discrete one-shot type systems.  The model provides a number of uses for reliability 
program managers, such as determining planned reliability achievement for available 
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program resources, serving as a baseline target which realized reliability values can 
be compared against, and quantifying the feasibility of a test program for achieving 
final reliability goals.  The model also provides a series of useful metrics associated 
with the reliability growth of the system. 
2.2 Reliability Growth Projection Models 
2.2.1 Corcoran, Weingarten, Zehna Model (1964) 
 Corcoran, Weingarten and Zehna [23] developed the first model for estimating 
reliability after corrective action. The approach was developed with consideration to 
estimating reliability in the final stage of development of an “expensive item.” The 
reliability projection is suitable in cases where corrective actions are installed at the 
end of a test consisting of N independent trials.  The trial outcomes are assumed to 
follow a multinomial distribution with parameters N (total number of trials), q0 
(unknown success probability), and pi (unknown failure probability for failure mode i 
= 1, ..., k ).  The assumption of a multinomial model implies that at most one failure 
mode can occur per trial.  An exact expression for the system reliability is presented, 
and comparisons of various estimators are provided.  
2.2.2 AMSAA Crow Projection Model (1982) 
 The AMSAA Crow Projection Model [24] uses the NHPP interpretation of the 
Duane Postulate to describe the rate of occurrence of failure modes in the system.  
The intent of the model is to project the growth in reliability that would be seen at the 
beginning of the next phase of testing following implementation of planned corrective 
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actions.  In this regard, the model assumes that all corrective actions are delayed until 
the end of the current test phase.  The model is also one of the first to introduce the 
concept of the reliability growth potential, which is the theoretical upper limit on 
reliability that can be achieved via the test-fix-test reliability growth paradigm.  This 
concept is an important factor that governs reliability growth programs in general, 
and it is commonly considered and monitored for current reliability growth programs 
in the U.S. Department of Defense.  Two separate goodness-of-fit procedures are 
available, a Cramer Von-Mises test and Chi-Squared test, but no interval procedures 
have been published. 
2.2.3 AMSAA Maturity Projection Model (1995) 
 Instead of a direct NHPP assumption, the AMSAA Maturity Projection Model 
(AMPM) [18] uses a “doubly-stochastic” process to describe the underlying behavior 
of the system failure intensity.  The model assumes that the system is comprised of a 
number of failure modes, with the collection of mode failure rates being realizations 
from a common Gamma distribution.  The time between failures for each mode is 
then assumed to be Exponential.  AMPM is the first projection model to allow for 
arbitrary corrective actions, as the corrective actions can occur during the test or be 
delayed until after the test.  Because of this it uses only the first occurrences of each 
failure mode to develop failure intensity estimates.  The AMPM is also the underlying 
methodology on which the PM2 reliability growth planning model [17] is founded. 
 In addition to the system level failure intensity, the model also provides 
estimates for the expected number of observed failure modes in later testing, the rate 
of occurrence of new failure modes, and the percent of the initial failure intensity 
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comprised of the modes that have been surfaced.  Goodness of fit procedures are 
available using the expected number of failure modes, but no confidence intervals 
have been developed to date. 
2.2.4 Clark Projection Model (1999) 
 The projection model proposed by Clark [25] was developed due to the 
recognition that many programs do not achieve significant reliability growth until late 
in the program near production.  The proposed reasoning for this occurrence is the 
lack of focus on reliability early in the development of a new system.  The Clark 
model is an extended version of the AMSAA Crow projection model [24] that has 
two main differences.  The first is that the original model is modified to allow for 
arbitrary corrective actions, and the second is the addition of an inherent failure rate 
term that allows for decisions to be made regarding future reliability investment.  If 
the current reliability is too close to the maximum possible value, it may not be cost 
effective to continue to invest in further reliability improvement through test-fix-test 
processes.  
2.2.5 AMSAA Maturity Projection Model – Stein (2004) 
 The AMSAA Maturity Projection Model – Stein (AMPM-Stein) [26] was 
developed as an extension to AMPM [18].  The extension does limit one of the 
original assumptions of the model, as the corrective actions in this case must be 
delayed until after the test.  The model uses the same underlying theoretical structure 
as the original AMPM, but additional data are used to develop the model estimates.  
All of the data, both first and repeat occurrence times, are used to develop shrinkage 
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estimates, or Stein estimates, [27] to develop the model.  The benefit of the approach 
is that the use of the additional data provides an increase in the accuracy of the 
resulting estimates.  The shrinkage estimation minimizes the mean square error value, 
which provides an immediate connection to Bayesian modeling using squared error 
loss functions.  As with the original AMPM, goodness of fit procedures are available, 
but no confidence interval methods have been reported to date. 
2.2.6 Crow Extended Model (2004) 
 The Crow Extended Model [20] was developed to model arbitrary corrective 
action strategies using the previously existing AMSAA-Crow NHPP modeling 
framework.  The Extended Model is a straightforward combination of the AMSAA 
Tracking Model [28] and the AMSAA Crow Projection Model [24].  Failure Modes 
are classified using the traditional A-mode and B-mode distinction, where A-modes 
are those failure modes that will not be addressed via corrective action.  The B-modes 
are further divided into BC-modes and BD-modes, with BC-modes having corrective 
actions implemented during the test phase and BD-modes having the corrective action 
delayed until after the test is complete.  The model uses all A, BC, and BD-mode 
failures in the AMSAA Tracking Model to get an estimate of the reliability growth 
that occurs during the test.  The BD-mode failure intensity is then estimated using the 
maximum likelihood estimate nBD/T for nBD failures in test time T.  Because the BD-
mode corrective actions are delayed, their growth contribution during the test must be 
subtracted from the Tracking Model estimate and replaced with a more appropriate 
estimator.  The BD-mode failure intensity after corrective action is then estimated 
with the AMSAA Crow Projection Model [24].  The overall result for the Extended 
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Model then subtracts the BD-mode maximum likelihood estimate nBD/T from the 
Tracking Model result and replaces it with the AMSAA Crow Projection Model 
result.   
 The model has been shown through simulation study [7] to provide extremely 
optimistic results when a large proportion of corrective actions are delayed.  There is 
also a logical discrepancy by treating the A and BD-modes together with the BC-
modes with the AMSAA Tracking Model, which assumes that reliability growth is 
occurring because failure modes are being addressed during the test.  The attempt to 
overcome the issue by subtracting out the BD-mode contribution leaves a bias in the 
model that can provide systemically optimistic results. 
2.2.7 Hall Discrete Projection Model (2008)  
 The discrete reliability growth projection model proposed by Hall [29],[30] is 
a discrete counterpart to the AMPM-Stein Model [26].  The model uses Stein-
estimation procedures [27] to develop shrinkage estimates for the failure intensity of 
unobserved failure modes in the system.  All corrective actions are delayed until the 
end of the current test phase, and more than one failure mode can occur on a given 
trial during the test.   
 Analogous to the AMPM Model [18], the discrete method proposed by Hall 
uses a geometric likelihood for the first occurrence trial of an observed failure mode, 
and the mode probabilities of failure are assumed to be a realization from an 
underlying Beta distribution.  Both Method of Moments and Maximum Likelihood 
Estimators are provided, and results are developed for systems with a known number 
of failure modes and those assumed to be complex with a large number of modes.  A 
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number of associated management metrics are also presented, such as the expected 
number of new failure modes to be observed during additional testing, the rate of 
occurrence of new failure modes, and the reliability growth potential of the system.  
Model performance is also studied via Monte Carlo simulation, and results indicate 
that performance is reasonable with small errors in the projection estimates. 
2.2.8 Bayesian Methodology for Discrete Reliability Growth (2009) 
 The discrete reliability growth methodology presented by Hall and Mosleh in 
[31] was developed as an additional estimation procedure to those first presented in 
[22] and [29].  The approach again uses the underlying theoretical assumption of 
mode failure probabilities as realizations from an underlying Beta distribution.  
Additional assumptions include a Binomial distribution for observed failures during 
test, with all corrective actions delayed until the end of the testing.   
 The Bayesian inference in the model is used only to estimate the parameters 
of the underlying Beta distribution.  Squared error loss is used along with a constant 
prior, and numerical methods are used to evaluate the resulting posterior.  Simulation 
methods are also used to generate uncertainty distributions on each of the 
management metrics developed in [29] and [30].   
2.2.9 Hall, Ellner, Mosleh Discrete Reliability Growth Projection Model (2010)  
 The model presented in [22] uses the underlying assumption of mode failure 
probabilities as realizations from a Beta distribution.  The model differs from the 
previously presented discrete models though, as it allows for arbitrary corrective 
actions to occur either during or directly after the test.  Only failure mode first 
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occurrence trials are used, along with the corresponding FEF for each failure mode.  
Because only the first occurrence of each failure mode is used, the Geometric 
distribution is used to model the mode first occurrences.  Goodness-of-fit procedures 
are presented in order to validate the model assumptions.   
 Maximum likelihood estimates are developed for the parameters of the Beta 
distribution, with results given for a finite number of failure modes and a complex 
system consisting of a large number of failure modes.  A number of management 
metrics and model equations are also developed, such as the reliability growth 
potential, the expected number of new failure modes, and the fraction of the initial 
failure probability surfaced during the testing. 
2.3 Reliability Growth Tracking 
2.3.1 Weiss’s Reliability Growth Model (1956) 
 Weiss [32] provided an early method for modeling the reliability growth of 
guided-missile systems.   The approach assumed Poisson failures for the system, with 
the system’s Mean Time to Failure (MTTF) changing over successive tests as failure 
modes were observed and mitigated. The approach is flexible enough to allow for 
both increasing and decreasing reliability as a function of time.  The distribution of 
the time-to-failure estimator is provided to allow for calculations on the uncertainty.   
2.3.2 Lloyd and Lipow’s Reliability Growth Model (1962) 
 Lloyd and Lipow [33] provide a reliability growth model for system containing 
a single failure mode. Discrete test events are used, with corrective actions made to 
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the system after any failures.  The approach allows for corrective actions to be 




R n( ) =1 − a exp −b n −1( )[ ],     (1) 
where a and b are model parameters that are estimated from the data.  Other 
functional forms of potential reliability growth models are also discussed. 
2.3.3 Cox and Lewis’s Reliability Growth Model (1966) 
 Cox and Lewis [34] proposed an early NHPP model.  The functional form is 
defined by  
 
 
m t( ) = exp at + b[ ],     (2) 
where a and b are estimated from the test data.  Reliability growth occurs when a is 
less then zero.  Goodness-of-fit procedures are also presented for model assessment. 
2.3.4 Barlow and Scheuer Reliability Growth During a Development Testing 
Program (1966) 
 Barlow and Scheuer [35] present a reliability growth model involving K 
stages of DT for a system.  A trinomial approach is used to define success and failure, 
with failure further divided into inherent and assignable cause categories.  Inherent 
failures are defined as “those which reflect the state-of-the-art and whose elimination 
would require an advancement thereof”, and assignable cause failures are defined as 
failures which can be corrected through design or operational corrective actions.  The 
reliability of the system in the ith stage of testing is given by ri = 1 – q0 - qi, where q0 
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is the probability of an inherent failure and qi is the probability of assignable cause 
failure at the ith stage.  Estimates of the failure probabilities and reliability are 
presented using the trinomial framework.  A caution is also provided regarding 
interpretation and use of the resulting estimates.  The authors point out that assignable 
cause failures may "mask" inherent failures and vice versa, and recommend that the 
reliability estimate is the only one that should be “trusted”. 
2.3.5 Pollock’s Bayesian Reliability Growth Model (1968) 
 Pollock’s model for reliability growth [36] provides estimated improvements 
in reliability due to corrective actions that are implemented for the system.  The 
model assumes a decreasing trend in the failure rate for each system, and the 
probability of successful repair is specified in order to quantify the probability of 
transitioning from a failed state to a repaired state.  The projections are developed for 
both continuous and discrete systems with separate prior distributions used for before 
and after corrective actions.  Separate estimation procedures are also given for before 
and after testing and corrective actions have been performed. 
 The model contains concepts that are similar in application and intent to the 
FEF values that are used in more recent reliability growth projection models, 
although they are somewhat more restrictive in the treatment of corrective actions.  
Pollock’s µ is equivalent to the remaining failure rate after a corrective action has 
been applied, which is given by (1-d)λ for FEF d and failure rate λ.  The parameter a 
is the repair probability, or the probability of the failure rate decreasing to µ.  When 
applied together, these terms do allow for the possibility of non-effective corrective 
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actions to be made to the system.  They do model a binary process though, as the 
corrective action is either successful or it is not, and levels of imperfect corrective 
actions cannot be considered.  Current approaches using FEF values now allow for 
varying degrees of corrective action effectiveness represented by the assigned value 
of the FEF for the specified failure mode. 
2.3.6 Littlewood and Verrall Bayesian Reliability Growth Model (1973) 
 The Bayesian reliability growth model proposed by Littlewood and Verrall in 
[37] was originally developed for computer software.  The concepts underlying the 
model are introduced within the software development context, but they are easily 
applicable to a wide variety of situations.  The model assumes a Gamma-Exponential 
process, with Exponential time between failures and failure rates distributed via the 
Gamma distribution.   
 The scale parameter of the Gamma is the focus of the reliability growth in the 
model.  The parameter is allowed to vary with time, which implicitly accounts for the 
effectiveness of corrective actions that are implemented.  Estimation of the Gamma 
scale parameter is also discussed, and numerical procedures are provided along with a 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness of fit approach that eliminates that need for 
numerical integration procedures. 
2.3.7 Crow’s Reliability Growth Tracking Model (1974) 
 Crow’s tracking model [14] is a probabilistic extension of the Duane model 
[11].  The same log-linear relationship of the Duane model is used to describe the 
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underlying functional form of the tracking model.  The probabilistic extension treats 
this relationship as a NHPP.  The mean value function of the NHPP is given as  
 
µ t( ) = λtβ .     (3) 
The assumption of an NHPP for the number of failures allowed for the development 
of statistical estimators and associated goodness-of-fit tests, which gave more 
statistical rigor to the repairable systems reliability growth that was covered by the 
Duane model.  The model is also known as the “Weibull Process” due to the 
mathematical property that the time to first failure in the assumed NHPP is a Weibull 
random variable.  Another common name is the “Power Law Process”, which is a 
direct result of the functional form of the NHPP. 
 This approach to reliability growth tracking became the foundation for a 
number of later models, and the same underlying NHPP form was used for an 
assortment of planning, tracking, and projection models.  Crow continued to expand 
upon the original development, adding confidence bounds on the NHPP parameters 
and associated MTBF, and extensions to include both time-truncated and failure-
truncated testing.  Straightforward extensions were later provided to account for 
multiple identical systems under test. 
2.3.8 Smith’s Bayesian Note on Reliability Growth during Development Testing 
(1977) 
 This short paper [38] provides a Bayesian method for estimating the final 
reliability that is achieved after multiple Binomial tests have been conducted.  
Uniform prior distributions are used on the successive Binomial parameters.  The 
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marginal distribution for the probability of success on the last configuration of the 
system is developed.  The result is a convex combination Beta functions, and a 
numerical example is provided for comparison with other previously developed 
techniques. 
2.3.9 Fard and Dietrich’s Bayes Reliability Growth Model for Development Testing 
(1987) 
 Fard and Dietrich [39] provide a correction to the model proposed by Smith 
[38].  The assumptions surrounding the test program are the same as those originally 
used by Smith: the development consists of a series of binomial tests, the reliability is 
assumed to be non-decreasing, and the prior distributions for each of the successive 
reliabilities are uniform.  An example is provided for comparison, and a simulation 
study is also presented to examine the performance of the corrected estimator.  The 
model is shown to perform as good or better than Read’s Barlow Sheuer model, and 
the mean squared error decreases significantly as the number of test stages is 
increased. 
2.3.10 Engelhart and Bain’s Prediction Intervals for the Weibull Process (1978) 
 Engelhart and Bain [40] provide a short paper on prediction intervals for the 
model form proposed by Crow in [14].  The intent of the paper is to provide statistical 
inference on the kth future observation of the model process, to include point 
estimates and confidence intervals.  Results are derived with the intent of avoiding 
numerical integration.  For values other than k = 1, simplified approximations are 
provided based on available Chi-Squared percentile calculations.  An example 
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application is also provided, with comparisons between the assumed Weibull process 
and an exponential process model. 
2.3.11 Barlow Scheuer Reliability Growth from Bayesian Viewpoint (1978) 
 Weinrich and Gross [41] present the Barlow-Scheuer Reliability Growth 
Model using Bayesian methods for estimation.  As in the Barlow-Scheuer Model 
[36], failures are assigned to two categories: inherent failures and assignable-cause 
failures.  As in the original version of the model, this assignment is similar to current 
reliability growth models that divide failure modes into A and B modes, where A 
modes are those inherent failure modes that will not receive a corrective action and B 
modes are those failure modes for which a corrective action will be implemented 
when observed.  Dirichlet priors are used for the three possible outcomes of 
assignable cause failure, inherent failure, or success. 
 The model assumes that testing occurs in independent stages, but differs from 
the original version in the treatment of assignable cause failures.  When a corrective 
action is implemented for an assignable cause failure, the original Barlow-Sheuer 
model redistributed the failure probability into the success category.  The Bayesian 
version is somewhat more conservative in its approach though, as it allows for the 
assignable cause probability to be redistributed among the other causes of failure 
along with the success.  This treatment still assumes that the corrective action is 
perfect, with the failure probability for the specific failure reduced to zero after the 
corrective action occurs. 
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2.3.12 Langberg and Proschan’s Relability Growth Involving Dependent 
Components (1979) 
 Langberg and Proschan [42] provide a theoretical discussion on modeling 
reliability growth when dependency may exist between components within the 
system.  The approach involves transforming the problem involving dependency into 
an equivalent model with independence.  Consistency between the limiting forms of 
the dependent and independent approaches is demonstrated, but no practical examples 
are provided. 
2.3.13 Goel and Okumoto Time Dependent Error-Detection Rate Model for Software 
Reliability and Other Performance Measures (1979) 
 Goel and Okumoto [43] provide a NHPP model for modeling the occurrence 
of software failures.    The objective of the approach is to provide a parsimonious 
model with parameters that have an underlying physical interpretation while also 
yielding a quantitative assessment of software performance.  The main assumption is 
a standard NHPP, and the mean value function is motivated by assuming 
proportionality to the expected number of unobserved failures in the code.  This 
assumption results in a difference equation that can be easily solved to find the mean 
value function of  
 
µ t( ) = a 1 − e−bt( ).      (4) 
The parameter b is equal to the ratio of detected failures to remaining failures, which 
fits the original intent of the model. 
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 Various performance measures of interest are derived along with MLEs for 
the model parameters.  An example application is provided, and comparisons are 
made between the proposed NHPP and the Jelinski-Moranda model [44].  The results 
show that the NHPP fits the example failure data well, and the performance measures 
are also shown to be more conservative than the Jelinski-Moranda approach. 
2.3.14 Crow’s Discrete Reliability Growth Tracking Model (1983) 
 Crow’s discrete reliability growth tracking model [45] can be considered as 
the discrete analogue of the continuous version [14] first developed in 1974.   The 
model uses the same NHPP assumption for the cumulative number of failures as the 
continuous version.  This allows for development of expressions that describe the 
change in probability of failure from configuration to configuration.   Statistical 
estimators and associated goodness-of-fit metrics are developed for the model.  
Results are also provided for both grouped data (i.e. where each configuration 
involves multiple test trials) and trial-by-trial data. 
2.3.15 Littlewood’s Rationale for a Modified Duane Model (1984) 
 Littlewood [46] provides a discussion of the Duane Model and its associated 
Power Law NHPP.  Two undesirable properties are noted: the first being that the rate-
of-occurrence of failiures (ROCOF) is infinite at time t = 0, and the second being that 
the ROCOF is zero as the time t goes infinity.  A straightforward modification to 
handle the second problem is proposed.   It involves the addition of a constant term to 
represent the rate of occurrence of failures that cannot be removed from the system, 
and no further development is provided.   
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 The paper instead focuses on the first problem of an infinite ROCOF at time 
zero.  The proposed approach is to model the occurrence of independent 
exponentially distributed faults with rates that are realizations of a Gamma 
distribution.  No estimation procedures or associated goodness-of-fit procedures are 
presented.  The resulting NHPP is a modified Power Law with a finite value of the 
ROCOF at time zero.  This approach appears to be similar in concept to Littlewood 
and Verral [37], in that it examines the reliability on a failure or fault mode basis.  
The NHPP is used in this case to describe the behavior between the faults rather than 
the failures themselves.  An additional interesting point in the paper is the further 
discussion involving the use of the NHPP to model the occurrences of failures in a 
reliability growth setting.  It is noted that the process of observing and then correcting 
a failure does not result in independent increments, and therefore the assumption of 
an NHPP for failure occurrences in reliability growth is not appropriate.   
2.3.16 Robinson and Dietrich’s Nonparametric Bayes Reliability Growth Model 
(1989) 
 Robinson and Dietrich [47] present a nonparametric approach to assessing the 
reliability growth of a system using Bayesian methods.  The main model assumptions 
are Exponential times between failure and non-decreasing reliability over successive 
stages of testing.  Each stage of testing is broken into distinct test periods.  General 
expressions for the moments of the resulting posterior distribution on the failure 
intensity are provided, along with an additional recursive estimation formula.  A 
numerical example is provided, and simulation studies are presented to compare the 
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model performance to the Power Law model and a previously developed 
nonparametric technique. 
2.3.17 Bayes Inference for Power Law Non-Homogeneous Poisson Process (1989) 
 Guida, Calabria, and Pulcini provide a Monte Carlo simulation study of the 
power law NHPP using Bayesian procedures [48].  Multiple cases are presented, each 
assuming different non-informative and informative priors for the α and β parameters 
in the NHPP parameterized as  
 

















.      (5) 
The first non-informative case uses a joint Jeffrey’s prior for both of the parameters, 
and a second non-informative case uses a uniform prior for β and a Jeffrey’s prior for 
α.  Informative priors for the NHPP parameters are developed by using a Gamma 
distribution to describe the expected number of failures in the time interval given by  
 









.     (6) 
  The simulation comparison results indicate that the Bayesian methods provide 
better estimates than the classical maximum likelihood estimators.  A number of 
cases were examined, and the benefits of the Bayesian methods were observed even 
in cases where there was a modest amount of prior information or even weak prior 
information. 
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2.3.18 Singpurwalla and Soyer’s Non-Homogeneous Autoregressive Processes for 
Tracking (Software) Reliability Growth, and Their Bayesian Analysis (1992)  
 Singpurwalla and Soyer [49] present a reliability growth model where the life 
between successive modifications to the system is assumed to be log-normally 
distributed.  The reliability growth or decay is described by a power law non-
homogeneous autoregressive process given as  
 
Xt = Xt −1
θ tε t ,     (7) 
where θt implies growth or decay and εt is log-normally distributed. 
 Two Bayesian formulations are considered, which relax constraints on the 
existence of least-squares estimators for higher order processes (i.e. greater than one).  
The first approach assumes exchangeability of coefficients in the prior distribution, 
while the second imposes an autoregressive relationship between the successive 
values of θt. The two approaches are compared using software reliability data, and 
likelihood ratio results show that the exchangeable prior approach is preferred over 
the autoregressive approach.  
2.3.19 Mazzuchi and Soyer’s Reliability Assessment and Prediction During Product 
Development (1992) 
 Mazzuchi and Soyer [50] present a Bayesian assessment approach for discrete 
type systems.  The underlying motivation for the approach is a test-fix-test approach 
involving multiple identical trials until a failure is observed.  Upon observation the 
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failure is addressed through a modification to the system that results in increased 
reliability.   
 The trials can therefore be modeled with a geometric likelihood, with the 
additional assumption that the sequence of reliability values resulting from successive 
modifications is non-decreasing.  An ordered Dirichlet distribution is used for the 
prior over the sequence of reliability values, resulting in Beta marginal distributions.  
Posterior results are developed along with prior predictive analysis.  Prior formulation 
through expert elicitation and feedback is also discussed in the context of the ordered 
Dirichlet approach.   
2.3.20 Fries Discrete Learning Curve Model (1993) 
 Fries [51] presents a discrete reliability growth tracking model that utilizes a 
learning curve approach to model the improvement in reliability over time.  
Derivations and comparisons of the approach are made, along with those of the model 
proposed by Crow in [45].  Approximate MLE procedures are presented, along with 
extensions that separate failures into two categories: those for which the root-cause is 
understood, and those for which the underlying cause remains unknown.  Examples 
are used to demonstrate the application of the approach. 
2.3.21 Fakre-Zakeri and Slud’s Mixture Models for Reliability of Software with 
Imperfect Debugging: Identifiability of Parameters (1995) 
 Fakre-Zakeri and Slud [52] present a mixture model approach for modeling 
the reliability of software when bugs are instantaneously detected and removed from 
the system.  The model is developed in a general manner, treating bug failure rates as 
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realizations from a common mixing distribution.  Many of the models in literature are 
shown to be examples of this structure that vary in the details of the mixture model or 
assumptions surrounding the correction of the bugs.  The number of bugs is assumed 
to fixed and unknown, but the only observable data during test is the overall result 
from a superposition of independent counting processes for each of the bugs.  
Debugging, or corrective actions for each observed bug, is assumed to remove bugs 
imperfectly or even introduce new bugs into the system with a certain probability p. 
 The paper discusses results from a probabilistic viewpoint, paying particular 
attention to the identifiability of the parameters of the potential probabilistic models.  
It is shown that the mixture model assumption allows for identifiable parameters, 
including the probability of introducing a new bug, when the mixture model is the 
widely used Gamma-Exponential type.  No statistical estimators or goodness-of-fit 
approaches are given, but references to many of the commonly used specific mixture 
model forms are given. 
2.3.22 AMSAA Subsystem Tracking Model (1996) 
 The AMSAA Subsystem Tracking Model (SSTRACK) [6] is a generalization 
of Crow’s reliability growth tracking model [14] that explicitly handles data from 
multiple subsystems.  The same underlying Power Law NHPP assumption is used for 
each of the subsystems.  The subsystems are assumed to be serial in structure, and the 
results are combined using the Lindstrom-Madden method [33] for combining data.  
Confidence intervals and goodness-of-fit procedures are provided along with 
statistical estimates of the model parameters.  
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2.3.23 Erklani, Mazzuchi, and Soyer’s Bayesian Computations for a Class of 
Reliability Growth Models (1998) 
 Erklani, Mazzuchi, and Soyer [53] present a Bayesian approach for a broad 
class of reliability growth models, including both continuous and discrete approaches.  
The model first proposed by Mazzuchi and Soyer [50] is presented, along with an 
extension of this approach to exponential and Weibull data.  The reliability changes 
are assumed to non-decreasing for the discrete version of the model, and the 
continuous data case is shown to be a special case of this assumption by 
reparameterizing the likelihood.  This allows for the use of the same ordered Dirichlet 
prior distribution for each case. 
 Development of the priors through expert elicitation is discussed, and 
difficulties in the various posterior calculations are also noted.  These difficulties 
provide motivation for the use of Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods for posterior 
analysis, and Gibbs sampling is demonstrated for each of the proposed approaches.  
Numerical examples are given along with comparisons between each of the potential 
model approaches. 
2.3.24 Walls and Quigley’s Building Prior Distributions for Bayesian Reliability 
Growth Modeling (2001) 
 Walls and Quigley [54] discuss an approach for eliciting expert opinion to 
develop appropriate prior distributions to support reliability growth modeling.  
Suggestions are given for eliminating possible bias in the elicitation, along with 
practical guidance for using the approach within a reliability growth program.  The 
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elicitation process consists of a five-stage approach.  The stages span the entirety of 
the process from development of data collection methods to mathematical 
aggregation of the results in the reliability growth analysis within a feedback loop.  
Specific guidance is also provided for three different roles within the process:  the 
assessor who collects and analyzes the reliability growth data, the management expert 
who will make decisions involving the reliability program, and the technical expert 
who can provide judgment on the various aspects of the system. 
2.3.25 Yu, Tian, and Tang’s Bayesian Predictive Analyses for Nonhomogeneous 
Poisson Processes with Power Law (2007) 
 Yu, Tian, and Tang [55] present a Bayesian approach to modeling reliability 
growth using the Power Law NHPP.  Their work focuses on the predictive capability 
of the model, rather than the statistical inference itself.  The motivation cited is the 
increasing demand for expensive and highly reliable systems in the commercial and 
military industries.  This paper is in many ways a Bayesian analogue to the work first 
completed by Engelhart and Bain [40]. 
 Results are developed for both a single system under test and two systems 
under test.  Posterior and predictive distributions are also developed for two cases, 
with focus on the probability of observing a future number of failures during a test 
period.  The first assumes the shape parameter of the Power Law NHPP is known, 
and the second assumes both parameters are unknown.  Examples are given in order 
to compare the performance of the model assumptions.  The probability of observing 
at most k failures is shown to converge for relatively small values of k for each 
assumed treatment of the shape parameter. 
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2.3.26 Li, Chang, and Chen’s Building Reliability Growth Models Using Sequential 
Experiments (2010) 
 Li, Chang, and Chen [56] present a sequential Bayesian approach to model the 
reliability improvement of a system over a series of reliability growth tests.  Failure 
times are treated as Weibull random variables, with the shape parameter 0 < β < 1to 
match the Weibull Process NHPP under reliability growth conditions.  A reduced bias 
adjustment procedure is used to sequentially develop empirical Bayes estimates of the 
parameters of the Weibull likelihood for the first test phase, and the posterior results 
are used for the prior distribution in successive phases of testing.  Comparisons are 
made with Crow’s reliability growth tracking model [14], and the proposed approach 
is shown to provide results that are as good as Crow’s model while using much 
smaller datasets. 
2.3.27 Xing, Wu, Jiang, and Liu’s Dynamic Bayesian Evaluation Method for System 
Reliability Growth Based on In-Time Correction (2010) 
 Xing, Wu, Jiang, and Liu [57] present a discrete reliability growth approach 
that allows for important information from the development process to be 
incorporated into the model.  As in other papers, the motivation for the model is the 
development of highly reliable systems under difficult fiscal and time constraints.  
The Power Law process for discrete reliability growth developed by Crow in [45] is 
used again here to describe the growth process, and results are derived for both trial-
by-trial and configuration-by-configuration development. 
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 A Bayesian updating process is developed, using maximum entropy to 
develop the prior distribution on the system reliability by assuming that the first two 
moments are known.  A Beta distribution is then used to approximate the prior and 
allow for simple conjugate updating through the underlying Beta-Binomial process.   
2.3.28 Quigley and Walls Reliability Inference Mixing Bayes and Empirical Bayes 
(2011)  
 Quigley and Walls [58] present an approach to assessing reliability by 
combining Bayes and empirical Bayes methods.  The system is assumed to be 
undergoing design changes due to identified failure modes and possible new 
innovation.  Relevant operational data is assumed to exist as well, such as in 
organizations that develop families of similar products.  The method assumes that the 
system is sufficiently complex, in that it contains a large number of potential 
engineering concerns, or failure modes.  The system can also be divided into mutually 
exclusive and conditionally independent concerns.  System failure occurs when the 
first concern is realized during test, indicating a serial relationship between the 
modes.   
 Subjective Bayes techniques are used to construct prior distributions for the 
number of concerns in the system, and empirical Bayes is used to develop the 
distribution for the time to occurrence of a specific concern.  The empirical Bayes 
approach pools the failure data across multiple classes of concerns to assess the 
covariance structure between the classes of concerns.  A unique distribution for each 
class is then provided to use in the system reliability calculation.  An aerospace 
design example is provided to illustrate the approach. 
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2.3.29 Bichon, McFarland, and Mahadevan’s Surrogate Models for Reliability 
Analysis with Multiple Failure Modes (2011) 
 Bichon, McFarland, and Mahadevan [59] present a method for computing the 
reliability of a system with multiple failure modes through a surrogate model. The 
approach considers the overall reliability of a system with multiple failure modes in 
either a series or parallel configuration.  A response function is also assumed for each 
failure mode, where the mode is considered to have occurred when the response value 
surpasses a predefined threshold.  A Gaussian process regression model is then used 
as a surrogate in a global reliability analysis approach that considers the overall 
behavior of the various response functions for the failure modes.   
2.3.30 Strunz and Herrmann’s Planning, Tracking, and Projecting Reliability 
Growth: A Bayesian Approach (2012) 
 Strunz and Herrmann [60] present a unique Bayesian approach to reliability 
growth tracking using lower level data aggregation for liquid rocket engines.  A Beta 
prior distribution is used for each of the functional nodes in the functional block 
diagram that describes the system behavior.  The number of equivalent trials and 
failures are developed through consideration of two main failure mechanisms and the 
relationship between the testing profiles and mission profiles.  Acceleration factors 
are also employed to increase the accuracy of the prior distribution. 
 Markov Chain Monte Carlo techniques are used to develop the posteriors for 
each node, subsystem, and system defined in the block diagram.  The technique is 
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demonstrated on a liquid rocket reliability test program that includes a contractual 
reliability requirement. 
2.3.31 Pievatolo, Ruggeri, and Soyer’s Bayesian Hidden Markov Model for 
Imperfect Debugging (2012) 
 Pievatolo, Ruggeri, and Soyer [61] consider software failures within an 
imperfect debugging process.  The introduction of bugs into the software is 
considered to be a latent or unobservable process, which allows for the use of latent 
variables within a hidden Markov model.  The states within the model are the bug 
rates of occurrence at specified times in the testing.   
 A Bayesian approach is used, where each row of the state transition matrix 
follows a Dirichlet distribution and the bug rates of occurrence follow Gamma prior 
distributions.  The initial states are also assumed to follow a uniform prior 
distribution, meaning that each is equally likely a priori.  The joint posterior of the 
states, bug occurrence rates, and transition probabilities is calculated through Gibbs 
sampling.  An approach for estimating the unknown number of states is also provided 
utilizing the marginal likelihood is also presented. 
2.3.32 H. Okamura, et. al’s Software Reliability Growth Models with Normal Failure 
Time Distributions (2013) 
 Okamura, Dohi, and Osaki [62] present a model for software reliability 
growth that models failure times using the Normal distribution.  The authors discuss 
the problem of modeling software reliability growth with the large number of models 
that are available in the literature.  The model selection process is reduced to one of 
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choosing the appropriate failure time distribution from a number of well known 
statistical candidates, of which the Normal distribution has not been previously 
considered.  The truncated Normal and the LogNormal are both developed for 
software failure times within the reliability growth model, and the Expectation 
maximization algorithm is demonstrated for estimating the parameters for each case.  
Both individual failure data and grouped data are presented, and a numerical example 
is provided to demonstrate the approach. 
2.3.33 Wang, et. al.’s Discrete Nonhomogeneous Poisson Process Software 
Reliability Growth Models (2013) 
 Wang, Wu, Lu, and Li [63] present an approach to modeling software 
reliability growth by considering test coverage along with the failures that occur in 
the process.  The testing is considered as a set of discrete test cases, and the coverage 
assumes that test units are independent with execution probability p for a single test 
unit.  The Beta distribution is used to consider the variability on p, and maximum 
likelihood methods are presented to estimate the parameters of the distribution.   
 The reliability growth model is then developed by assuming that the number 
of faults detected is proportional to the test coverage obtained for each test case.  A 
more restrictive assumption in the initial model is that the debugging process for a 
fault is perfect.  This assumption is relaxed in an extended version of the model that is 
also developed, and maximum likelihood estimates are developed for both 
approaches.  Numerical examples demonstrating the capability of the approach are 
also presented. 
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2.4 Reliability Demonstration Methods  
2.4.1 Yadav, et. al.’s Reliability Demonstration Test Planning (2006) 
 Yadav, Singh, and Goel [64] present an approach to demonstrating the 
reliability of a new system.  The approach is a systematic method for identifying the 
reliability critical elements within the system, and then deciding the appropriate 
reliability demonstration methods to be used for each element.  The system is broken 
into 3 dimensions: physical, functional, and time.  The system level reliability is then 
allocated into each of the critical elements in the system.  The items are ranked via 
the criticality from the FMEA or previously available warranty or field data.  A 6-step 
approach is then identified that takes the developer through the process of 
decomposition, allocation, prior information collection, testing, and assessment.  The 
approach considers the last stages as iterative, and they are to be repeated along with 
any necessary design modifications until the reliability has been sufficiently 
demonstrated.  The assessment itself is Bayesian, and the Gamma distribution is used 
as the prior for the rate parameter of the Weibull.  Continuous updating of the 
assessed reliability is discussed, and the approach advocates the use of all prior 
information, including previous test data and other qualitative information. 
2.4.2 Fan and Chang’s Bayesian Zero Failure Reliability Demonstration Test of 
High Quality Electro-explosive Devices (2009) 
  Fan and Chang [65] present a Bayesian reliability demonstration test for 
electro-explosive devices.  The devices are assumed to be highly reliable, meaning 
that reliability demonstration using standard test methods may not be feasible.  The 
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lifetime of the product is assumed to follow the Exponential distribution, and the 
failure rate is related to temperature through an acceleration factor given by 
 
λw = α 0e
α1w,     (8) 
where w is the temperature and the α values are unknown parameters. 
 The statistical risks for the test are also presented to provide the ability to plan 
for a test that is likely to be passed for a specified temperature.  A simulation study is 
also presented to examine the posterior assurance associated with the approach.  The 
sensitivity of the method with respect to the choice of the prior distribution is also 
discussed, and the statistical risks are shown to be insensitive to the choice of the 
prior. 
2.4.3 Guo and Liao’s Methods of Reliability Demonstration (2012) 
 Guo and Liao [66] present a discussion of reliability demonstration testing 
procedures.  They compare the binomial test based on the number of failures 
observed during the demonstration test with the failure time approach using the 
distribution of the time to failure of the product under test.  The binomial test is 
assumed to be for one-shot devices, or for those systems whose mission length is 
equal to the length of the demonstration test.  A method for conversion of the 
requirement to an equivalent one for a different test length is also provided.   
 The failure time test approach is presented, with the Weibull distribution used 
to model the time to failure.  A comparison of the two test approaches is made, and 
the equivalence between the two methods is presented.  The failure time approach 
assumes that the β parameter is given prior to the test.  The results from each method 
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are shown for different test conditions, with the demonstrated reliability and 
corresponding median rate provided. 
2.4.4 Elsayed’s Overview of Reliability Testing (2012)   
 Elsayed [67] provides a general overview of a number reliability tests.  Eight 
different types of reliability testing are discussed, along with reliability estimation and 
prediction methods.  The tests presented are: highly accelerated life testing, reliability 
growth testing, highly accelerated stress screening, reliability demonstration testing, 
reliability acceptance testing, burn-in testing, built-in-self testing, and accelerated life 
testing.  An overview of various estimation techniques is also provided, each of 
which could applied within the context of multiple reliability tests. 
 The paper concludes by discussing the design of accelerated life test plans.  
Mechanical, electrical, and environmental stresses are considered, and the application 
of the stressors within the test is also discussed.  The remaining consideration 
involves the proportion of units that are to be subjected to the chosen stress levels.  
The design of the test plan is presented in the context of an optimization problem 
involving minimization of the variance associated with the problem. 
2.4.5 Crow’s Demonstrating Reliability Growth Requirements with Confidence 
(2012)  
 Crow [68] presents a method for combining developmental and operational 
test data in the context of demonstrating a reliability growth requirement.  The 
approach follows that of Miller [69], which is based on the MIL-HDBK 189 model 
[14] originally developed by Crow.  The technique assumes a reliability growth 
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program is followed by a fixed configuration reliability demonstration test.   The 
existence of the growth program is used to increase the probability of successfully 
demonstrating the reliability requirement.  The problems that exist with 
demonstrating a requirement with a lower confidence bound in a fixed configuration 
test are discussed, and the high design goals that result from this approach are cited as 
problematic for developers.  
 The approach provides a means for combining developmental reliability 
growth data with data from the demonstration test.  Lower confidence bounds are 
provided along with operations characteristic curve results for the combined 
estimator.  The results are also shown to reduce program risk and cost, and a 
numerical example is provided. 
2.4.6 Cotroneo et. al.’s Combining Operational and Debug Testing for Improving 
Reliability (2013)   
 Cotroneo, Pietrantuono, and Russo [70] present an approach for combining 
debug testing with OT for software systems.  The method is presented as a means of 
overcoming the limitations associated with OT of highly reliable systems.  Various 
problems with OT are discussed, including lack of knowledge of the true operational 
profile of the system and the effectiveness of the operational test in understanding 
reliability.   
 Debug testing is assumed to stress the system under exceptional and 
unexpected inputs, providing a contrast to OT that stresses the system with 
representative operational profiles.  The failure region domain is defined, and 
probabilities of observing a failure region within the operational profile are also 
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specified.  The overall probability of system failure in OT is then defined using a 
Bernoulli distribution for each execution of operational test inputs.  The combination 
of the two test methods is used to increase the likelihood of observing and correcting 
high and low occurrence failures in the system.  An expression for the probability that 
the combined test strategy is better than OT alone is derived, along with associated 
confidence bounds on the probability.  The approach is examined through simulated 
test cases, each of which focused on the operational profile, the number of test cases, 
and the relative amount of debug versus operational test cases.  The paper concludes 
with a case study demonstrating the increased performance of the combined method 
on a space system. 
2.4.7 Hill, et. al.’s Acquisition and Testing, DT/OT Testing (2013) 
 Hill, Gutman, Chambal, and Kitchen [71] discuss developmental and OT 
within the acquisition process in the U.S. Department of Defense.  Different 
approaches for assessing test results via statistical estimators are discussed, along 
with the underlying assumptions associated with each.  The assumption of a “good” 
or “bad” system is presented, along with reasons and relevant scenarios for each 
approach. 
 The paper presents an approach that uses both of the assumptions 
simultaneously by allowing for two separate requirements.  Objective and Threshold 
parameters are defined, where the system is to be designed to the objective in DT and 
tested to the threshold in OT.  The system is assumed to be good during verification 
of design to the objective in DT.  During OT the system assumed to be bad, and the 
minimal acceptable performance of threshold is then verified with high confidence.  
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The approach is very similar to current reliability growth approaches within the 
Defense Department, where the system reliability is assessed with 2-sided confidence 
intervals in DT and assessed with a lower confidence bound during OT. 
 
2.5  System Reliability Assessment 
2.5.1 Hamada et. al.’s Bayesian Approach for Combining Multilevel Failure 
Information in Fault Trees (2004) 
 Hamada, et. al. [72] provide a method for combining corresponding to 
different levels within a fault tree for a system.  The data are assumed to be discrete, 
and the use of the combined data provides an increase in accuracy and precision of 
the reliability estimates, thus reducing the aggregation error that can exist for such a 
problem.   
 Basic, top, and intermediate events in the fault tree are considered.  Prior 
information about the basic events in the fault tree is described by a Beta distribution, 
and the data for such events are assumed to follow a Binomial likelihood.  Equivalent 
trials and failures are calculated for the prior information on intermediate and top-
level events, and the resulting posteriors can be seen to provide information on the 
basic events through the fault tree structure.  The relative strength or weakness of the 
data for each event is also considered through the coefficient of variation assigned to 
each.   Weak data have a fairly large coefficient of variation, while strong data have a 
relatively small value.  The approach also discusses data collection within the context 
of reducing the variation in the posterior distribution.  The method is developed as a 
means of defining optimal testing and data collection for the system. 
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2.5.2 Reese, Hamada, and Robinson’s Assessing System Reliability by Combining 
Data from Different Test Modalities (2005) 
 Reese, Hamada, and Robinson [73] present an approach to combining discrete 
data from different test modalities to assess the overall reliability of a two component 
parallel system.  The approach considers the combination of four types of data: test 
data from specially produced samples, nondestructive testing, laboratory testing, and 
flight testing.  The nondestructive tests are performed at the component level, while 
the remaining tests are performed at the system level.  The fidelity of the data sources 
is also considered, where fidelity is defined as the amount of agreement with field 
usage conditions. 
 A logistic regression approach is used to relate the different test modalities, 











 = µ .        (9) 
The probability of failure values, pi, from the additional test modalities are then 










 = µ + λi  , i  =  1, 2, 3.           (10) 
The li values act as explanatory variables in the regression model, and they are related 
through the assumption that they follow a common Gamma distribution.  A 
hierarchical model is then developed where the m parameter is assigned a Normal 
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prior distribution and the parameters of the Gamma have additional hierarchical 
Gamma priors.  Markov Chain Monte Carlo procedures are then used to solve for the 
desired posterior distribution of the system failure probability. 
2.5.3 Groen and Droguett’s Competing Failure Mode Modeling (2005) 
 Groen and Droguett [74] provide a method that considers multiple failure 
modes within a system.  The approach is a Bayesian framework for assessing time to 
failure distributions for products.  Each product is defined as a combination of 
operating environment and system design or configuration, and the probabilistic 
nature of the Bayesian framework allows for combination of data across products.  
The combination methods use adjustment factors to account for differences in the 
operating environment or changes to the design.  The factors can be treated as 
deterministic quantities, or uncertainty distributions can be used to characterize the 
variability associated with each factor.  The use of factors allows for data from 
similar products to be used in the reliability assessment, and while not explicitly 
stated, it could also allow for reliability growth to be considered. 
 A major assumption of the approach is that the product is comprised of 
different failure modes, and the analysis can be performed using data at the failure 
mode level or product level.  There is no assumed inherent connection between the 
failure modes other than the link that is provided by the system/product level 
reliability.  Weibull likelihoods are used to characterize the time to failure for specific 
failure modes, and the aging behavior of the mode is assumed to be constant between 
products with the same mode.  The failure rates for each of the modes are then 
connected serially within the system, allowing for a straightforward summation to 
 59 
- CHAPTER 2 - 
obtain the system level assessment.  Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods are used to 
obtain the posterior distribution of the failure rate for the system.  A numerical 
example considering 2 failure modes is provided.  An earlier version of a similar 
approach is also presented by Groen, et. al. in [75]. 
2.5.4 Wilson, Graves, Hamada, and Reese’s Advanced in Data Combination, 
Analysis, and Collection for System Reliability Assessment (2006) 
 Wilson, et. al. [76] provides an overview of various data combination methods 
for both component and system reliability assessment that exist in the literature.  Two 
examples of component reliability assessment are given.  The first involves 
degradation and failure time data, and the second uses pass-fail Bernoulli and quality 
data to estimate the reliability of a component.   
 System reliability is assessed through a combination of life data and 
degradation data for components within the system.  A logistic regression approach 
similar to that in [73] is used to transform binary test data for a component into the 
continuous domain, which then allows for a combined reliability function that 
includes additional Weibull lifetimes and degradation data from a Lognormal process.  
A Nonhomogeneous Poisson Process model for clustered supercomputer failures is 
also developed, along with an approach to combining component life data within a 
fault tree structure. 
 The review discusses the fully Bayesian implementation of each example, 
with complex hierarchical models developed and solved through Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo methods.  The paper ends by discussing the various methods for 
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representing the system, to include Bayesian networks and flowgraph models.  
Optimal resource allocation in the spirit of [72] is also discussed.   
2.5.5 Yadav, Choudhary, and Bilen’s Complex System Reliability Estimation 
Methodology in the Absence of Failure Data (2008) 
 Yadav, Choudary, and Bilen [77] present a methodology for estimating 
system reliability in cases where failure data are initially unavailable.  The approach 
is comprehensive in nature, including physics-based fundamentals to establish the 
mathematical model of the system.  Uncertainty is applied at all levels of the system.  
The approach involves establishing a transfer function to describe the acceptable 
performance of the system, and the overall system reliability is calculated by 
computing the ratio of the number of trials that fall within the acceptable range to the 
total number of trials. 
 Environmental factors are considered within the model through the reliability 
estimate adjustor factor, which considers the difference between the initial failure rate 
and the true failure when the environment is considered.  The uncertainty on the 
variables within the model is accounted for through the use of fuzzy logic, and the 
initial reliability estimate is then updated through standard Bayesian model updating.  
A case demonstrating the approach for a hazardous gas detection system is also 
presented. 
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2.5.6 Pan’s Reliability Prediction Using Accelerated Life Data and Field Failures 
(2009) 
 Pan [78] presents a Bayesian approach to system reliability assessment that 
integrates field failure data and accelerated life test data.  The accelerated life test 
results are assumed to not adequately represent the field failure of the system because 
of variation in the field usage that exists.  A conjugate prior framework is utilized to 
simplify the process, and a calibration factor is used to account for the differences in 
the accelerated test and the field conditions.  Uncertainty on both the failure rate and 
the calibration factor is considered, and the posterior is updated using the accelerated 
life test results via Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods.  The calibration factor is not 
treated as a nuisance parameter, and the joint posterior for both model parameters is 
developed.  An example application involving temperature accelerated testing of an 
electronic device is presented. 
2.5.7 Wilson, Anderson-Cook, and Huzurbazar’s Case Study for Quantifying 
System Reliability and Uncertainty (2011)  
 Wilson, Anderson-Cook, and Huzurbazar [79] present a case study for system 
reliability assessment that quantifies the uncertainty present in the estimate.  The 
approach is motivated by the limitations in obtaining full system level test results due 
to cost, practicality, or technical permissibility.  Subsystem and component data are 
used to develop the system level reliability estimate, and the uncertainty from each of 
the data sources is aggregated to provide uncertainty at the system level.  A reliability 
block diagram is used to define the system reliability structure. 
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 Discrete test data, continuous test data, and multi-level data are all 
demonstrated within the proposed framework.  Components with no available test 
data are used in the approach.   Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods are used to 
evaluate the system level posterior distribution, where the system reliability is 
obtained through the structure defined by the reliability block diagram.  The approach 
provides a proof-of-concept that can be adapted to other more complex systems while 
still accounting for the appropriate uncertainty that exists in the assessment. 
2.6 Conclusion 
 This chapter reviewed a number of reliability growth models and reliability 
assessment techniques that are found in the literature.  Various models for reliability 
growth planning, tracking, and projection have been presented in order to define the 
current state-of-the-art in reliability growth.  Many modeling approaches are available 
for both continuous and discrete systems, with a number of classical and Bayesian 
approaches available.  A number of more general methods for system reliability 
assessment were also reviewed. 
 From reviewing the literature, there is a general lack of reliability growth 
approaches that consider data from throughout the developmental program of the 
system.  This is particularly true for reliability growth projection models, which are 
the current preference in the U.S. Department of Defense.  The models apply to single 
test phases only, with no way of updating results from test phase to test phase.  The 
models involving arbitrary corrective action strategies can also be improved, as the 
current state-of-art involves using only the first observed time or trial of occurrence 
for a given failure mode.   
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 There are also limited approaches for combining data from different types of 
testing within a reliability growth program.  Current approaches for data combination 
from different test modalities involve various types of testing in combination with 
reliability demonstration or OT, but there are limited options that consider reliability 
growth testing combined with operational reliability demonstration testing.  The 
failure mode based options currently available in the literature also consider only 
finite numbers of known failure modes in the system, with no allowance or 
accounting for unobserved failure modes.  These approaches are also developed 
specifically for time-to-failure distributions, with no extensions to consider reliability 
for complex repairable systems. 
 Finally, there is a decided disconnect between the current reliability growth 
approaches in the literature and the reliability assessment methods involving 
reliability engineering efforts.  The use of component and subsystem data for system 
reliability assessment occurs in various papers, but none of these discuss an approach 
that connects the results to reliability growth modeling approaches.  The use of 
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3 A BAYESIAN MODEL FOR COMPLEX SYSTEM RELIABILITY 
GROWTH UNDER ARBITRARY CORRECTIVE ACTIONS1 
3.1 Introduction 
3.1.1 Background 
 The work presented in this chapter differs from the reliability growth 
projection models reviewed in Chapter 2, as it is a Bayesian reliability growth 
projection model that explicitly applies FEFs.  The model assumes the same 
piecewise-Exponential probabilistic process modeled by Ellner and Wald’s AMSAA 
[18] while also providing a complete inference framework via the posterior 
distribution on the system failure intensity.  A Bayesian posterior distribution is first 
developed for each failure mode in the system, allowing for the application of FEFs 
as appropriate.  The likelihood is also generalized to allow for arbitrary corrective 
actions to occur at any point both during and after the test period.  An additional 
extension that is unique amongst the class of Bayesian reliability growth models is 
the ability to estimate the posterior distribution of the failure intensity due to failure 
modes that have not yet been observed, including the important metric of growth 
potential failure intensity.  The model provides an analytic expression that is a useful 
metric for reliability program managers, as it indicates the relative contribution of any 
remaining failure modes in the system along with the theoretical lower bound on the 
failure intensity that can be achieved via the test-fix-test reliability growth paradigm.  
Goodness-of-fit procedures to assess model appropriateness are a vital part of any 
1 Material from Chapter 3 has been submitted for publication to IEEE Transactions on Reliability.   
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reliability growth model, and two methods are presented here.  The first is a visual 
method involving the number of observed failure modes, and the second is a more 
formal test for goodness of fit.  An additional feature unique to the proposed model is 
the ease with which extensions can be made.  Extensions of the basic framework are 
presented to allow for both multiple systems under test and uncertainty on the 
assessed FEF values.   
 Use of a model such as that proposed here can be extremely informative to 
reliability program managers and engineers.  This is particularly true for programs 
that are early in the development process, as the results from early reliability growth 
testing can be used to shape future resource investment for the program.  They can 
also provide an indication when further reliability growth testing may provide 
diminishing returns, thus leading to a more efficient developmental reliability 
program. 
3.1.2 Chapter Overview 
 This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 develops the model 
framework, including model assumptions, data requirements, and a useful 
management metric.  Section 3.3 discusses prior development while presenting 
empirical Bayes estimators, and Section 3.4 provides two procedures for assessing the 
goodness of fit of the model.  Section 3.5 develops extensions to the basic model to 
handle multiple systems under test and uncertainty associated with the assessed FEF 
values.  Simulation performance comparisons of the basic model are presented in 
Section 3.6, and an example application is presented in Section 3.7.  Conclusions are 
provided in Section 3.8. 
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3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Model Assumptions 
 When projecting the reliability growth of a complex system, it is common to 
treat the system failure intensity as a sum of failure intensities (or failure 
probabilities) from independent failure modes.  Modeling the system as a 
combination of failure modes enables the use of FEF values, which mathematically 
quantify the fractional reduction in the failure intensity for a given failure mode after 
a corrective action has been implemented.  The assumptions for the model are as 
follows: 
1. The system is comprised of a large number of failure modes that are serial 
in nature; the occurrence of any failure mode results in failure of the 
system. 
2. Failure modes generate failures independently of one another. 
3. The failure intensity, or rate of occurrence of failure, for each mode is 
constant both before and after a corrective action is implemented.   
4. The resulting failure intensity after corrective action will be reduced from 
the initial value according to the assigned FEF. 
5. Corrective actions to failure modes do not introduce new failure modes 
into the system. 
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3.2.2 Data Requirements 
 Reliability growth projection models fall into one of two categories.  The first 
treats all corrective actions as delayed, while the second allows for corrective actions 
to be either delayed or occur during the test itself.  As stated previously, the model 
developed here falls into the latter category by allowing for arbitrary corrective 
actions.  It differs from previous models in this category [18],[20], as it uses the 
cumulative times of failure for each failure mode, along with the time of any 
associated corrective actions and their assessed FEFs to estimate the failure intensity 
of the system.  We stress the importance of assigning realistic FEF values for failure 
mode corrective actions.  The projected improvement in reliability will be erroneous 
if the assigned FEF values are unrealistic.  Proper consideration of the root cause of 
the failure mode and the type of corrective action is essential to assignment of a 
realistic FEF value.  An additional utility of reliability growth projection models of 
this type involves sensitivity analysis on the FEF values.  If known reliability targets 
are desired after corrective actions have been implemented, sensitivity analysis on the 
FEF values can determine the levels that are necessary to achieve the desired targets.  
Application of the model in this manner can then help to drive resource expenditure 
during the corrective action process. 
 Beyond the FEF values, the approach proposed here only requires information 
that is commonly collected during reliability growth testing.  Proper configuration 
management is vitally important to ensure that reliability estimates are representative 
of the actual system as the design progresses and matures, and the data requirements 
for the model fall within a well executed configuration management process.  
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Assumption 6 is also vitally important, as any estimates of reliability under non-
operational conditions should be treated with extreme caution if they are to be used in 
any programmatic resourcing decisions.  
3.2.3 Failure Mode Posterior Distribution 
For the ith failure mode in the system, assume that ni failures are observed in 
test length T with times 
 
ti,1,ti, 2 ,...,ti, ni( ).  Further assume that the failures are divided 
such that ni,1 occur before a corrective action is implemented, and ni - ni,1 failures 
occur after the corrective action.  For a corrective action that occurs at time vi, let di 
represent the FEF resulting from the corrective action.  From assumptions 2-4 the 
likelihood can then be expressed as    
 
l ti,1,ti, 2 ,...,ti, ni ,ni ,n i, 1 | λi( )= 1 − di( )
ni −ni, 1λi
ni exp −λi vi + 1 − di( ) T − vi( )[ ]( ). (1) 
Note that the form of the likelihood in (1) does not contain the actual failure times.  
They are part of a telescoping sum, and are replaced by the counts of failures before 
and after the corrective action.   
 For the prior on the individual mode failure intensity, we use the Gamma[α,β] 
distribution parameterized as  
 
p λi( ) =
λi
α −1










 .    (2) 
The choice of a Gamma prior distribution is not only mathematically convenient; it 
has also been used commonly in past work to model mode-to-mode variation that 
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may be present in the system.  The failure intensities for the collection of failure 
modes found in a complex system are shown to be adequately modeled as a random 
realization from a Gamma distribution in both [18] and [26].  Using a Gamma 
distribution in this way also recognizes what may be referred to as the “vital few, 
trivial many” property among mode failure intensities.  This property acknowledges 
that each failure mode provides a different contribution to the overall system failure 
intensity, with a relatively few number of failure modes being significant enough to 
be observed in test.   
 Standard posterior distribution calculations result in the posterior distribution 
for the failure mode failure intensity given by  
 
p λi | ti,1,ti, 2 ,...,ti, ni ,ni( )= λi
α+ ni −1
Γ α + ni( )
1
β






















   (3) 
Note that the ni,1 term in (1) only applies to the constant term (1−di) and is therefore 
canceled from the posterior distribution.   From (3) the distribution of the failure 
mode failure intensity is then 
 
λi ~ Gamma α + ni ,
1
β















 .  (4) 
Note that if no corrective action is attempted, di is zero and (4) then reduces to the 
traditional Gamma posterior commonly found in many references that discuss 
Bayesian statistics.  See for example Section 7.4 in [81].  From (4) we can also 
leverage properties of the Gamma distribution to develop the posterior for the reduced 
failure intensity after a corrective action has been implemented.   
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1 −di( )λi ~ Gamma α + ni , 1 − di( )
1
β
















3.2.4 Complex System Posterior Distribution 
 We develop the posterior for a complex system by first assuming a finite 
number of modes, K, and then examining the results as K becomes large.  From 
assumption 1 the failure intensity after corrective actions for the entire system can be 
found by summing the individual mode failure intensities.  If we denote the number 
of observed modes as m and let n = (n1,n2,…,nm) be the vector of observed failures 
for each of the observed failure modes, we can represent the mean of the system 
posterior after corrective actions as  
 












1 − di( ) α + ni( )
1
β
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1 − di( ) α + ni( )
1
β

































    (6) 
It is useful to reparameterize the expression in (6) to aid in computing the limiting 
form for complex systems.   Note that the prior mean for system failure intensity can 
be expressed as  
 
λB = Kαβ .     (7) 
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Reparameterizing the prior Gamma distribution in terms of the prior system mean and 
the β parameter then allows the result in (6) to be expressed as  
 
 
E λs | n[ ] =












































































































.       (8) 
The result for a complex system consisting of a large number of failure modes can be 
examined by taking the limit of (8) as K becomes large while holding the prior mean 
in (7) and the β parameter constant.  This yields the expression shown in (9).  
 
E λs | n[ ] =
1 − di( )ni
1
β





















∑ + λB1 + βT    (9) 
 The variance of the system posterior after corrective actions is similarly found to be  
 
Var λs | n[ ] =





































2 .     (10) 
The results in (9) and (10) can also be used to calculate the incremental reduction in 
the system failure intensity.  The individual FEF for a specific observed failure mode 
should not be included in the posterior estimate until the corrective action for that 
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mode has been implemented.  This is analogous to using the posterior result in (4) 
before the corrective action and the result in (5) after the corrective action.  
Examination of (9) and (10) shows that this is accomplished by setting the di in the 
numerator to 0 before the corrective action has been implemented.  We also point out 
that when no corrective actions are applied during the test, the result in (9) is a 
Bayesian alternative to the traditional failure intensity point estimate for a HPP. 
 When all corrective actions occur at the same time with the same level of fix 
effectiveness, the posterior distribution for the system with a finite number of failure 
modes will be exactly Gamma.  This is not usually the case during reliability growth 
testing, as most failure modes will have different underlying root causes and different 
levels of fix effectiveness.  For this reason it is necessary to examine the posterior 
distribution through simulation to understand if the Gamma will be a reasonable 
approximation under arbitrary corrective action strategies.  Because the individual 
failure mode posteriors are Gamma from (4) and (5), it is straightforward to simulate 
failure intensities from the individual mode posteriors.  A histogram of the posterior 
results under an arbitrary corrective action strategy is shown in Figure 3.1.  The 
simulated system was comprised of 50 failure modes and tested for 2000 hours.  The 
corrective action strategy allowed for 5% of the observed failure modes to be 
corrected during the test, while the remaining 95% were corrected when the test was 
completed.  The average FEF value for the corrective actions was 0.7.  The dashed 
line represents a Gamma distribution fit to the data using a standard method-of-
moments based approach with parameters given by (11) and (12).  The parameters are 
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developed from the mean and variance in (9) and (10), and the form of the Gamma 
distribution follows (2). 
 
˜ α =
E λs | n[ ]
2
Var λs | n[ ]
    (11) 
 
˜ β =
Var λs | n[ ]
E λs | n[ ]
    (12) 
 
Fig 3.1. System Level Posterior Distribution with Approximate Gamma Distribution Overlaid 
The results shown in Figure 3.1 indicate that the Gamma distribution defined by (11) 
and (12) is indeed a reasonable approximation.  The approximate conjugate 
relationship that is found through (11) and (12) is also beneficial for updating the 
system level results with data from additional test events.  This allows for reliability 
assessment throughout the system’s development to use all of the previously available 
data, rather than being strictly based on the most current test event.  The updating 
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process acts to decrease the uncertainty associated with the posterior distribution 
while also accounting for reduced failure intensity resulting from the reliability 
growth process.  Note that configuration changes beyond those involving corrective 
actions to observed failure modes may cause the conjugate combination to be 
unrealistic, and any differences in the test events such as test article configuration and 
environment should always be considered before this technique is practically 
employed.  
3.2.5 Initial Failure Intensity 
 The initial system failure intensity at the start of the test can be estimated 
easily using results from the previous section.  Using the individual failure mode 
posterior in (4) instead of (5) provides failure intensity estimates prior to any 
corrective actions being implemented.  This amounts to estimating the initial step in a 
piecewise Exponential process.  Applying (4) in the same manner as previously 
developed yields the system level posterior mean and variance of the initial failure 
intensity shown in (13) and (14).  Note that the failure intensity for any step in the 
piecewise Exponential process can be estimated in a similar manner by simply 
applying the FEF for the failure mode that has been corrected.  This is equivalent to 
using the mode posterior in (5) in place of (4) for the failure mode associated with the 
corrective action.   
 
E λs, initial | n[ ]= ni1
β





















∑ + λB1 + βT   (13) 
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Var λs, initial | n[ ]= ni1
β

































2 .             (14) 
Posterior interval estimates for the initial failure intensity can be found using the 
same techniques developed in Section 3.2.4. 
3.2.6 Growth Potential Failure Intensity 
 Crow introduced the concept of reliability growth potential after development 
of the AMSAA Crow Projection Model [82].  The growth potential represents the 
theoretical upper bound on reliability, and hence lower bound on failure intensity, that 
can be achieved within the test-fix-test reliability growth paradigm.  This theoretical 
bound can be found by applying the average FEF to the remaining failure intensity 
due to the unobserved failure modes.  It can be estimated using the posterior 
distribution for the failure intensity in (9) and (10). 
 The posterior mean growth potential is given by 
 
E λs, GP | n[ ]= 1 − di( )ni1
β





















∑ + 1 − µd( )
λB
1 + βT
,   (15) 
where µd is the average FEF that should be expected for the remaining failure modes 
in the system.  The value of µd can be estimated by computing the arithmetic average 
of FEF values for the observed failure modes.  The variance is then similarly given by  
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2 . (16) 
Posterior interval estimates for the growth potential failure intensity can be found 
using the same techniques developed in Section 3.2.4. 
 The growth potential failure intensity can indicate whether additional test-fix-
test reliability should be pursued for the program in question.  If the resulting growth 
potential failure intensity estimates are higher than the desired objective, resources 
should be expended for reliability improvement initiatives outside of the traditional 
test-fix-test approach. 
3.2.7 Failure Modes Observed During Follow-on Testing 
 A particularly useful management metric can also be developed from the 
posterior distribution for the system: the distribution of the number of failure modes 
observed in a future time interval.  These metrics are helpful for reliability program 
managers who must make decisions regarding future resource allocation for the 
program, particularly when planning to observe and mitigate new failure modes in 
future testing.  These metrics can also be used to visually examine the validity of the 
underlying model assumptions for both the prior and posterior distributions, and this 
is discussed in more detail in Section 3.4.  The posterior expected number of failure 
modes is found by first defining the indicator function for the ith unobserved failure 
mode as  
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I i t( ) =





.   (17) 
The posterior predicted mean of Ii(t) is found by examining the posterior probability 
that the unobserved failure mode is observed by some time t > T.  The likelihood of 
observing a failure mode by time t > T is given from Assumption 3 in Section 3.2.1 
as 
 
p Ii t( ) =1 | λi ,ni ,t > T( ) =1 − e−λi t −T( )             (18) 
Using the posterior distribution on the mode failure intensity in (4) with the ni, vi, and 
di set to 0 for an unobserved failure mode, the unconditional marginal distribution for 
Ii(t) can be found by calculating the joint distribution of (4) and (18) and then 
marginalizing with respect to λi.  The unconditional expected value is given by 
 
















α .  (19) 
Summing over all K - m unobserved modes in the system yields 
 
E Ii t( )
i =m+1
K












































    (20) 
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E Ii t( )
i =m+1
K























.      (21) 
Because Ii(t) is a Bernoulli random variable, summing over the unobserved modes 
yields a Binomial random variable.  Taking the limit as K becomes large then results 
in a Poisson random variable with the mean shown in (21).   Figure 3.2 shows a plot 
of the posterior distribution for the number of modes for 500 hours beyond test time T 
= 500 for a sample data set.  The solid line indicates the posterior mean, while the 
dashed lines indicate 0.05 and 0.95 percentiles respectively (90% probability 
interval).  
 
Fig 3.2.  Posterior Number of Failure Modes in Follow On Testing 
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3.3 Empirical Bayes Estimators 
 We first point out that it is entirely possible to parameterize the Gamma prior 
through other means such as historical data or elicitation of experts.  A five-stage 
approach for developing priors using expert elicitation is outlined in [80].  Although 
not fully Bayesian in their application, empirical Bayes estimates are presented here 
for completeness.  These methods present a useful alternative for situations when 
relevant prior information is not available and excessive subjectivity is undesirable.  
The posterior probability intervals that result from using this approach will not 
represent the full uncertainty in the estimation, and this should be considered when 
making decisions with the model results in this context.   
 Empirical Bayes estimates are developed in [81] and extended in [26], but the 
previous results are limited to those cases where there are no corrective actions 
occurring.  The results contained in Section 7.7 in [81] can be generalized to handle 
arbitrary corrective actions though, noting that the use of the Poisson likelihood will 
provide the same results as those for the Exponential likelihood.  Finite results are 
developed and then extended to handle the limiting case for complex systems.  From 
the distribution in (4), the resulting maximum likelihood equations for estimating the 
Gamma parameters are given as  
 













+ vi + 1 − di( ) T − vi( )i =1
K
∑
  and   (22) 
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m  +  
1
1 +






































K ˆ β − c
(23)
 






+ vi + 1 − di( ) T − vi( )i =1
K
∑ .   (24) 
Results analogous to those in (22) and (23) can be found by taking the limit with 
respect to K. 
 
ˆ λ B =





+ vi + 1 − di( ) T − vi( )i =1
m
∑          (25) 
 
m  =
1 + ˆ β T
ˆ β 2T
log 1 + ˆ β T[ ]  ni1
ˆ β 













        (26) 
Setting the vi equal to T in (25) and (26) will provide results equivalent to those in 





∑ > m . 
3.4 Model Assessment and Goodness of Fit 
 For assessing the utility of the model and appropriateness of the underlying 
assumptions, we present two approaches.  The first uses the distribution for the 
observed number of failure modes to provide a visual indication of the validity of the 
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model assumptions.  The second is a more formal Bayesian Chi-Squared Test for 
goodness of fit. 
3.4.1 Prior Predicted Cumulative Number of Failure Modes  
 The distribution for the prior number of failure modes that should be observed 
by some time t can be found similarly to the posterior results shown in Section 3.2.6.  
By considering the prior distribution in place of the posterior, the expected value for a 
single failure mode in (19) is modified slightly to be  
 
E Ii t( )[ ] = p Ii t( ) =1 | t ≤ T( ) =1 − 11 + βt( )α .         (27) 
Note that in this context t is any time in the interval (0,T).  Summing over all failure 















log 1 + βt( ).        (28) 
The distributional results from Section 3.2.7 will also apply in this case, and the 
distribution on the prior number of failure modes will be Poisson with the mean given 
by (28).  An example plot showing the cumulative observed number of failure modes 
and the prior predicted distribution as a function of time t is shown in Figure 3.3.   
The solid line represents the mean cumulative number of failure modes, and the 
dashed lines represent the 5th and 95th percentiles of the prior predicted distribution at 
time t respectively.  The points are the cumulative number of observed failure modes 
by time t. 
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Fig 3.3.  Comparison Plot of Observed Failure Modes and Prior Predicted Cumulative Number of 
Failure Modes Distribution vs Test Time t 
 
Although it is not a formal goodness of fit test, using a plot like Figure 3.3 can be 
useful for indicating any differences between the observed data and the model 
assumptions.  The results in (27) and (28) use both the prior and the likelihood, so 
reasonable agreement between the distribution and the observed data should indicate 
that the model assumptions are reasonable. 
3.4.2 Bayesian Chi-Square Test 
 The Bayesian Chi-Square test developed by Johnson in [83] can be used for 
additional assessment of the model assumptions.  The Chi-Square test statistic 
requires the data to be conditionally independent observations from a probability 
density function.  Assumption 3 in Section 3.2.1 states that the time between 
successive failures will be piecewise-Exponentially distributed with a rate that 
depends on the application of specific corrective actions.  This allows us to treat the 
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inter-arrival times between the failures as an observed sequence of Exponential 
random variables, where the rate parameter of the distribution will be reduced by the 
appropriate FEF after each successive corrective action.  The failure free periods prior 
to corrective actions, and at the ends of time truncated tests, can be handled using the 
appropriate Exponential distribution and randomization procedures as defined in [84].  
The addition of the failure free periods result in a sample size of n, where n is one 
plus the sum of the number of failures and the number of corrective actions that occur 
during the test. 
 Following the method outlined in [83], define θ~  as a sampled value from the 
posterior distribution, which is the Gamma distribution developed in Section 3.2.  As 
described in Section 3.2, the mean and variance defined in (9) and (10) will need to 
be modified accordingly to account for the timing of any corrective actions that occur 
during the test phase.  The required distributions can be found using the same 
approach discussed in Section 3.2 for estimating each step of the piecewise 
Exponential process.  This is again accomplished by setting the FEF in the numerator 
to zero until after the corrective action has been implemented.   
 The unit interval is then divided into q sub-intervals such that 
 
0 ≡ a0 < a1 < ... < aq−1 < aq ≡1.  Next let yi be the times between successive failures 
and Fj be the corresponding Exponential distributions with the appropriate failure rate 
parameters.  Define 
 
zj ˜ θ ( ) to be a vector of length q whose 𝑞𝑡ℎ jth element is zero 
unless  
 
Fj yj | ˜ θ ( )∈ aq−1,aq( ).      (29) 
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When the condition in (29) holds, the qth element of zj is set to one.  When applying 
the randomization procedures defined in [84] to the failure free intervals, a random 
number is drawn from the interval 
 
1 −Fj T −yj | ˜ θ ( ), 1[ ] in place of the Fj in (29).  Note 
that the time prior to corrective actions is handled in the same manner, with T 
replaced by the corrective action time v.  Next define  
 
m ˜ θ ( ) = zj ˜ θ ( )
j =1
n
∑     (30) 
as a vector of length q, where each element of the vector represents the total number 
of points in the corresponding subinterval of the unit interval.  The Chi-Square 
statistic from [83] is defined as 
 
RB ˜ θ ( ) =













,            (31) 
where the pk are defined as the differences between the aq values that divide the unit 
interval.  The statistic in (31) is asymptotically Chi-Squared with q-1 degrees of 
freedom under repeated sampling of both the data and the posterior parameter of 
interest.  The data cannot be repeatedly sampled in practice, but the utility of the 
statistic is that poorly specified models will not follow the proper Chi-Squared 
Distribution and will likely have a higher number of samples in the tail of the 
distribution.  Figure 3.4 shows an example of this concept for the Piecewise-
Exponential model developed above.  Figure 3.4(a) contains 2000 samples of failure 
data using the mean of the prior distribution as the true value of the failure intensity, 
while Figure 3.4(b) samples the same failure data with a prior mean that is a factor of 
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ten less than the true failure intensity.  The data in both cases were simulated using a 
single corrective action that occurred midway through the test.  The solid line shows 
the reference Chi-Squared Distribution, which has six degrees of freedom for this 
example.  The differences can be seen immediately, and the poorly specified (prior) 
model shows an extremely poor fit to the reference distribution.   
 
 
(a)       (b) 
Fig 3.4.  Chi-Squared Distribution Example for (a) Properly specified prior distribution, (b) 
Misspecified prior distribution 
 
 To assess the appropriateness of the model in practical cases, repeated 
sampling of the data is generally not practical.  Random samples can instead be 
drawn from the posterior distribution while applying the appropriate FEF values for 
any corrective actions that have occurred during the test.  The statistic in (31) can be 
calculated for each of these samples, and the proportion that exceeds a specified 
critical value from the Chi-Squared Distribution can be reported and compared to the 
desired size of the test.  While not a formal test, large proportions exceeding the 
desired critical value indicate problems with the model fit.  For the example in Figure 
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3.4, the proportion of samples greater than the 0.8 percentile are 0.19 and 0.61 for 
cases (a) and (b) respectively, which again demonstrates the lack of fit for the second 
example.  A number of additional examples applying the test statistic in (31) are 
presented in [84].  
 It is worth noting that the Gamma distribution has reasonable flexibility for 
modeling different behaviors in the data.  Use of the empirical Bayes procedures 
outlined in Section 3.3 should also help to mitigate any problems with the parameters 
of the prior.  Lack of fit in these cases is likely due to problems with the likelihood, 
with system specific factors causing the rate of occurrence of failures to be non-
constant between successive corrective actions.  This may occur in situations where 
system usage involves cycling between severe and benign environmental usage 
conditions. 
3.5 Extensions to Basic Model 
 A particular benefit of the Bayesian framework established Section 3.2.4. is 
the ease with which various extensions to the basic model can be made.  A number of 
possible extensions exist, but two very useful cases are presented here.  The first 
involves an extension to allow for data collected from multiple test articles, which is 
often common in developmental reliability growth testing.  The second includes 
uncertainty on the FEF.  The FEF values are generally assessed based on engineering 
judgment and it is therefore desirable to allow for some uncertainty regarding their 
values.  Though not presented here, it is also possible to develop marginal posterior 
distributions for the FEF values themselves if desired. 
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3.5.1 Multiple Systems Under Test 
 For situations when there are multiple identical systems undergoing the same 
DT, it is desirable to combine the failure data that are observed in order to more 
accurately assess the overall reliability of the system.  This situation can present 
practical implementation problems for models that use failure mode first occurrence 
times such as [18].  It can be difficult to account for all testing that is accrued across 
the systems without artificially scaling the occurrence times of the failure modes, but 
the current model framework can easily handle this situation through a 
straightforward extension of the likelihood shown in (1).  For a single failure mode, 
the extended version of the likelihood for multiple systems under test is given by  
 













                                                                      exp −λi vi, j
j =1
p
∑ + 1 − di( ) Tj
j =1
p




















  (32) 
The previous notation is extended in (32) as follows:   
1. There are p systems under test for test time Tj. 
2. ti,j,l is the lth observed time of failure for ith failure mode on the jth system. 
3. There are ni,j occurrences of the ith failure mode on the jth system. 
4. The vi,j are the corrective action times for the ith failure mode on the jth system.  
 
The likelihood in (32) can also handle a number of common situations that occur in 
DT, such as dependencies due to preemptive corrective actions on certain systems 
due to failure modes being observed on previously tested systems.  We point out that 
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setting the vi,j to zero easily handles this situation, which is again difficult for many 
traditional reliability growth projection models to handle appropriately. 
 The resulting system level posterior mean and variance can then be found 
similarly to the basic model in Section 3.2.  The posterior mean and variance, 
respectively, are found to be 
 
 
E λs | n[ ] =









∑ + 1 − di( ) Tj
j =1
p



































          (33) 
 
Var λs | n[ ] =










∑ + 1 − di( ) Tj
j =1
p















































2 .     (34) 
Note that the expressions in (33) and (34) are simple extensions to those in (9) and 
(10), with 
 





ni = ni, j
j =1
p





∑ .  The same substitutions apply when 
calculating additional quantities of interest such as the growth potential failure 
intensity and the empirical Bayes estimators in Section 3.3.   
 For the posterior distribution on the number of failure modes observed in 
follow on testing the likelihood of observing a failure mode on at least one of the p 
systems by time t is updated as 
 
p I t( ) =1 | λ ,n,t > T( ) =1 − e−pλ t −T( ).           (35) 
The unconditional expected value in (19) is then modified to be  
 89 
- CHAPTER 3 - 
 
E I t( ) | t > T[ ] = p I t( ) =1 | n( ) =1 − 1
1 +



















α ,  (36) 





E Ii t( )
i =m+1
K




























.       (37) 
 For the prior number of failure modes used in the visual goodness of fit in 
Section 3.4, the likelihood of observing a failure mode on at least one of the p 
systems by time t is updated as  
 
p I t( ) =1 | λ ,n,t > T( ) =1 − e−pλt .                   (38) 















log 1 + βpt( ).      (39) 
When comparing the observed failure modes to the prior prediction, note that the time 
of first occurrence for a failure mode should be the minimum of the occurrence times 
observed over all of the systems under test.  Modifications to the Chi-Square test in 
Section 3.4.2 are not necessary for multiple systems, as (33) and (34) can be used 
directly in place of (9) and (10).  The procedure deals with time between failures, so 
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the data from each system under test can be used within the existing framework.  
Note that because each system may have unique corrective action implementation 
during the test, additional random samples may be necessary to cover the additional 
systems.  Caution should also be exercised to ensure that the appropriate distribution 
function corresponding to the corrective action interval is used. 
3.5.2 Uncertain FEF 
 The model extension for including uncertainty on the FEF involves the 
addition of a prior distribution on the FEF parameter d in (1).  The posterior 
distribution is then given by 
 
p λ | n( ) = p d( )p λ( )l n | λ( )








∫ ∂d .        (40) 
The likelihood and prior distributions from Section 3.2 are used for the failure 
intensity.  The Beta distribution given in (41) is used for the prior distribution on the 
FEF. 
 
p d( ) = Γ a + b( )
Γ a( )Γ b( )
d a−1( ) 1 − d( ) b−1( )                (41) 
A useful method for describing the Beta prior can be found by specifying the mean 
and variance for the FEF and then developing the corresponding Method-of-Moments 
estimators.   
 The posterior for the FEF could also be found in a similar manner to that in 
(40).  The outermost integration with respect to d could instead be calculated with 
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respect to λ, which would result in the desired marginal posterior on the FEF.  The 
technique should be used cautiously though, particularly in cases where little 
information is available after the corrective action has been completed.  The approach 
could be useful in managing the reliability growth program, as it would provide an 
indication of the overall effectiveness of the corrective action process. 
 The resulting system level posterior mean and variance can then be found 
similarly to the basic model in Section 3.2.  For m observed modes with m’ corrected, 
the posterior mean and variance are found to be 
 
 






























































∑ + λB1 + βT
(42) 
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Var λs | n[ ] =
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2    (43) 
 2F1(a,b,c,z) is the integral form of the hypergeometric function given by  
 
2 F1 a ,b,c,z( ) =
Γ c( )
Γ b( )Γ c − b( )
tb−1 1 − t( )c −b−1 1 − tz( )−a dt
0
1
∫ .           (44) 
Additional parameters of interest such as the growth potential failure intensity and the 
number of modes observed in follow-on testing are developed similarly by 
substituting the posterior parameters in (42) and (43) for the original values in (9) and 
(10). 
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3.6 Simulation Performance 
 A simulation was developed to examine the performance of the basic model 
under varying conditions.  Each replication of the simulation consists of the following 
steps: 
1. Set input variables: prior parameters, test length, number of failure 
modes, mean and coefficient of variation of FEFs, and corrective 
action strategy. 
2. Simulate mode failure intensities from prior Gamma distribution. 
3. Simulate random FEF values for each failure mode from a Beta 
distribution. 
4. For each failure mode, simulate random failures with the appropriate 
failure intensity according to the corrective action strategy. 
 
The corrective action strategy in the simulation randomly determines when a 
corrective action is made for each observed failure mode.  The corrective action 
decision is made by first choosing the probability that a corrective action will occur 
during the test.  A uniform random number is then drawn for comparison to the 
probability for each observed failure mode.  Model estimates were developed 
assuming that the exact FEF values were known.  The “true” results from the 
simulation were then compared to the model estimates to gauge the robustness of the 
technique while also indicating the relative error that should be expected when 
applying this type of model.  The coverage properties of the posterior probability 
intervals are also examined within the context of the simulation.  Comparisons are 
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made between the proposed approach and two of the more popular reliability growth 
projection models: the AMPM [18] and the Crow-Extended Model [20].  The 
comparisons are made only for the point estimate (posterior mean) due to the fact that 
interval results are not yet published for the AMPM. 
 A number of different cases were examined using the simulation, with five 
presented here.  Table 3.1 contains the input values for each case.  The probability of 
corrective action is the probability that an observed failure mode is addressed during 
the test.  K is the number of modes in the system, λB and β are the parameters of the 
Gamma distribution, α is found from equation (7), T is the length of the test, µd and 
cv are the mean and coefficient of variation, respectively, of the FEF distribution.  
Heuristic examination of the simulation convergence shows that 1000 replications 
were sufficient for each case.  Table 3.2 shows the average result for each case, 
including the posterior mean and 80% lower probability bound, mean relative error, 
and coverage properties of the probability interval.  Empirical distributions of the 







K β λB α T µd cv 
1 0.2 5000 0.001 0.002 0.0004 5000 0.7 0.1 
2 0.1 2000 0.0001 0.02 0.1 5000 0.7 0.1 
3 0.2 1000 0.001 0.02 0.02 2500 0.7 0.1 
4 0.1 500 0.0001 0.002 0.04 5000 0.7 0.1 
5 0.2 250 0.001 0.02 0.08 2500 0.7 0.1 
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TABLE 3.2 
SIMULATION RESULTS 






















1 12 1498.3 1311.0 1008.3 0.38 0.82 1576.4 0.42 2216.0 1.13 
2 99 67.0 67.9 64.4 0.10 0.65 64.2 0.11 66.2 0.18 
3 48 105.4 105.4 94.1 0.15 0.75 106.3 0.16 106.0 0.34 
4 11 676.5 695.2 589.3 0.29 0.70 660.7 0.31 878.6 0.68 
5 48 107.8 107.6 95.8 0.16 0.75 109.8 0.17 118.3 0.34 
 
 
The results in Table 3.2 indicate that the model performs well on average.  To aid in 
examining the model performance beyond just the average comparison, Figure 3.5 
shows the empirical distribution of the relative error for each of the test cases.  Higher 
slopes in the plots mean that larger proportions of samples fall closer to the true 
simulation value, which indicate more accuracy in the model result.  The results in 
Figure 3.5 show that the proposed model outperforms both the AMPM and Crow 
Extended for accuracy.  Additional simulation comparisons over a broader set of test 
cases are presented in [7], and the results indicate that AMPM outperforms the Crow 
Extended Model with respect to accuracy and relative error distributions.  By 
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extension, the proposed approach should therefore perform well over a broad range of 
cases. 
 The classical coverage of the probability bounds are shown to be slightly non-
conservative in most cases, but this is an unfortunate consequence of simulating with 
finite values of K.  We can see this by examining the coverage under non-informative 
prior conditions such as those of a Jeffrey’s prior.  These cases should generally 
behave close to the desired classical properties, but explicit use of the Jeffrey’s prior 
is not possible due to difficulties in convergence of the limit for complex systems.  
The posterior result will converge to a Jeffrey’s based posterior as α becomes small 
and β becomes large though, which can be seen in Case 1 where K is large.  Choosing 
K large enough will also act to drive α toward zero and cause behavior more in line 
with a non-informative prior.  Because K can be considered arbitrarily large for a 
complex system, the resulting coverage properties for a complex system should match 
those of classical methods.  
 
(a)           (b) 
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   (c)              (d) 
 
(e) 
Fig 3.5.  Empirical Distribution of Relative Error Comparisons for Cases 1-5 (a-e):  Proposed Model 
(solid), AMPM (thick dashed), Crow-Extended (dotted) 
 
3.7 Example Application 
 This section presents an example application of the model using data from a 
developmental test.  Twenty-five systems were each tested for 175 hours, and 13 
failure modes were observed across all of the systems.  Across all systems, 43 total 
failures were observed.  The occurrence times for each mode are shown by system in 
Table 3.3, along with the associated times of corrective action and FEFs.  All 
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corrective actions were implemented after the test, with the exception of mode 8, 
which was implemented for all systems at 100 hours. 
 
TABLE 3.3 
SAMPLE FAILURE MODE DATA 
Mode FEF System Number Occurrence Time Corrective action time 
1 0.5 19 106.3 175 
2 0 
7 107.3 




















4 0 20 97.0 NA 25 36.4 
5 0.8 21 70.8 175 
6 0 
3 148.1 
NA 7 70.6 8 118.1 
22 18.0 
7 0.7 15 37.8 175 
8 0.8 
6 74.3 
100 7 65.7 
7 93.1 
9 0.5 13 90.8 175 
10 0.5 13 99.2 175 
11 0.5 17 130.8 175 
12 0 5 169.1 NA 
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13 0 7 102.7 NA 
 
 The empirical Bayes estimates in (23) and (24) are found to be 
 
ˆ λ B = 0.0101             (40) 
 
ˆ β = 0.0016            (41) 
Applying these estimates within the basic model in (9) and (10) yields the posterior 
mean and eighty percent upper probability bounds in (42) and (43) respectively. 
 
λs = 0.0087              (42) 
 
λUB = 0.0098               (43) 
The resulting posterior approximation is plotted in Figure 3.6.  Note that of the 7 
failure modes that were addressed with corrective actions, the average FEF value was 
0.61.  This would indicate that the improvement in reliability from the corrective 
actions will not be significant.  The point estimate of the failure intensity for a 
standard HPP is just 4375/43 = 0.0098, which is only slightly higher than the 
projected failure intensity after corrective actions in (42).  This comparison not only 
provides a “consistency check” of the proposed model, but it also indicates the results 
that can be expected when the FEF values are somewhat moderate. 
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Fig 3.6.  Approximate Posterior Distribution for Sample Problem 
 Goodness of fit can be checked using the visual and Chi-Squared tests 
developed in Section 3.4, with the appropriate modifications to handle multiple 
systems as discussed in Section 3.5.1.  Figure 3.7 shows the failure mode first 
occurrence times overlaid on the distribution of the prior cumulative number of 
modes.  The prior mean is the solid line, and the dashed lines represent a 90% 
probability interval.  The visual results indicate that the data agree well with the 
model assumptions.  Ten thousand samples of the Chi-Squared test statistic in (29) 
showed one sample greater than the critical value for a Chi-Squared variable with 6 
degrees of freedom.  The six degrees of freedom result from the n = 43+25+2 = 70 
data points while using n0.4 groups for the calculation.  This small proportion provides 
additional evidence of agreement with the model assumptions. 
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Fig 3.7. Comparison of Observed Failure Modes and Prior Predicted Distribution for Cumulative 
Number of Failure Modes for Sample Problem 
 
Figure 3.8 also shows the distribution for the cumulative number of modes observed 
in follow-on testing of 250 hours.  The mean is again the solid line, and the dashed 
lines represent a 90% probability interval. 
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 This chapter has presented a new method for projecting the reliability growth 
of a complex continuously operating system.  The model allows for arbitrary 
corrective action strategies, and it differs from other models of this type by using all 
available data.  It also differs from other reliability growth projection models in that it 
offers a complete inference framework via the posterior distribution on the system 
failure intensity.  A unique feature of this approach with respect to other Bayesian 
techniques is the analytic expression for the failure intensity contribution from 
unobserved failure modes.  Expressions for estimating the initial failure intensity, 
growth potential failure intensity, and the cumulative number of failure modes 
expected in future testing are also developed.  Two separate goodness-of-fit 
procedures are presented for assessing the appropriateness of the underlying model 
assumptions.  Extensions to the basic framework are also developed.  The first 
accounts for multiple systems under test, and the second develops the posterior 
distribution while allowing for uncertainty on the FEF values that are assessed. 
 Taken as a whole, the results are useful for reliability program managers 
making decisions regarding the investment of resources to improve reliability.  The 
model can be used to estimate the resulting reliability after corrective actions are 
applied, and the associated metrics can help to aid in future decisions.  Resource 
planning can be made based on the posterior distribution for the number of failure 
modes that will be seen in future testing.  The use of the growth potential failure 
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intensity can also indicate whether additional test-fix-test reliability should be 
pursued for the program.  If the resulting growth potential failure intensity estimates 
are higher than the desired objective, resources should be expended for reliability 
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4 ASSESSING RELIABILITY GROWTH USING DEVELOPMENTAL 
AND OPERATIONAL TEST DATA2 
4.1 Introduction 
4.1.1 Background 
 The approach presented here is conceptually the same as those in [68]-[70] 
and [85].  The major difference being that the Bayesian formulation easily allows for 
uncertainty to be included throughout the problem, to include the degradation scale 
factor between developmental growth and operational demonstration testing.  This 
provides an additional uncertainty in the results that will more closely match the 
practical situation, in which limited information on the actual degradation may be 
available.  The model also provides a complete inference framework via the posterior 
distribution, which includes both developmental and operational reliability 
information.  These types of results are particularly useful in planning reliability 
growth programs, where different test events, both growth and constant configuration, 
may be used throughout.  The results can also be extended to develop a Bayesian 
reliability growth planning model, which is the subject of Chapter 5. 
4.1.2 Chapter Overview 
 The methodology of the approach is presented in Section 4.2.  It includes 
model assumptions, data requirements, and the development of the initial framework 
for combining data from two different tests.  The presentation of the methodology is 
2 A condensed version of the material in Chapter 4 was accepted for publication in 2014 RAMS 
Proceedings.  A full detailed version will be submitted for journal publication when Chapter 3 is 
accepted for publication. 
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broken into two separate sections: developmental reliability growth assessment, and 
operational reliability assessment using the developmental reliability growth 
assessment posterior results as prior information.  Straightforward generalizations of 
the initial framework that are appropriate for multiple systems under test are also 
presented.  Analogous OC curve results for the proposed model are developed in 
Section 4.3.  A Bayesian goodness of fit of test to assess the appropriateness of the 
overall model assumptions is presented in Section 4.4.  Section 4.5 discusses the 
performance of the proposed model, and conclusions are presented in Section 4.6. 
4.2 Methodology 
 The development of the methodology considers the combination of 
developmental and operational test data for a single system while accounting for 
differences in the underlying failure intensity that may exist between the two test 
events.  The method allows for reliability growth through the developmental test, 
where one or more failure modes may be mitigated through the implementation of a 
corrective action.  The operational test is assumed to be a constant configuration test, 
and the difference in the two test environments is modeled explicitly.  More 
specifically, a decrease in reliability (or increase in failure intensity) between the test 
phases is considered probabilistically.  The methodology is then extended to include 
multiple test phases and multiple systems under test. 
4.2.1 Assessing Reliability Growth in DT  
This section presents a method for modeling the reliability growth of a system 
during a developmental test phase.  The results from this procedure are then used as 
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prior information when assessing the reliability from the operational test in Section 
4.2.2.  The approach is the same as that developed in Chapter 3, but an outline of the 
method is presented here for completeness.  The assumptions for the reliability 
growth test data are as follows: 
 
1. The system is sufficiently complex; i.e. a large number of failure modes exist 
in the system. 
2. Failure modes generate system failures independently. 
3. Each occurrence of a failure mode results in a system failure. 
4. The failure intensity for a given failure mode is constant both before and after 
a corrective is implemented. 
5. No new failure modes are induced by corrective actions. 
 
Using the same notation as in Chapter 3, we assume for failure mode i that ni 
failures are observed in test length T with times 
 
ti,1,ti, 2 ,...,ti, ni( ).  Further assume that 
the failures are divided such that ni,1 occur before a corrective action is implemented 
and ni - ni,1 failures occur after the corrective action.  For a corrective action that 
occurs at time vi, let di represent the FEF resulting from the corrective action.  From 
assumptions 2. and 4. the likelihood can then be expressed as   
 
l ti,1,ti, 2 ,...,ti, ni ,ni ,n i, 1 | λi( )= 1 − di( )
ni −ni, 1λi
ni exp −λi vi + 1 − di( ) TDT − vi( )[ ]( ).    (1) 
We note that the likelihood involves a telescoping sum of the individual failure times, 
and the simplified form in (1) reduces to a function of the number of failures.  The 
individual failure times are therefore suppressed in future notation. 
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 For the prior distribution on the failure intensity, it is useful to consider a 
distribution that will adequately reflect the failure intensity for a given failure mode.  
The failure intensities for the collection of failure modes found in a complex system 
are shown to be adequately modeled as a random realization from a Gamma 
distribution [18], [26].  This form of the prior probability distribution recognizes what 
is commonly referred to as the “vital few, trivial many” property among failure mode 
failure intensities.  This property acknowledges that each failure mode provides a 
different contribution to the overall system failure intensity, with a relatively few 
number of failure modes being significant enough to be observed in test.  We assume 
the prior distribution to be a Gamma(α,β) parameterized as  
 
p λi( ) =
λi
α −1










 ,    (2) 
where α > 0 and β > 0.  Because of the conjugate nature of (2), standard techniques 
yield the posterior distribution for a single failure mode to be the Gamma distribution 
parameterized in (3). 
 
p λi | ni( ) =
λi
α+ ni −1
Γ α + ni( )
1
β





− α+ ni( )
 *
                                                      exp −λi
1
β













         (3) 
Note also that if no corrective action is attempted, the di are equal to zero, and (3) 
reduces to the Gamma posterior that is commonly found through conjugate Gamma-
Exponential methods. 
 The posterior estimate for the system level failure intensity can be found by 
summing the individual mode posterior estimates and taking the limit as the number 
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of modes becomes large.  The result was shown in Chapter 3 to be well approximated 
by a Gamma distribution with mean and variance given in (4) and (5).  We use the 
notation λDT to denote the system level failure intensity from DT and distinguish 
between later assessments of the desired operational failure intensity.  The variable n 
refers to the vector containing the number of failures for each of the m observed 
failure modes.  In taking the limit with respect to the number of modes, the mean and 
variance in (4) and (5) are expressed in terms of the prior system level mean λB and 
the original β parameter from the prior Gamma distribution. 
 
E λDT | n[ ] =
1 − di( )ni
1
β





















∑ + λB1 + βTDT
  (4) 
 
Var λDT | n[ ] =





































2 .            (5) 
This results in  
 
λDT ~ Gamma ˜ α , ˜ β [ ],     (6) 
where the approximate Gamma can be easily determined using the mean and variance 
to yield the parameters in (7) and (8). 
 
˜ α =
E λDT | n[ ]
2
Var λDT | n[ ]
           (7) 
 
˜ β =
Var λDT | n[ ]
E λDT | n[ ]
           (8) 
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 Note that both the prior and posterior distributions on the system level failure 
intensity in DT are Gamma, which is a conjugate relationship.  This allows for ease in 
modeling multiple developmental test phases within the framework already 
established.  The posterior distribution results in (7) and (8) can be used as prior 
parameters for a follow-on phase of DT, and this updating process can be continued 
with each additional phase of DT.  Updating in this manner assumes consistency 
between successive test phases, and the posterior defined by (7) and (8) may not be an 
appropriate prior if this assumption is significantly violated.  In these cases it is 
important to consider the model goodness of fit procedures described in Chapter 3 to 
ensure that the results are reasonable.  Equations for empirical Bayes estimation of 
the unknown prior λB and β parameters in (4) and (5) are also provided in Chapter 3. 
4.2.2 Assessing Reliability in OT  
 For assessing the reliability from an operational test, the Gamma posterior 
distribution from Section 4.2.1 can be used to develop the prior distribution.  The 
conjugate relationship of the Gamma-Exponential can easily be leveraged in this 
context, but the degradation in the system reliability must also be considered.  This 
degradation is traditionally considered in terms of a decrease in the system Mean 
Time Between Failure (MTBF).  Assuming a 
 
100γ % degradation in the MTBF (or a 
corresponding increase in system failure intensity) leads to the relationship between 
the developmental and operational failure intensities shown in (9)-(11), where the DT 
and OT subscripts denote the corresponding MTBF and failure intensity values. 
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= 1 − γ( ) 1
λDT
        (10) 
 
λDT = 1 − γ( )λOT         (11) 
Utilizing the form of the distribution in (6) and properties of the Gamma distribution 




1 − γ( )
~ Gamma ˜ α ,
˜ β 






 .          (12) 
The prior distribution in (12) is conditioned on the γ parameter, so we can also 
express (12) as 
 








 .    (13) 
The expression in (13) is now a reasonable prior distribution for use with the test data 
from the operational test phase.  For nOT failures in test time TOT at times 
 
tOT,1,tOT,2,...,tOT,nOT( ) the likelihood is a simplified version of (1) shown in (14). 
 
l  tOT,1,  tOT,2,  ...  , tOT,nOT , nOT | λOT( )=λOT nOT exp −λOTTOT( )   (14) 
A simple conjugate relationship would yield a posterior distribution that is 
conditional on γ.  The true value of γ is unknown though, so the desired unconditional 
posterior is given by  
 
p λOT | nOT( ) =
p γ( )p λOT | γ( )l tOT,1,tOT,2,?,tOT,nOT ,nOT | λOT( )
p γ( )p λOT | γ( )l tOT,1,tOT,2,?,tOT,nOT ,nOT | λOT( )∂λOT∂γ
Λ, Γ
∫∫Γ
∫ ∂γ ,    (15) 
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where the Λ and Γ in (15) denote the support of the prior distributions on λ and γ, and 
the degradation is assumed to be independent of the failure intensity.  Note that the 
expression in (15) treats the degradation factor as a nuisance parameter by finding the 
joint posterior distribution and then calculating the resulting marginal distribution of 
interest.  We again suppress the individual failure times in notation for the posterior 
distribution.     
 When developing the prior distribution on the degradation between test 
phases, detailed information is generally not available.  For this reason we 
demonstrate the use of the Maximum Entropy principle [87],[88] to provide a 
repeatable approach that allows for consistency in application.  We further assume 
that only average MTBF degradation values are available.  The average values can be 
determined through examination of historical performance on similar systems, or 
through comparison of the potential failure modes that exist in the system with the 
developmental test environment.  Maximizing the entropy subject to the assumed 
mean value of the MTBF degradation γ and a range of (0,1) results in the prior 
distribution for γ being a truncated Exponential distribution given by  
 
p γ( ) = µexp −µγ( )
1 − exp −µ( )
,    (16) 





exp − µ( )
1 −exp − µ( )
= ε     (17) 
for mean degradation value ε.   Examining equation (17) reveals that µ will be zero 
when the mean degradation is equal to 0.5.  This presents no real problem in practice 
though, as the mean value of the degradation is not likely to be known with high 
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precision.  Perturbing the mean slightly to 0.49 will allow for a positive solution, and 
the end result can be shown to be insensitive to this level of difference.  To aid in 
analytic calculations of (15), the truncated Exponential distribution in (16) is 
approximated with a Beta distribution.  The parameters of the Beta distribution can be 
found by equating the mean and second moment about the origin of the two 









1 − exp −µ( )


















exp −µ( ) + 2 − 1
µ
exp −µ( ) − 1
µ 2






1 − exp −µ( )
          (19) 
A comparison plot of the two prior distributions is shown in Figure 4.1.  The mean in 
the example is set at ε = 0.20, and the priors are seen to match very closely on the 
(0,1) interval.   
 
 
Fig. 4.1:  Comparison of Truncated Exponential and Beta Prior Distributions 
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We point out that the model is developed using only the Beta approximation as the 
prior distribution.  While the maximum entropy approach in (16)-(19) provides a 
repeatable framework that will be consistent between different users with the same 
mean degradation, other relevant information should also be used whenever possible 
to develop the Beta prior. 
 For the system failure intensity under squared error loss, the Bayes estimate of 
the failure intensity is just the mean of the posterior distribution in (15).  Utilizing the 
Beta prior on the degradation, the mean is found to be 
 
E λOT | nOT[ ] =



















































where 2F1(a,b,c,z) is the integral form of the hypergeometric function given by  
 
2 F1 a ,b,c,z( ) =
Γ c( )
Γ b( )Γ c − b( )
tb−1 1 − t( )c −b−1 1 − tz( )−a dt
0
1
∫ .  (21) 
The function given in (21) can be evaluated by most standard mathematical software, 
and numerous numerical procedures in many programming languages are also 
available.  Note that the mean of the posterior Gamma distribution with no 
degradation is given by 
 
E λOT[ ] =




.        (22) 
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The degradation between the two test environments results in the additional factor 
containing the Hypergeometric functions.  The ratio acts as a scale parameter for the 
usual posterior mean to account for the differences in the two test environments.  The 
posterior variance can be developed similarly as  
 
Var λOT | nOT[ ] =
















































































































































The mean of the posterior distribution in (22) is a scaled Gamma mean.  This 
provides evidence that the overall posterior may be well approximated by a Gamma 
distribution with parameters given by (7) and (8), substituting the mean and variance 
from (20) and (23).  To confirm this notion,
 
Figure 4.2 shows a histogram developed 
using a simple Metropolis Random Walk to generate samples from the posterior in 
(15).  The dashed line is the approximate Gamma developed using (20) and (23), 
which confirms that the Gamma provides a reasonable description of the posterior 
distribution. 
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Fig. 4.2:  Approximate Gamma Overlaid on True Posterior Distribution 
 
4.2.3 Generalization for Multiple Systems under Test  
 The results in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 pertain to a single system under test. A 
particularly useful property of the Bayesian framework is the ease of extension that is 
possible.  This section presents one such extension to address the common situation 
involving multiple identical systems under test.   
 The extension of the reliability growth model in Section 4.2.1 was presented 
in Chapter 3.  The posterior distribution can again be modeled sufficiently with a 
Gamma distribution, where the parameters are developed using the appropriate 
posterior mean and variance along with the techniques described in Section 4.2.1.  
This allows us to utilize the same approach as in Section 4.2.2 for developing the 
prior distribution on λ.  For the extension of the likelihood in (14), assume there are p 
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systems under test.  Next assume that for a given system j, nOT,j failures are observed 
in test length Tj with times 
 
tOT,j,1,..., tOT,j, nOT, j( ).  The likelihood is then given as  
 


















  (24) 
The likelihood again involves a telescoping sum of the individual failure times, and 
the simplified form reduces to a function of the total number of failures across each of 
the systems.  Substituting (24) into the posterior defined in (15) results in the updated 










∑  for TOT. 
 
E λOT | nOT[ ] =






















2 F1 ˜ α + nOT, j
j =1
p
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Var λOT | nOT[ ] =












































2 F1 ˜ α + nOT, j
j =1
p





















2 F1 ˜ α + nOT, j
j =1
p
























- CHAPTER 4 - 
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The likelihood in (24) can also be considered as a single system with test time equal 
to the total test time across all of the systems.  Using this representation, the system 
level posterior distribution is again sufficiently represented by a Gamma distribution 
with the parameters defined in (7) and (8). 
4.3 Demonstration Testing 
 As mentioned previously, demonstration test planning with classical OC-
curve analysis presents a number of issues for practical application.  The method 
involves calculating the consumer and producer risks associated with the planned 
demonstration test, where demonstration is considered to be successful if the 
appropriate lower confidence bound on the MTBF is greater than or equal to the 
required MTBF [6].  The consumer risk, denoted by α, is the risk of accepting that the 
MTBF of the system meets its requirement when it truly does not.  It is determined by 
the desired statistical confidence level, resulting in a maximum number of failures 
that can be observed during a successful test.  Producer risk is the probability of not 
accepting that the MTBF of the system meets its requirement when it truly does.  It 
can be found by considering the power or probability of a successful demonstration 
the test, where a successful test is defined as observing less than or equal to the 
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allowable number of failures during the demonstration test.  The producer risk can 
then be recognized as the complement of the probability of a successful test.  The 
approach is conditional on the value of the system failure intensity entering the test, 
which is not known in practice.  This is due to two sources of uncertainty: the first is 
that involving the system failure intensity at the end of the developmental test 
program, and the second is the amount of degradation that will occur when 
transitioning from a developmental test environment to an operational test 
environment.   
 The model framework outlined in Section 4.2.2 explicitly addresses the 
uncertainty present prior to entering the test by considering uncertainty on both the 
system failure intensity and the associated degradation factor between the prior DT 
and the operational demonstration test.  Figure 4.3 shows an example of the Gamma 
posterior distribution of the failure intensity relative to the requirement for a 
consumer risk of 0.20.  As shown in the figure, consumer risk of 0.20 corresponds to 
0.20 posterior probability of the failure intensity being greater than the requirement.  
When considering the consumer risk in this setting, the appropriate upper probability 
bound from the Gamma posterior distribution defined by (20) and (23) can be used to 
determine the maximum number of allowable failures for the desired level of 
consumer risk.   
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Fig 4.3: Graphical Representation of Consumer Risk (α = 0.20) 
 
When the maximum number of failures allowed for a successful demonstration test, 
nmax, has been determined, the full unconditional probability of a successful test can 
also be calculated.  The Gamma prior defined in (13) and the Beta prior defined by 
(18) and (19) account for the uncertainty in the failure intensity and degradation 












Γ a + b( )Γ ˜ α + i( )Γ b + ˜ α( )






























  (29) 
The expression in (29) can be developed as a straightforward extension of the 
classical probability of acceptance defined in [6] as 
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i exp −λOTTOT( )
i!i =0
nOT
∑ .   (30) 
Equation (29) can be developed from (30) by substituting the DT-OT relationship 
from (11) and (12) for the operational failure intensity in (30) and then marginalizing 
with respect to the distributions in (13), (18), and (19).  This result represents a more 
complete description of the probability of a successful test and the corresponding 
producer risk that exists.   
 When the reliability demonstration event is used to develop reliability design 
goals, use of the posterior distribution in (20) and (23) along with (29) will result in 
lower goals for the same consumer and producer risks when compared to the classical 
OC curve based results.  These design goals can be thought of as reliability 
“demonstration margins”, which serve as overall programmatic risk indicators for 
planned development and testing programs.  The proposed assessment approach using 
combined developmental and operational test data can therefore be seen to directly 
reduce the programmatic risks that may exist due to reliability demonstration with 
operational test data alone.  Note that the reduced goals are a direct result of the 
additional information provided by the development reliability growth test data.  The 
reliability growth model in Section 4.2.1 and Chapter 3 provides a substantial amount 
of information on the failure intensity of the system during DT.  This information is 
useful even when a conservative approach is used to assign the prior on the 
degradation factor, such as with the maximum entropy approach in Section 4.2.2. 
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4.4 Model Assessment 
The validity of the assumptions and relative “goodness” of the model are 
important considerations when utilizing any model for inference.  A chi-squared 
goodness of fit test [83],[84] can be used to provide an indication of the 
appropriateness of the chosen model.  The Bayesian chi-squared test statistic 
developed in [83] utilizes the properties of the cumulative distribution function 
corresponding to the likelihood function used in the development of the posterior 
distribution along with samples from the posterior distribution.  Application of this 
test to developmental reliability growth test data was presented in Chapter 3 and will 
not be presented in this chapter.  For assessing the combined developmental and 
operational test model, the method is as follows. 
 Following the method outlined in [84], the posterior distribution is the Gamma 
distribution developed in Section 4.2.2 with mean and variance in (20) and (23).  The 
unit interval is then divided into q sub-intervals such that 
 
0 ≡ a0 < a1 < ... < aq−1 < aq ≡1.  For failure times (tOT,1,tOT,2,…,tOT,nOT), let yj be the 
times between successive operational test failures for j = 1,…,nOT.  Also let Fj be the 
corresponding cumulative Exponential distribution with the failure rate parameter 
 
˜ λ  
sampled from the Gamma posterior.  Next define 
 
zj ˜ λ ( ) to be a vector of length q 
whose jth𝑞𝑡ℎ element is zero unless  
 
F yj | ˜ λ ( )∈ aq−1,aq( ),      (31) 
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in which case the 𝑞𝑡ℎ element of zj is set to one.  For the failure free interval at the 
end of the operational test, a random number is drawn from the interval 
 
1 −F TOT −tOT, nOT | ˜ λ ( ), 1[ ] in place of the Fj in (31) [84].  Next define  
 
m ˜ θ ( ) = zj ˜ θ ( )
j =1
nOT +1
∑ .    (32) 
The expression in (32) is a vector of length q, where each element of the vector 
represents the total number of points in the qth subinterval of the unit interval.  The 
summation in (32) also involves nOT + 1 terms because of the failure free interval at 
the end of the test.  The chi-square statistic from [83] is defined as 
 
RB ˜ θ ( ) =













,       (33) 
where the pk are defined as the differences between the aq values that divide the unit 
interval.  The statistic in (33) is asymptotically chi-squared with q -1 degrees of 
freedom under repeated sampling of both the data and the posterior parameter of 
interest.  As described in Chapter 3 and [83], the utility of the statistic is that poorly 
specified models will not follow the proper chi-squared distribution and will likely 
have a higher number of samples in the tail of the distribution.  The proportion of 
samples of (33) that fall beyond the desired critical value of the chi-squared 
distribution can be used to assess model fit.  For example, 50% of the sampled values 
of RB falling above the 0.95 quantile of the chi-squared distribution would indicate a 
problem with model fit [84]. 
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4.5 Performance Comparisons 
 Performance of the proposed method is examined using two separate 
approaches.  The first involves comparing the relative error distributions for the 
proposed method and the classical estimate from multiple replications of simulated 
tests.  The second compares the Bayes posterior risk of each method to examine the 
sensitivity of the prior distribution on the DT-OT degradation factor.   
 For the relative error comparisons, a simulation was developed to examine the 
behavior of the proposed model.  The simulation uses an input parameterization for 
the Gamma distribution and then generates random failure intensities for the specified 
number of failure modes.  For each realized value of the failure mode developmental 
failure intensity, random failures are then generated for a developmental test phase of 
a desired length.  Corrective actions are applied according to an arbitrary corrective 
action strategy, with random FEF values for each mode drawn from a Beta 
distribution.  The failure intensities are then scaled through the application of a 
degradation factor that is randomly sampled from an additional Beta distribution.  
This determines the true operational failure intensity, from which random failures are 
then generated for a second operational test of desired length.   The true underlying 
system level failure intensity (and corresponding MTBF) is then known from the sum 
of the realized values in the simulation, and there are realized failures from one or 
more of the test phases that can be used in the model framework to estimate the 
system level failure intensity.  One thousand replications were determined to be 
sufficient based on sufficient convergence of the mean result as a function of the 
number of replications. 
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 Table 4.1 contains ten cases that were examined for comparison purposes.  
The cases were chosen to cover the possible scenarios with different amounts of 
testing and reliability.  Table 4.2 contains the average results over the one thousand 
replications for each case.  MTBF values are reported in the table instead of the 
failure intensities to provide a more intuitive understanding of the inputs for each 
case.  The average relative error values for both the Bayesian technique proposed here 
and the classical estimate using only the data from the operational test event are also 
included.  The average absolute relative error is a useful measure of performance for 
models of this type, and it provides an indication on the general ability of the model 
to provide a reasonable estimate of the desired system failure intensity.  The absolute 





,        (34) 
where λ is the true operational system failure intensity from the simulation, and λ̂  is 
the model estimate resulting from the simulated data.  Note that the use of the 
absolute relative error may provide a conservative indication of the performance of 
the estimators.  The failure intensities are generally small values, so seemingly minor 
differences may actually be large percentage values and result in high relative error 
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TABLE 4.1 

















1 500 0.0001 100 1000 2000 0.2 
2 500 0.0001 400 1000 2000 0.2 
3 500 0.0001 100 2000 2000 0.2 
4 500 0.0001 400 2000 2000 0.2 
5 500 0.0001 100 2000 500 0.2 
6 500 0.0001 400 2000 500 0.2 
7 500 0.0001 100 5000 500 0.2 
8 500 0.0001 400 5000 500 0.2 
9 500 0.0001 100 10000 500 0.2 




  COMPARISON RESULTS FOR SIMULATION CASES 
























1 71.4 72.4 65.5 0.16 74.7 61.9 0.15 11.6 46.1 
2 292.8 299.6 239.6 0.27 384.5 231.5 0.32 4.3 7.1 
3 77.8 81 74.4 0.15 82.2 67.5 0.15 20.6 29.1 
4 313.4 318.3 263.2 0.29 389.4 236.2 0.31 6.9 6.8 
5 77.5 84.7 76.6 0.19 92 57.4 0.31 20.5 7.3 
6 313.9 319 253.7 0.35 238.4 159.4 0.6 6.8 1.9 
7 89.9 97.1 88.8 0.15 110.8 65 0.33 49.3 7 
8 372.4 393.2 333.7 0.27 235.6 179.1 0.7 13.4 1.6 
9 110.3 116.6 107.6 0.13 137.8 79.8 0.37 99.1 5.5 
10 445.2 465 402.7 0.22 250.2 190.2 0.72 25.1 1.3 
   
 The results averaged over 1000 replications in Table 4.2 are informative of the 
general performance of the two models on the average, but the distribution of the 
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relative error is also of interest.  Examining the empirical distribution of the relative 
error will provide additional information regarding the performance and utility of the 
model.  Figures 4.4 - 4.7 show the empirical distribution of the relative error for the 
four of the test cases listed in Table 4.1.  The dashed and solid lines represent the 
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Fig. 4.7: Case 9 Empirical Distribution of Relative Error 
 
The distributions for the relative error in Figures 4.4 and 4.5 demonstrate that the 
proposed Bayesian model and the classical estimate provide similar results for those 
cases where there is a relatively large amount of OT.   Figures 4.6 – 4.7 show that the 
Bayesian model using the combined data from both tests provides more accurate 
estimates of the total system failure intensity than the classical estimate in cases 
where the amount of OT is limited.  For example in Figure 4.6 for Case 8, the 
Bayesian model provides an estimate that is within 30% of the true value 
approximately 80% of the time, while the corresponding classical estimate is within 
30% roughly 50% of the time.  Expanding the relative error to 40% shows nearly 
95% of the Bayesian estimates to be within this threshold, while only 65% of the 
classical estimates fall within this range.  This behavior is to be expected though, as 
more information is being used in developing the combined Bayesian estimate.   
 Further simulation runs were also made in order to understand the sensitivity 
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degradation parameter that are used.  Table 4.3 shows the average results over 1000 
replications when the chosen mean degradation is optimistic (true mean = 0.2, model 
input = 0.1), and Table 4.4 shows the average results over 1000 replications when the 
chosen mean is conservative (true mean = 0.2, model input = 0.3).  As the results in 
tables show, the proposed Bayesian method still performs well and provides lower 
mean absolute relative error values in many cases even when the mean of the 
degradation is misspecified.  This is particularly true when the amount of OT is lower 
than the amount of DT, further highlighting the utility of the proposed method.   
 
 
   
TABLE 4.3 
  COMPARISON RESULTS FOR OPTIMISTIC MEAN DEGRADATION (TRUE 
MEAN = 0.2, MODEL INPUT = 0.1) 
 
























1 71.2 83.5 75.8 0.19 73.5 61 0.15 11.5 33.4 
2 296.8 294.2 238.9 0.32 370.8 222.1 0.26 4.8 7.2 
3 77.4 94.5 87.5 0.19 80.1 65.9 0.15 20.9 47.1 
4 332.2 373.6 311.6 0.27 436.6 252.8 0.3 6.6 6.6 
5 77.2 103.1 94.2 0.25 93.6 58 0.31 20.7 7.2 
6 310.4 380.8 309.1 0.32 234.5 160.9 0.64 6.8 2 
7 91.8 119.7 110.9 0.23 108.1 64.9 0.32 50 6.1 
8 373.1 481 414.4 0.28 250.7 176.7 0.66 13.4 1.4 
9 110.4 143.7 133.9 0.23 139.1 78.7 0.38 99.4 5.2 
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TABLE 4.4 
  COMPARISON RESULTS FOR CONSERVATIVE MEAN DEGRADATION 
(TRUE MEAN = 0.2, MODEL INPUT = 0.3) 
 
























1 72 63.4 57.1 0.26 75.7 62.6 0.16 11.6 32.2 
2 293.2 249.4 200.4 0.41 384.4 224.8 0.32 4.8 8.2 
3 76.8 64.8 59.2 0.26 80.3 66 0.15 20.7 38.4 
4 307.7 267.6 219.7 0.41 397.7 235.3 0.32 6.6 8.6 
5 76.6 61.8 55 0.34 95.7 57.9 0.33 20.5 7.5 
6 317 252.8 195 0.59 252.5 167.5 0.63 6.9 1.6 
7 92 71.7 64.3 0.33 114.1 67 0.34 49.8 6.1 
8 366.9 288 234.1 0.47 247.3 170.9 0.67 13.2 1.8 
9 110 83.7 75.2 0.34 144.6 78 0.37 100.1 5.2 
10 441.6 336 277.3 0.44 248.3 185.6 0.73 25.1 1.4 
 
 The Bayesian posterior risk provides an additional method for examining the 
performance of the proposed method.  The use of the posterior risk places the 
problem of reliability assessment within a decision theoretic framework, and it 
naturally aligns with the decision of whether a system’s reliability is sufficient or not.  
In this context we continue to use the squared error loss function [89].  Also, in order 
to rectify potential issues resulting from comparing Bayesian and classical methods 
within this framework, we note that the classical point estimate and confidence 
bounds for the exponential distribution can be derived equivalently from the Bayesian 
posterior distribution resulting from the use of the Jeffrey’s prior distribution [90].  
We also point out that this prior need not be improper.  Finite bounds can be used for 
the support of the prior, and the posterior can be examined with respect to the limits 
of the chosen bounds.  The development of this result is as follows. 
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 For the Jeffrey’s prior development, the distribution will be proportional to the 
inverse of the failure intensity [89] such that  
 
p λOT( ) ∝
1
λOT
.     (35) 
This yields the prior distribution given by (36). 
 











, l1 <λOT < l2   (36) 
The posterior distribution that results from using (36) as a prior along with the 
likelihood in (14) is given by 
 




























.        (37) 
Because the desired range for the failure intensity is the positive real line, taking the 
appropriate limits in the denominator of (37) then yields 
 
p λOT | TOT( ) =
λOT





.         (38) 
The posterior distribution in (38) is a Gamma(α,β) distribution of the same form as in 
(2), which can then be used to develop the desired classical results.   
 The Bayesian posterior risk under quadratic loss for a given prior distribution 
is just the variance of the posterior distribution that results [89].  The posterior risk for 
the classical estimator is then just the variance of the Gamma distribution in (38), 
which is given by  
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Var λOT | TOT( ) =
nOT
TOT
2 .           (39) 
For the proposed Bayes method, the variance of the posterior was defined in (23). 
Examining (23) and (39), we can compare the posterior risks by varying the number 
of observed failures nOT for fixed test length TOT along with the prior information 
regarding the failure intensity and DT-OT degradation.  The prior Gamma parameters 
in (23) can be developed by specifying a prior mean and variance on the failure 
intensity, or equivalently a prior mean and beta parameter.  The prior Beta parameters 
can be developed by specifying the mean DT-OT degradation and using the 
maximum entropy methods described in Section 4.2.2.  Examining the posterior risk 
under these conditions allows for straightforward comparison of the two methods, and 
it also allows for ease in further examining the sensitivity of the proposed Bayesian 
model to the mean of the DT-OT degradation.   
 Table 4.5 contains four cases for comparison.  The prior Gamma parameters 
for the failure intensity, prior Beta parameters for the DT-OT degradation, and test 
length are fixed for each case.  The cases correspond to a prior MTBF value of 250 
hours, and the Beta prior parameters in cases 1 and 3 correspond to a mean 
degradation of 0.05.  The Beta parameters in Cases 2 and 4 correspond to a Uniform 
distribution, which assumes no known prior information about the degradation.  Note 
also that the test length is chosen to represent two separate cases: the first being 
where many multiples of the MTBF are available for testing, and the second being 
testing for only twice the value of the MTBF.  Larger numbers of failures would be 
expected in Cases 1 and 2, and relatively few failures would be expected in Cases 3 
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and 4. The plots in Figures 4.8 – 4.11 show the resulting posterior risk comparisons 




POSTERIOR RISK COMPARISON CASES 
Case α β a b Test Length 
1 40 0.0001 0.9 17.1 5000 
2 40 0.0001 1 1 5000 
3 40 0.0001 0.9 17.1 500 
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Fig. 4.11: Posterior Risk Comparison Case 4 
 
The results in Figures 4.8 - 4.11 indicate that the proposed Bayesian method provides 
a generally lower variance, and therefore lower posterior risk, than the classical 
approach.  This is especially true when examining the plots for reasonable numbers of 
failures that would be expected during the test lengths for each of the cases.  For 
Cases 1 and 2 in Figures 4.8 and 4.9 respectively, the classical risk is below the 
proposed Bayesian model when there are approximately 6 or less failures.  It is likely 
that more than 6 failures will be observed in a 5000 hour test when the system MTBF 
is 250 hours, so the proposed will be lower risk in most practical applications.  The 
proposed Bayesian approach also provides lower risk in those cases when the mean 
DT-OT degradation is treated as unknown and a uniform distribution is used for the 
uncertainty.  These results are a further indication of the utility of the proposed model 
for reliability assessment. 
4.6 Discussion and Conclusions 
 This chapter presents a new reliability assessment model that allows for the 
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continuously operating systems.  The model offers an alternative to the traditional 
reliability assessment that is based on a single test event using only the data collected 
from the test phase in question.  Differences in the test environments and stressors 
must always be considered when combining data from different test events, and the 
model explicitly accounts for the degradation that exists when moving from 
developmental to OT.   
 Note that the posterior distribution after OT does not explicitly use the amount 
of DT.  It only assumes that the uncertainty on the system failure intensity prior to OT 
can be represented by a Gamma distribution.  This increases the flexibility of the 
approach by allowing for the use of additional relevant reliability information.  Data 
from lower level testing or analysis may potentially be used along with or in place of 
developmental reliability growth testing to develop the prior Gamma.  If lower level 
data is used to develop the prior without system level data, it is important that a 
rigorous examination of the potential failure modes be completed in order to 
determine a reasonable value for the mean degradation between developmental and 
OT.  For the degradation distribution itself, the use of the Maximum Entropy 
approach provides a repeatable framework to allow for consistency.  The assessment 
model is developed using only the Beta approximation for prior distribution on the 
degradation though, and other relevant information should also be used whenever 
possible to develop the Beta prior on the degradation value.  
 Also note that the degradation in reliability between the developmental and 
operational tests is applied through a scaling of the system level failure intensity.  
While the assumption is a basic approach, it provides the necessary flexibility for the 
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degradation to occur in many possible ways.  For instance, the DT may not have the 
opportunity to fully exercise certain components of the system, leading to an increase 
in the failure intensity for a subset of the failure modes during OT.  It is also possible 
that the DT may fully exercise all aspects of the system, but in a more benign manner 
than the operational environment.  The same degradation may then be realized 
through a smaller individual increase across a larger number of failure modes.     
 The approach serves as a natural extension of the current approach to 
reliability demonstration used in the Defense industry while explicitly modeling the 
additional uncertainty that exists in the problem.  Use of the posterior distribution in 
(20) and (23) along with the probability of a successful test defined by (29) will 
generally lead to tighter uncertainty intervals and result in lower reliability design 
goals.  This approach can help to directly reduce the programmatic risks that may 
exist due to reliability demonstration in a constrained environment with operational 
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5 RELIABILITY GROWTH PLANNING USING COMBINED 
DEVELOPMENTAL AND OPERATIONAL TEST DATA FOR 
RELIABILITY DEMONSTRATION 
5.1 Introduction 
5.1.1 Background  
 This chapter presents an approach to reliability growth planning that serves to 
mitigate the problems associated with the high reliability goals resulting from 
traditional reliability demonstration.  The proposed method uses a combination of 
developmental reliability growth test data and operational reliability test data for 
reliability demonstration within a Bayesian probabilistic framework.   Demonstration 
in this manner was developed in [6].  Degradation between the developmental and 
operational test phases is accounted for through the probabilistic application of a scale 
factor.  The Bayesian formulation that is used easily allows for uncertainty to be 
included on the scale factor.  This provides an approach that will more closely match 
the practical situation, in which limited information on the actual degradation may be 
available.  The reliability growth portion of the method is based on the projection 
model developed in Chapter 3, which is an extension of the models found in [18] and 
[26]. 
5.1.2 Chapter Overview 
 The methodology of the approach is presented in Section 5.2.  It includes 
model assumptions, data requirements, and the development of the initial framework 
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for combining data from two different tests.  The presentation of the methodology is 
broken into two separate sections: developmental reliability growth assessment, and 
operational reliability assessment using prior reliability growth assessment results.  
Section 5.3 presents three associated management metrics that can be helpful in 
managing a reliability growth program.  An example application of the model is 
presented in Section 5.4, and conclusions are found in Section 5.5.   
5.2  Methodology 
 The methodology is presented in three parts.  The first considers the 
construction of a reliability growth planning curve for the developmental test 
program.  The reliability growth program assumes that the reliability of the system 
will be increasing due to the discovery and subsequent correction of failure modes 
inherent in the initial configuration of the system.  The second considers reliability 
demonstration using a combination of developmental and operational test data for a 
single system while accounting for differences in the underlying failure intensity that 
may exist between the two test events.  The operational test is assumed to be a 
constant configuration test with a more realistic test environment that causes a 
difference in the underlying system reliability.  Results from the reliability growth 
portion are used to explicitly model the uncertainty present in the failure intensity, 
and the difference in the two test environments is modeled explicitly with a 
probabilistic decrease in reliability (or increase in failure intensity) between the test 
phases.  The third part develops the actual planning curve by combining the results 
from the first two parts. 
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5.2.1 Data Requirements 
 The reliability growth planning model presented here utilizes the same inputs 
as current models that are found in [13].  The data requirements are: 
 
1. Initial MTBF, MI 
2. MTBF Requirement, MR 
3. Average FEF, µd 
4. MS 
5. Average reliability degradation between developmental and operational test 
environments, ε 
6. Test lengths for planned developmental and OT 
 
The initial MTBF is the mean of the prior distribution in this approach.  While it is 
commonly specified in currently used models, its use in a Bayesian setting may prove 
to be too informative for some applications.  In these cases it is recommended that 
any initial reliability growth planning curve be updated and reinitialized after the first 
phase of DT.  Empirical Bayes estimates from Chapter 3 can be applied to the data 
from the test and then utilized in the planning curve construction presented in this 
chapter. 
5.2.2 Modeling Reliability Growth in DT 
 The assumptions for the reliability growth testing mimic those in Chapters 3 
and 4 and are as follows: 
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1. A large number of failure modes (K) exist in the system. 
2. Failure modes generate failures independently of one another. 
3. Each occurrence of a failure mode results in a system failure. 
4. The failure intensity for a given failure mode is constant both before and after 
a corrective action is implemented. 
5. No new failure modes are induced by corrective actions. 
6. The resulting failure intensity after corrective action will be reduced from the 
initial value according to the assigned FEF.  
7. Failure mode failure intensities have a common prior Gamma distribution. 
 
For the failure intensity of each failure mode, we use a Gamma(α,β) parameterized as  
 
p λi( ) =
λi
α −1










  , α > 0, β > 0         (1) 
The system level failure intensity can then be approximated by a Gamma distribution 
with mean and variance given in (2) and (3).  We use the notation λDT to denote the 
system level failure intensity from DT and distinguish between later assessments of 
the desired operational failure intensity.  Because the results in Chapters 3 and 4 
make no distinction between A-modes and B-modes, we also substitute λI in place of 
λB to facilitate later classification of different types of failure modes.  The variable n 
refers to the vector containing the number of failures for each of the m observed 
failure modes. 
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E λDT | n[ ] =
1 − di( )ni
1
β





















∑ + λI1 + βTDT
      (2) 
 
Var λDT | n[ ] =





































2 .   (3) 
In this chapter we extend these results for reliability growth planning by making three 
additional assumptions that are common in reliability growth planning.  First, we 
assume that a portion of the observed failure modes will be considered as A-modes, 
which are defined as failure modes that will not receive corrective actions when 




λA = (1 − MS)λI       (4) 
B-modes are those failure modes that will be corrected when observed during the 
reliability growth process. λB is defined from the inputs as 
 
λB = MSλI                     (5) 
Note that 
 
λA +λB =λI .  We next assume that all failure modes will be corrected with 
an average level of fix effectiveness, denoted as µd.  All corrective actions are also 
assumed to be delayed until the end of the test length TDT.  
 To develop the planning model, we use assumption 4 and marginalize with 
respect to the observed number of failures during testing of length TDT.  This is 
equivalent to substituting the expected number of failures for the observed number of 
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failures in (2) and (3).  These modifications result in the updated expressions for the 
mean and variance given in (6) and (7). 
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2 .     (7) 
The expression in (6) is composed of three main parts.  The first is the failure 
intensity due to observed failure modes that will not be corrected.  The second is the 
remaining failure intensity for failure modes that have been observed during the test 
and corrected with the average level of fix effectiveness.  The third is the remaining 
failure intensity due to failure modes that have not yet been observed during the test.  
When no A-modes are considered, this expression is also identical to the idealized 
reliability growth planning curve for B-modes presented in [17].  When both A-
modes and B-modes are considered, the difference between the results here and in 
[17] is due to the treatment of the A-modes.  The approach presented here assumes all 
failure modes have the same common prior Gamma distribution, whereas the 
approach in [17] assumes a common Gamma for the B-modes and treats the A-modes 
separately.  Although the approach in [17] is not explicitly Bayesian, the use of a 
Gamma distribution to model variability in the failure intensity from mode to mode 
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aligns closely with the use of a Gamma prior distribution in Chapter 3.  The 
methodology underlying [17] also uses shrinkage estimation based on mean-squared-
error, which provides an additional connection to Bayesian results assuming squared 
error loss.  We also note that the equations represent planned reliability growth when 
no data are yet available.  As such the mean and variance are no longer conditioned 
on the observed failures, n.  
 The idealized reliability growth planning curve can also be viewed as a 
function of the DT test time TDT, allowing for (6) and (7) to be written with arbitrary 
time t as  
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2 .           (9) 
For the distribution of λDT, results in Chapter 3 show that the system level failure 
intensity is well approximated by a Gamma distribution when the corrective actions 
are applied in an arbitrary fashion throughout or after the test.  The approximation is 
not necessary for planning though.  When all corrective actions are delayed until the 
end of the test with the same average level of fix effectiveness, the system level 
failure intensity will be exactly Gamma distributed.  We then have  
 
λDT ~ Gamma ˜ α , ˜ β [ ],         (10) 
where the Gamma parameters can be defined using the mean and variance as in (11) 
and (12). 
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˜ α =
E λDT | t[ ]
2
Var λDT | t[ ]
            (11) 
 
˜ β =
Var λDT | t[ ]
E λDT | t[ ]
            (12)  
5.2.3 Overview of Reliability Demonstration Using Combined Developmental and 
Operational Test Data 
 The reliability demonstration approach presented here is the same as that 
developed in Chapter 4, but small modifications specific to reliability growth 
planning are necessary.  When combining data from DT and OT, degradation in 
reliability is generally assumed between the two test events [13].  This degradation is 
traditionally considered in terms of a decrease in the system MTBF.  Assuming 
 
100γ % degradation in the MTBF (or a corresponding increase in system failure 
intensity) leads to the relationship between the developmental and operational failure 
intensities shown in (13) and (14).  The DT and OT subscripts denote the 
corresponding MTBF and failure intensity values. 
 
MTBFOT = 1 −γ( )MTBFDT     (13) 
 
λDT = 1 − γ( )λOT          (14) 
Traditional techniques for reliability growth planning [13] treat the failure intensity 
from DT as a deterministic value, while also assuming a deterministic value for the γ 
parameter in (14).  The approach presented here and in Chapter 4 extends these 
concepts by considering the uncertainty that is present for both of these parameters.  
The uncertainty can then be modeled explicitly when calculating the statistical risks 
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of the demonstration test.  From the Gamma distribution defined by (11) and (12) in 
Section 5.2.2, we have  
 
λDT = 1 − γ( )λOT ~ Gamma ˜ α , ˜ β [ ].          (15) 
Because the failure intensity, λOT, is the true parameter of interest, we condition on γ 
and utilize properties of the Gamma distribution [86] to obtain the required 
distribution.  
 
λOT | γ ~ Gamma ˜ α ,
˜ β 






 .            (16) 
From Chapter 4 the uncertainty on the degradation parameter γ can also be modeled 
using maximum Entropy principles [87],[88] to arrive at an approximate Beta(a,b) 
distribution.  We assume an average degradation value for planning purposes, which 
can be determined by examining historical performance on similar systems or 
examining the potential failure modes that exist in the system in developmental and 
operational test environments.  Maximizing the entropy subject to the assumed mean 
value of the MTBF degradation γ and a range of (0,1) results in the prior distribution 
for γ being a truncated Exponential distribution given by  
 
p γ( ) = µexp −µγ( )
1 − exp −µ( )
,    (17) 






1 − exp −µ( )
= ε     (18) 
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for mean degradation value ε.  The Beta parameters can then be found by equating the 
means and second moments of the two distributions, which results in the system of 









1 − exp −µ( )


















exp −µ( ) + 2 − 1
µ
exp −µ( ) − 1
µ 2






1 − exp −µ( )
         (20) 
Equation (18) will result in µ = 0 when the mean degradation is set to 0.5.  For 
planning purposes the mean degradation is not generally known with high precision, 
and this difficulty is easily overcome by slightly perturbing the mean degradation to 
obtain a non-zero solution.  The posterior mean failure intensity from Chapter 4 is  
 
E λOT | nOT[ ] =


















































       (21) 
where 2F1(a,b,c,z) is the integral form of the hypergeometric function given by  
 
2 F1 a ,b,c,z( ) =
Γ c( )
Γ b( )Γ c − b( )
tb−1 1 − t( )c −b−1 1 − tz( )−a dt
0
1
∫ .         (22) 
The function given in (22) can be evaluated using standard numerical procedures.  
The posterior variance can be developed similarly as  
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Var λOT | nOT[ ] =















































































































































The posterior distribution is again well approximated by a Gamma distribution.  The 
distribution described by (21) and (23) can then be used to construct the reliability 
growth planning curve, which is presented in Section 5.2.4. 
 The posterior distribution after OT only assumes that the prior distribution on 
the system failure intensity can be represented by a Gamma distribution.  This 
increases the flexibility of the approach by allowing for the use of additional relevant 
reliability information for assessment, and it also provides necessary flexibility for 
reliability growth planning.  A number of reliability improvement activities are likely 
to occur concurrently with system level testing, the combination of which will help to 
mature the system to its end reliability target.  The planning curve is merely a 
roadmap though, and in practice growth will not usually follow the curve exactly 
throughout the entire developmental program.  This does not negatively impact 
planning models in general, as it is important only that the system achieves the 
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targeted posterior distribution represented by the end of planning curve.  As 
mentioned in Chapter 4, the proposed approach only requires that the system ends its 
developmental growth program with sufficiently mature reliability and a failure 
intensity that can be represented by the appropriate Gamma distribution.         
5.2.4 Constructing the Reliability Growth Planning Curve 
 Construction of the reliability growth planning curve begins by considering 
the statistical risks associated with the reliability demonstration.  The consumer risk, 
or probability of a system with insufficient reliability succeeding in the demonstration 
test, can be mitigated by considering the Gamma distribution defined by (21) and 
(23).  The distribution describes the uncertainty that is present in the operational 
assessment of the failure intensity and corresponding MTBF, and it is desirable to 
have a small probability that the MTBF of the system is below that of the MTBF 
requirement.  For desired consumer risk α, define 
 
ˆ λ 1−α as the (1-α)
th percentile of the 
Gamma distribution in (21) and (23).  This leads to the desired inequality given by 
 
ˆ λ 1−α ≤
1
MR
.     (24) 
The left side of the inequality in (24) is just a percentile of the Gamma distribution 
from (21) and (23), and closer observation reveals this term to be a function of two 
unknown parameters: the number of failures observed in the operational test, nOT, and 
the underlying β parameter.  The inequality in (24) is equivalent to requiring that the 
(1-α)th percentile of the MTBF is greater than or equal to the system’s MTBF 
requirement.  Figure 5.1 shows an example of the relationship for a consumer risk of 
0.20. 
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Fig. 5.1: Graphical Representation of Consumer Risk (α = 0.20) 
 
 The producer risk is defined as the probability of a system with sufficient 
reliability not succeeding in the demonstration test.  The probability of a successful 
test and the associated producer risk defined in Chapter 4 also address the uncertainty 
associated with operational assessment of the failure intensity and corresponding 
MTBF.  The uncertainties that are present for the system failure intensity and the 
associated degradation factor between the DT and the demonstration test are both 
considered explicitly.  It is also desirable to mitigate the producer risk in the 
reliability growth planning curve development.  For desired producer risk 1-p this 
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The right side of the inequality in (25) is the probability of a successful test, and the 
left side is the probability of a successful test resulting from the desired producer risk.  
The inequality therefore forces the reliability growth plan to have a probability of a 
successful demonstration test at least as high as the desired value, resulting in a 
producer risk that is at most the desired value.  Closer examination of (25) also 
reveals it to be a function of two unknown parameters: the number of failures 
observed in the operational test, nOT, and the underlying β parameter.  Simultaneously 
solving the inequalities in (24) and (25) will yield the two unknown parameters.  
There are a number of possible solutions that can be found, but the pair with the 
smallest value of β and/or largest nOT can be shown to provide the lowest risk.  This 
is because the β value is indicative of the steepness of the resulting reliability growth 
planning curve, and smaller values will indicate less aggressive reliability growth. 
 The solutions from (24) and (25) may appear at first to be a dramatic change 
from the current approach with classical OC curves [13].  The models currently used 
for reliability growth planning also appear on the surface to use only operational test 
data in the operational reliability assessment and corresponding statistical risk 
calculations.  But the use of the degradation factor approach in (13) and (14) is 
merely an implicit approach for using the developmental test results directly in the 
risk calculations.  The deterministic treatment of both the failure intensity and the 
degradation in these calculations would also appear to be undesirable.  Considering 
the uncertainty that is actually present leads directly to the inequalities in (24) and 
(25), with the additional benefit of lower reliability design goals.  The approach not 
only treats the problem within a more complete analytic framework, but it also helps 
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to directly reduce the programmatic risks that may exist due to statistical 
demonstration in a constrained environment.   
 When the (β, nOT) values are found from the inequalities, the idealized 
reliability growth planning curve can be constructed using the mean in (6).  The 
idealized curve represents the growth in reliability that would occur if corrective were 
implemented for failure modes immediately after they were observed and prior to 
further testing.  In practice repairs are made to the system and testing is continued, 
with corrective actions implemented after the test itself in time periods referred to as 
CAPs.  This allows for more efficient testing while also providing the time for root-
cause-analysis that is necessary for robust corrective actions.  With this in mind, the 
reliability targets for each successive phase of DT can then be constructed using the 
idealized curve.  The steps for each of the test phases are taken as the value of the 
idealized curve at the start of each test.  Note that this also allows for lag times for 
corrective actions to be employed as in [17].  Not all failure modes may be corrected 
prior to the start of the next test phase, so the appropriate point on the idealized 
growth curve can be chosen to represent any desired lag times. 
5.3 Management Metrics 
 A number of useful reliability growth planning metrics can also be developed 
within the proposed model.  They include the number of B-modes surfaced in testing, 
the failure intensity for B-modes not yet observed during testing, and the fraction of 
the initial failure intensity attributed to B-modes already observed in testing.  The 
metrics are comparable to those found in [17], and they also include the uncertainty 
distribution that results from the Bayesian approach.  They are specific to B-modes 
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because the B-modes are the failure modes that will require root cause analysis and 
corrective action development.  These activities will require additional resources in 
the form of manpower and time, and the metrics are therefore useful to managers 
looking to properly resource their reliability growth programs.  These results can be 
easily extended for only A-modes or all failure modes by substituting λA or λI 
respectively, in place of the λB. 
5.3.1 Number of Modes Surfaced in Testing 
 The number of B-modes surfaced in testing can be developed using the same 
approach as the prior predicted cumulative number of failure modes presented in 
Chapter 3.  First define the indicator function  
 
I i t( ) =





.          (26) 
The mean of Ii(t) is found by examining the probability that an unobserved failure 
mode is observed by some time t.  The likelihood of observing a B-failure mode by 
time t is given from Assumption 4 in Section 5.2.2 as 
 
p Ii t( ) =1 | λB( ) =1 − e−λB t         (27) 
Using the prior Gamma distribution on the mode failure intensity, the unconditional 
marginal distribution for Ii(t) can be found through standard techniques.  The 
unconditional expected value is given by 
 
E Ii t( )[ ] = p Ii t( ) =1( ) =1 − 11 + βt( )α .  (28) 
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Summing over all K modes in the system yields 
 








= K 1 −
1









,           (29) 















log 1 + βt[ ],   (30) 
where λB is defined by (5).  Because Ii(t) is a Bernoulli random variable, summing 
over all failure modes yields a Binomial random variable, and taking the limit as K 
becomes large yields a Poisson random variable with the mean shown in (30).  
Therefore if we denote m as the number of B-modes observed by time t, m will be 
Poisson distributed with mean  
 
E m[ ] = λB
β
log 1 + βt( ).        (31) 
5.3.2 Failure Intensity for Unobserved Failure Modes 
 From the results in Section 5.2.2 the failure intensity for unobserved failure 
modes at test time t, λB,unobserved, is just the third part of the expressions developed in 
(6) and (7).  This yields the mean and variance in (32) and (33), with λB again defined 
by (5). 
 
E λB,Unobserved | t[ ]= λB1 + βt           (32) 
 











2 .               (33) 
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5.3.3 Fraction of Initial Failure Intensity Attributed to Observed Failure Modes 
 The formula for the fraction of the initial B-mode failure intensity attributed to 
observed failure modes at test time t, θ(t), is discussed in [17] and can be represented 
as 
 






,        (34) 
where λB is defined by (5).  The mean of (34) can be expressed as  
 


























.         (35) 
Results in Chapter 3 show that as 
 
K → ∞, 
 
α → 0 and using similar methods as in 















   (36) 
The variance follows similarly, and is found to be  
 
Var θ t( )[ ] = β
2t
1 + βt( )2
.        (37) 
Because the failure modes are assumed to be independent by Assumption 2 in Section 
5.2.2, the distribution will be asymptotically Normal via the Central Limit Theorem. 
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5.4 Example Application 
 This section provides an example application of the proposed planning model, 
along with a comparison with the standard reliability growth planning model [17] 
using the same inputs.  The main difference between the two models is the 
demonstration test assessment and the associated statistical risks that result.  The 
model proposed here explicitly considers the uncertainty that is present, while the 
traditional approach using PM2 relies on the classical OC curve analysis and treats 
both the failure intensity and the DT-OT degradation parameter as known values.  As 
described in Section 5.2.4, all corrective actions are assumed to occur in CAPs 
between the developmental test phases.  In order to simplify the example, no 
corrective action lag times are assumed, although they can easily be included in both 
the proposed model and PM2.  The inputs for the example follow those in Section 
5.2.1 and are as follows: 
 
1. MI = 180 hours 
2. MR = 220 hours 
3. µd = 0.7 
4. MS = 0.95 
5. ε = 0.2 (mean DT-OT degradation) 
6. TDT,1 = 1000 hours, TDT,2 = 1500 hours, TDT,3 = 1000 hours, TDT,4 = 1500 
hours, TDT,5  = 1000 hours, TDT,6  = 1500 hours 
7. 
 
TDT = TDT, i
i =1
6
∑  = 7500 hours 
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8. TOT = 2000 hours 
9. Consumer risk = 0.2 
10.  Producer risk = 0.3 
 
 Numerical methods can be used to determine the (β, nOT) pair that satisfies the 
desired producer and consumer risk values.  Multiple solutions to the inequalities in 
(24) and (25) are possible, but a contour plot can be used to direct the numerical 
method that is used to gain the solution.  Figure 5.2 shows a contour plot for strict 
equality in (24) and (25).   
 
Fig. 5.2:  Contour Plot for Solutions to (24) and (25) 
The value of nOT must be an integer, and the contour plot indicates that the desired 
solution lies somewhere near nOT = 9 and β = 0.0004.  More precise numerical 
examination of the inequalities results in β = 0.00046 and nOT = 9 as the solution for 
the example.   









                  Producer Risk Solution using (25) 
                  Consumer Risk Solution using (24) 
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 The idealized planning curve that results from using these values is shown in 
Figure 5.2.  Note that the plot in Figure 5.3 only depicts the idealized curve and the 
associated reliability steps for each planned test phase.  It is also possible to plot 
upper and lower probability bounds for both the idealized curve and the steps by 
using the Gamma distribution defined in (10)-(12).  The probability bounds are left 
off of the example in Figure 5.3 in order to simplify comparisons between the two 
approaches.   
 
 
Fig. 5.3:  Proposed Bayesian Planning Curve for Example Case 
 
 The corresponding curve for the PM2 model is shown in Figure 5.4.  The right 
side of each curve provides an immediate comparison between the traditional OC 
curve approach and the combined DT-OT demonstration in the Bayesian model.  For 
the MTBF requirement of 220 hours, the idealized planning curve at the end of the 
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DT period is approximately 372 hours in the Bayesian model.  The corresponding 
point in PM2 is 462 hours.  The estimated value for the demonstration test, or initial 
operational test (IOT), is 267 hours in the Bayesian model and 370 hours in PM2.  
These values are used to set reliability design targets in the development of new 
systems, and the differences indicate a significant reduction in the margin that is 
needed in order to demonstrate the MTBF requirement.    
 Further comparison reveals that the initial MTBF in the Bayesian model is 
180 hours versus 220 hours in PM2.  These values are model inputs, but they both 
correspond to a goal MTBF to growth potential MTBF ratio of approximately 0.70.  
The growth potential MTBF, MGP, is a function of Mi, MS, and µd and is defined as  




1 − MS * µd
       (38) 
This ratio provides an indication of risk associated with the overall reliability growth 
goal.  Attempts to grow too near the reliability growth potential often involve 
significant risk.  This is due to diminishing returns in the test-fix-test reliability 
growth process, making growth more difficult once the initial dominant failure modes 
are observed and mitigated.  The initial MTBF value is also important, as it can be 
used to drive DFR activities that are to be completed before full system-level testing 
begins.  These activities should be conducted in order to improve the reliability prior 
to system-level testing, helping the program to achieve the initial targets on the 
reliability growth planning curve.  Achieving the first step is vitally important, as low 
initial MTBF values will in turn lower the growth potential MTBF in (38) and 
introduce significant risk to the overall reliability program.  The Bayesian model 
allows for the initial MTBF to be 40 hours lower than in PM2 while maintaining the 
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same ratio between the goal MTBF and growth potential MTBF.  This result helps to 
directly reduce the risk associated with achieving the initial target on the planning 
curve.  While both models are inherently using the same prior information through 
the specification of the initial MTBF and the solution for the β parameter, the relative 
strength of the prior assumptions may be cause for concern in practice.  In these cases 
it is recommended that the planning curve be redeveloped after the first phase of 
testing is completed.  The empirical Bayes procedures developed in Chapter 3 can be 
used to estimate the λB and β parameters directly from the failure data collected 
during the test.  These estimates can then be used directly to reinitialize the original 
curve based on actual system performance.  This will provide a more realistic 
indication of the expected future reliability performance during the DT program.  
While not presented in this example, reduced test lengths are also a potential benefit 
of the methodology developed here.  For a fixed developmental reliability target, the 
amount of testing necessary to demonstrate a reliability requirement at a given 
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Fig. 5.4:  Planning Curve for Example Case Using PM2 Model 
5.5  Conclusions 
 This chapter has presented a new reliability growth planning model that 
allows for the combination of developmental and operational data from different test 
events for reliability demonstration.  The approach serves as a natural extension of 
current reliability growth planning models used in the Defense industry while 
explicitly modeling the additional uncertainty that exists in the problem.  The 
uncertainty that is present in the failure intensity at the end of DT is modeled along 
with the planned degradation that occurs between the developmental and operational 
test environments.  Considering the additional information along with its uncertainty 
allows for tighter uncertainty intervals and lower reliability design goals, which are a 
significant benefit of the proposed approach.  The approach considers reliability 
growth planning within a more complete analytic framework while also helping to 
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directly reduce the programmatic risks that may exist due to statistical demonstration 
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6 DEVELOPMENT OF PRIOR INFORMATION USING LOWER-LEVEL 
DATA SOURCES 
6.1 Introduction 
6.1.1 Background  
 The reliability growth models in Chapters 3-5 describe the reliability of the 
system using data collected through complete system-level testing.  These data are 
perhaps the most desirable for assessing system reliability, but during early stages of 
development this type of information may be unavailable.  In early stages of 
development of the system, there are often other sources of reliability related 
information that are available, and in these cases it is possible to utilize these 
information sources to develop an early assessment of the system reliability.  When 
viewing the process of reliability assessment across the various stages of development 
of the system, assessment in this manner serves as prior information that can be 
updated with the reliability growth models in Chapters 3 and 4 when system-level test 
data become available.  The approach also serves as a means of connecting early 
engineering activities involving component modeling and characterization with the 
full system-level testing and reliability growth modeling that occurs later in the 
system’s life cycle.  
6.1.2 Chapter Overview 
 Section 6.2 of this chapter discusses the decomposition of the system into 
subsystems, components, and redundant blocks.  It also draws connections between 
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failures in the system and the failure modes that are used in the models in Chapters 3 
and 4.  Section 6.3 develops the posterior distributions for individual failure modes.  
The use of component/subsystem data and physics-based model results is discussed, 
along with probabilistic scaling to account for additional failure mechanisms that may 
be present in the operational environment.  Conclusions are presented in Section 6.4. 
6.2 System Level decomposition 
 The assumptions for the reliability growth models in Chapters 3 and 4 are as 
follows: 
1. The system is comprised of a large number of failure modes that are 
serial in nature; the occurrence of any failure mode results in failure of 
the system. 
2. Failure modes generate failures independently of one another. 
3. The failure intensity, or rate of occurrence of failure, for each mode is 
constant both before and after a corrective action is implemented.   
4. The resulting failure intensity after corrective action will be reduced 
from the initial value according to the assigned FEF. 
5. Corrective actions to failure modes do not introduce new failure modes 
into the system. 
As shown in Chapter 3, these assumptions along with a common prior Gamma 
distribution for all of the failure modes in the system lead to a posterior distribution 
on the projected system failure intensity.  The mean and variance of the posterior are 
given by 
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E λDT | n[ ] =
1 − di( )ni
1
β





















∑ + λB1 + βTDT
  (1) 
 
Var λDT | n[ ] =





































2 .            (2) 
Examination of the expressions in (1) and (2) shows them to be a function of the prior 
parameters λB and β.  The parameters describe the prior distribution of the failure 
intensity of the complex system.  Empirical Bayes procedures were developed in 
Chapter 3 to provide estimates of the parameters using the system level test data, but 
alternate estimates derived from lower level data are also possible.   
 The lower level reliability information must be combined to obtain a posterior 
distribution on the system level failure intensity, which then serves as the prior for the 
system-level reliability growth assessment.  A key consideration in the use of the 
lower-level reliability information is the representation of the system reliability 
structure.  As described in [72] and [73], a reliability block diagram or fault tree is 
typically used to describe the underlying structure of the system reliability as defined 
by the various components and subsystems within the system.  For the technique 
proposed here, a reliability block diagram will be used without loss of generality.  
The concepts could be easily extended to other system reliability models such as fault 
trees or event trees.   
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6.2.1 System-Level Failure Intensity  
 To connect the reliability growth assumptions to the system reliability model 
using a block diagram or fault tree, it is helpful to first consider a representation of 
the system as defined in Assumptions 1 and 2.  The reliability block diagram of this 
structure is shown in Figure 6.1.  The overall system is just a serial connection of the 
failure modes that exist in the system, where the occurrence of any failure mode 
causes failure of the system. 
 
 
Fig 6.1. Complex System Structure as Series of K Failure Modes 
 
 By recognizing that that each failure mode can occur in one of two ways, the 
failure mode structure in Figure 6.1 can be mapped to the structure of subsystems and 
components within the system.  A failure mode can occur as a result of a component 
failure that causes failure of the system, or a failure mode can occur due to failure of 
two or more components within a redundant block in the system structure.  This 
allows for the block diagram in Figure 6.1 to be equivalently represented by that 
shown in Figure 6.2, where component or redundant block failures each lead to 
specific failure modes within the system.  The first two modes in the example are 
caused by specific component failures, while the third mode is caused by failure of 
any pairing of components 3, 4, and 5.  It is important in developing this 
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representation that the structure be reduced to its simplest form.  For example, if a 
component can contribute to two failure modes involving redundancy, the structure of 
the system should be modified such that the two failure modes are combined into a 
single mode.  The redundancy can then be appropriately modeled as described in 
Section 6.3.2. 
 
Fig 6.2. Serial Failure Modes Represented as Component or Subsystem Failures 
 
 The system level structure in Figure 6.2 can also be represented using 
subsystems, where one or more components or redundant blocks comprise an 
individual subsystem.  This extends the flexibility of the system-level description 
when estimating the posterior distribution, as data for individual subsystems can be 
used in place of estimating the posteriors for each individual mode failure intensity 











∑ ,          (3) 
where p subsystems are present in the system and each subsystem contains Fmi 
failure modes.  This decomposition allows for the failure modes from a complete 
subsystem to be modeled equivalently as a single failure mode, as the subsystem 
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failure intensity is just the sum of the contributions from each of the modes within the 
subsystem.  The posterior distribution for each of the failure modes linked to 
components, redundant blocks, or subsystems can then be developed using any 
relevant reliability data that are available.  A discussion of the use of component life 
data, historical data, and physics-based modeling is presented in Section 6.3. 
 When the posterior distributions of the failure intensities for the necessary 
failure modes are defined, the system reliability structure can be used to develop the 
posterior distribution for the system level failure intensity.  Monte Carlo methods can 
be used to generate samples from the posterior distributions for each of the mode 
failure intensities.  The resulting samples from each of the failure modes can then be 
summed across the system due to the serial representation of the system reliability 
structure.  The computational complexity involved is relatively small.  As 
demonstrated in Section 6.3, the posterior distributions for the mode failure intensities 
will consist mainly of Gamma distributions.  For distributions that are more complex, 
such as those that involve physics-based models, the required samples from the 
distribution on the failure intensity are already available via the original distribution 
development, so there is no additional computational burden.  The reduction of the 
system structure to a serial representation may seem overly simplistic, but this 
approach is very relevant for complex systems.  The serial structure results in a 
constant failure intensity for the system, which is also supported in asymptotic theory 
for complex repairable systems and superimposed renewal processes such as 
Drenick’s Theorem [91].      
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 As discussed in Chapter 3, sums of Gamma distributed random variables will 
again be approximately Gamma distributed.  This will generally be the case with the 
approach discussed here, as many of the mode posterior distributions that result will 
be well approximated by the Gamma.  It is worth examining the potential impact of 
the approximate Gamma distributions on the distribution of the system-level failure 
intensity.  The worst possible scenario would involve a system composed of 2 
subsystems, with data available only at the subsystem level.  A large difference in the 
β parameters for the Gamma posteriors for each subsystem may negatively impact the 
resulting system level posterior.  The availability of more data on components and 
other failure modes should serve to minimize the impact from modeling at the 
subsystem level, so this scenario should suffice.  The resulting posterior distribution 
for the system is shown in Figure 6.3.  The first subsystem used a Gamma(1, 50-1) 
posterior for the mode failure intensity, and the second used a Gamma(5, 250-1). 
 
 
Fig 6.3. System Failure Intensity for 2 Subsystems with Overlaid Gamma Approximation  
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The results indicate that the system level distribution is still reasonably approximated 
by a Gamma distribution.  The parameters of the system-level distribution can be 
found through standard method-of-moments based approaches, and the resulting λB 
and β parameters can then be used for the prior parameters in the reliability growth 
projection model in Chapter 3.  This allows for direct connection of lower-level 
reliability data and information to be used in connection with the system-level 
reliability growth models. 
6.2.2 Accounting for Failures Due to Integration of Components and Subsystems 
 A potential drawback of the reliability block diagram or fault tree approach 
for modeling the system reliability is the assumption of independence between the 
various components and subsystems.  For many complex systems, a large number of 
failures are possible due to interactions between the subsystems, and the methods for 
assessing system reliability in Section 6.2.1 may not adequately address this issue.  
The simplest potential solution to the problem is to use engineering knowledge about 
the potential failure modes in the system and associate any potential integration 
problems with a specific subsystem or component.  There will likely be little to no 
data available to characterize the integration failure intensity, but the scaling approach 
in Section 6.3.3 can be used to account for the differences between the estimated or 
modeled failure intensity and the true operational failure intensity.  Historical data 
from similar systems can also serve as a valuable source of information to help with 
the application of the scale factor. 
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 A second method for handling the integration failures is to add an integration 
block directly to the reliability block diagram or system reliability model.  This 
approach can be used to explicitly capture the integration related failure modes that 
may exist throughout the system in a single block in the model.  Historical 
information from similar can again serve as a valuable source for understanding the 
potential failure intensity of the integration block, and Maximum Entropy methods 
can be used to develop the specific distribution given the available information.   
 Note that in cases where there is little knowledge of the potential integration 
failure modes, the resulting Maximum Entropy distribution will be uniform.  If the 
integration block is a significant contribution to the overall failure intensity, for 
example when two major subsystems are combined together, the uniform distribution 
for the integration failures may influence the posterior on the system-level failure 
intensity.  The system-level result may be look more like a uniform, meaning that it 
cannot easily be approximated with a Gamma distribution.  This is an indication of 
immaturity with respect to the system-level reliability.  More engineering effort 
should be made to characterize the potential integration failure modes within the 
system prior to full system-level reliability growth testing.  When the reliability 
becomes more mature, the integration block can be better characterized.  The 
resulting system-level posterior distribution will then be more easily characterized 
with a Gamma distribution, which then serves as the appropriate prior information for 
the reliability growth process.  
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6.3 Failure Mode Posterior Distribution 
6.3.1 Failure Mode from Component Failure 
 When a failure mode is caused by failure of a single component, the mode is 
caused by the occurrence of one or more failure mechanisms [92].  The failure and 
subsequent replacement for an individual failure mechanism considers the component 
as a consumable item that is replaced with a new version upon failure.  When 
modeling the process of failure and replacement in this manner, the failure 
mechanism can be assumed to induce a renewal process for the component and its 
associated failure mode [93].  The existence of multiple potential failure mechanisms 
for the component and associated mode causes a superposition of renewal processes 
for the failure mode.  Theoretical results can be applied to develop a reasonable 
model of this process.  When examining renewal processes, the Elementary Renewal 
Theorem [93] can be used to describe the behavior of the process over time.  
Applying the Elementary Renewal Theorem to the failure and replacement process 
for the failure mechanism states that for a failure process with mean time between 









.            (4) 
The limit in (4) states that the rate of occurrence of failures for the failure mechanism 
being considered converges to 1/µ as t becomes large.  The theorem can also be used 
to state that  
 
m t( ) ≈ t
µ
 when t is large,         (5) 
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which says that for large t, the expected number of failures from the specific 
mechanism by time t is the standard rate of occurrence multiplied by the length of 
time t.  An extension of this result is known as Blackwell’s Theorem [93].  
Blackwell’s Theorem generalizes (5) and shows the expected number of failures in a 
general time interval of length u converges to u/µ as t becomes large.    
 These results indicate that when the process of failure and subsequent 
replacement of a component and failure mode is considered over a large enough time 
period, the only requirement for modeling the process is the mean time between 
successive failures for the mechanism.  This result is true for general renewal 
distributions even when the life distribution for the mechanism in question is subject 
to significant wear out or aging over time.  The major benefit of this concept is that 
when multiple failure mechanisms contribute to the occurrence of a failure mode, the 
failure mode occurs via a superposition of renewal processes.  Drenick’s Theorem 
states that a Homogeneous Poisson Process (HPP) with rate 1/µ can then be used to 
approximate the failure process for the mode over a sufficiently large time period 
[91].  The use of the limit reduces a potentially complex estimation problem to a 
straightforward calculation that can be accomplished through the HPP.  It is useful to 
understand the performance of the HPP approximation, as the result assumes a 
number of failure mechanisms are present for the failure mode.  Examining the 
superposition of renewal processes for 2 failure mechanisms can provide an 
understanding of how useful the HPP may be in practice.  A Weibull(α,β) distribution 
with density function in (6) can be used to model a failure mechanism with an 
increasing hazard rate such as one resulting from again or wear-out. Other 
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distributions with increasing hazard rates could also be used without loss of 
generality. 
 





















,  t > 0,  α > 0,  β > 0           (6) 
An example of this concept is shown in Figure 6.4.  Weibull(1.5, 2) and Weibull(5, 
3.2) distributions were used to represent failure mechanisms with increasing hazard 
rates, and 50 failures were simulated from the corresponding distribution in (6).  The 
plotted results were truncated to represent the time period where the two processes 
overlapped, resulting in 64 total failures for the superimposed process.  The expected 
number of failures was estimated using the MLE for a HPP [94], and it is shown as 
the solid line in the plot.   
 
Fig 6.4. Cumulative Number of Failures vs. Time for 2 Superimposed Renewal Processes with 
Corresponding HPP Expected Number of Failures Overlaid ( 
 
The results in Figure 6.4 indicate that the 2 superimposed renewal processes can be 
well approximated with a HPP.  It is also useful to understand the approximation 
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when the time interval is relatively short, as the theorem from Drenick [91] is 
asymptotic with respect to complexity and time.  Figure 6.5 contains the results for 
the first 10 samples using the same renewal distributions as in Figure 6.4. 
 
 
Fig 6.5. Cumulative Number of Failures vs. Time for 2 Superimposed Renewal Processes with 
Corresponding HPP Expected Number of Failures Overlaid 
  
The results indicate that the HPP approximation is still reasonable even when time 
and complexity are not large.  Caution should nevertheless be used in these cases, as 
the variation in the process may provide results that are inaccurate.  If the failure 
modes in the system have very little data or are low complexity with respect to the 
number of contributing failure mechanisms, the HPP should be carefully examined 
before use. 
 Component failure data may be directly available from component life testing 
or from historical failure data collected from field usage.  If such data are available 
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for a component, the results in Sections 6.2 and 6.3 can be used to develop a posterior 
distribution on the component failure intensity that describes the component renewal 
process.  Assume the n samples of the component life have been collected with 
failures occurring at times (t1,t2,…,tn).  Section 6.3 indicates that failures of the 
component can be adequately modeled using the HPP, which implies that the 
Exponential likelihood can be used for the data.  The likelihood is given as  
 
l t1,...tn | λ( ) = λ exp −λti( )
i =1
n
∏         (7) 
To be conservative, a non-informative prior distribution can be used for the 
component failure intensity λ, which is given by the same Jeffrey’s prior that was 
presented in Chapter 4 as  
 










, l1 <λ < l2
.    (8) 





































































λ .                   (9) 
Because the desired range for the failure intensity is the positive real line, taking the 
appropriate limits in the denominator of (9) then yields 
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p λ | t1,...,tn( ) =






















.         (10) 
The posterior distribution in (10) is a Gamma distribution of the same form as used in 
the reliability growth models in Chapters 3 and 4.  Note that if other relevant prior 
information is available, a Gamma prior distribution can easily be substituted in place 
of the Jeffrey’s prior in (7).  As demonstrated in Chapter 3, the posterior will again be 
a Gamma in this case, which can be used in the same manner when constructing the 
system level posterior distribution. 
 When historical reliability information is available for the component, it can 
be used in a similar manner as the component life test data.  If the historical 
information is for identical components that are used in a different system or 
operating environment, the data may not provide a completely accurate representation 
of the failure intensity of the component.  The method presented in Section 6.3.4 
should be considered in this case, as it provides a probabilistic approach for 
accounting for the potential differences in the estimated mode failure intensity and the 
true mode failure intensity. 
6.3.2 Failure Mode from Failure of Redundant Block 
 When a failure mode is the result of failure in two or more components within 
a redundant block in the system reliability structure, the approach from Section 6.3.1 
can be applied for each of the components within the block.  A redundant block is 
considered as a K-of-N structure without loss of generality, as standard parallel 
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redundancy is a special case of this structure.  Each component failure is also 
assumed to occur from multiple contributing failure modes, allowing for the HPP 
representation for component failure.   
 To develop the corresponding failure intensity for the failure mode caused by 
the K-of-N failure, the mission time Tm can be used to calculate the individual 
reliability for each component.  The reliability for a component in an HPP is given by 
 
Rc Tm( ) = exp −λcTm( ),           (11) 
and the corresponding reliability of the K-of-N block, RB(Tm), can be found using 
standard techniques for system reliability analysis in references such as [93] and [94].  
The failure intensity for the failure mode, and hence K-of-N block, can then be found 
by inverting the reliability expression in (11).  This yields a failure intensity value of  
 
λi = −
log RB Tm( )( )
Tm
,        (12) 
where λ i is the desired mode failure intensity.  The approach in (12) is an 
approximation that provides consistency with the assumptions of the reliability 
growth models, but it should be noted that the failure modes from redundant blocks in 
the system should not provide a large contribution to the overall system failure 
intensity.  In practice the approximation should not influence the overall system level 
failure intensity, but caution should be used if redundant blocks within the system are 
thought to provide a significant contribution to the overall system reliability or failure 
intensity.  Sensitivity analysis should be performed in these situations, as the models 
contained in this work may not be appropriate.   
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 The corresponding posterior distribution for the failure intensity in (12) can be 
found through Monte Carlo methods.  The Gamma posterior described in Section 
6.3.1 can be used to generate samples for the component failure intensity, and the 
resulting distribution for the component reliability in (11) can be found by 
transforming each of the posterior samples.  The transformed samples of the 
component reliability can then be used to calculate the reliability of the K-of-N block, 
and the block reliability can be transformed further using (12) to get the mode failure 
intensity.   
6.3.3 Using Physics-Based Model Results 
 There are a number of examples in the literature involving fusion of different 
information sources to estimate system reliability; see for example [72] - [76].  None 
of these approaches consider the use of physics-based modeling of failure 
mechanisms in the estimation.  This information is frequently available early in the 
design process before much testing has been completed though, and for this reason it 
is desirable to utilize it to characterize the failure intensity within the renewal process 
for the specific component in question.   
 The approach presented here recognizes that physics-of-failure models 
generally contain material constants that are available in handbooks or other 
references [92].  Define the physical function for the life of a component as 
 
f N , a( ), 
where N is the life and a is a constant parameter related to the underlying physical 
failure mechanism being considered.  These constants are typically estimated from 
empirical testing under controlled conditions, which imparts some amount of 
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uncertainty as to their actual value.  Because of the uncertainties in the empirical 
constants, the function f is generally regarded as the mean or median value of the 
predicted life.  Additional uncertainty results directly from variation in the 
manufacturing process that is used to produce the materials.  Even if the original test 
results were available to develop the uncertainty distributions for the material 
constants, the uncertainty due to manufacturing and production variation would still 
not be quantified.  The principle of Maximum Entropy [87],[88] can therefore be used 
to develop probability distributions on each of the material constants.  This approach 
is general enough to capture the overarching empirical uncertainty along with the 
material variation associated with the parameters.  A probability distribution on the 
component life N can be found by using the Maximum Entropy derived probability 
distribution for the constant a.  Let 
 
p a( ) denote the probability distribution for a.  
Because 
 
f N , a( ) will likely be a complex function, an analytical form for the 
distribution of N will generally not be feasible.  Monte Carlo simulation can be used 
instead to develop the necessary distribution.  The use of simulation will be even 
more necessary when considering that most physics-based life calculations involve 
more than one parameter.  The Maximum Entropy probability distribution will 
generally take a form that allows for straightforward random number generation, and 
n values can be sampled from
 
p a( ).  The realized values can then be used to calculate 
n realizations of the life N, which provides the desired distribution on the component 
life.  Because the original function f provides the mean or median life, it is reasonable 
to use this result to estimate the approximate failure intensity for the component 
renewal process as described in Section 6.2.1.   
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 To transform the distribution on the cycles to failure Nf into a distribution on 
the failure intensity for the component renewal process, the operational usage of the 
component must be understood.  In particular, the number of cycles of the applied 
stress per operating hour or mile must be reasonably known.  The distribution on the 





,     (13) 
where λ is the failure intensity and c is the number of cycles per time or mileage 
increment.   
 To demonstrate the concept of the approach, consider the stress-life model 
given by  
 
S = ANf
b ,     (14) 
where S is the applied stress, Nf is the cycles to failure for the component, and A and 
b are constants specific to the material being considered.  As discussed in previous 
chapters, Maximum Entropy maximizes the uncertainty associated with the problem, 
subject to any constraints associated with the information available in the analysis.  
The constraints that are applied in the derivation of the Maximum Entropy 
distribution take the form of moments for the distribution, and the support of the 
distribution must also be specified.  For the values A and b, we assume only that the 
support of each variable is known.  That is, A will fall in the range (A1, A2) and b will 
fall in the range (b1, b2).  Applying these basic constraints in the Maximum Entropy 
approach yields a uniform distribution [87] for each parameter as shown in (15) and 
(16). 
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p A( ) = 1
A2 − A1
, A1 < A < A2       (15) 
 
p b( ) = 1
b2 − b1
, b1 < b < b2                    (16) 
Random realizations can be easily drawn from the distributions in (15) and (16).  













.     (17) 
10,000 realizations of each parameter were sampled using (A1, A2) = (1800, 2200) 
and    (b1, b2) = (-0.12, -0.08).  The resulting values were inserted into (17) with 
applied stress S = 1000.  A histogram of the resulting distribution is shown in Figure 
6.6.   
 
 
Fig 6.6. Distribution on Component Life  
 Assuming c = 100 cycles per hour and using the transform defined in (13) 
yields the distribution on the failure intensity of the renewal process shown in Figure 
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6.7.  This distribution can be used to develop the distribution on the mode failure 
intensity that is subsequently used to develop the system level failure intensity.   
 
Fig 6.7. Distribution on Failure Intensity for Component Renewal Process  
 
Note that as with other types of component information, the failure mechanism being 
modeled may not provide a completely accurate representation of the failure intensity 
of the component.  The approach in Section 6.3.4 should be considered in this case, as 
it provides a probabilistic method for accounting for the potential differences in the 
estimated failure intensity and the true operational failure intensity. 
6.3.4 Scaling to Account Accounting for Additional Failure Mechanisms 
 This section presents a method for scaling estimates of the failure intensity for 
those cases where the available data or modeling may not completely represent the 
known failure mechanisms that contribute to the occurrence of the failure mode.  This 
situation can occur commonly when using historical data from like or identical 
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components that were used in different operational environments.  It can also occur 
when using the physics-of-failure approaches described in Section 6.3.3, as other 
failure mechanisms beyond that being modeled may be present.  In these cases 
potentially large contributors to the failure intensity will not be considered, and the 
result will be an underestimate of the true value. 
 To account for this issue, we examine the true failure intensity for a failure 
mode, denoted as λi,true. The mode failure intensity can be decomposed into 
contributions from the n individual failure mechanisms as a sum given by  
 
λi, true = λi, j
j =1
n
∑              (18) 
When only a subset of the potential failure modes or mechanisms is addressed in the 
information used to develop the estimate, a scale factor fm can be used to represent 
the relationship between the estimated failure intensity, 
 
ˆ λ i , and the true failure 
intensity.  This is represented as 
 
fmλi, true = ˆ λ i  , fm ∈ 0, 1( )           (19) 
If the number of contributing failure mechanisms is large and only 1 or 2 are 
considered in the data or modeling, the value of the scale factor fm will be small.  If 
the information used in the estimate considers most or all of the dominant failure 
mechanisms, then the value of fm will be large.  Because fm is unknown in practice, it 
is desirable to account for the uncertainty associated with its value.  This can be 
accomplished by using Maximum Entropy to assign a probability distribution to the 
value of fm.  The relationship in (19) leads to the conditional distribution for λ true 
given by  
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                      (20)  
The unconditional distribution of λ i,true is then found by marginalizing with respect to 
the distribution of fm as in (21). 
 
p λi, true( )= p fm( )p ˆ λ i | fm( )
0
1
∫ dfm    (21)  
Conservative treatment of the scale factor assumes no information is available other 
than the support of fm, which results in a uniform distribution over the specified range 
[87].  In practical applications, the contribution of the failure mechanism(s) to the 
overall mode/component failure rate should be examined to determine the range of 
the scale factor.  A FMECA could used to help with this determination, and historical 
data could also be used when available.  Note that an additional assumption of a mean 
or variance value beyond the range of the factor would change the probability 
distribution associated with fm. A detailed discussion of the distributions resulting 
from different assumptions can be found in [88].  Figure 6.8 depicts an example 
application of the scale factor assuming a Uniform(0.5,1) distribution for the physics-
model example in Figure 6.9 in Section 6.3.3.  The application of the scale factor can 
be seen to shift the distribution to the right, while also increasing the overall variance 
of the failure intensity.  Note that the hyperbolic shape of the distribution also lends 
itself to being approximated by a Gamma distribution.  Though not necessary for the 
calculations, this point is useful when examining the behavior of the system-level 
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Fig 6.8. Scaled Distribution on Failure Intensity for Component Renewal Process  
 
6.4  Conclusion 
 This chapter presents a general approach for combing to lower-level sources 
of reliability data and information to develop a prior distribution on the system-level 
failure intensity.  The reliability growth models in Chapters 3-5 consider the failure 
intensity of complex repairable systems over time.  Each component or redundant 
block is mapped to the corresponding failure mode that results when a failure occurs.  
The individual modes are also assumed to occur via multiple potential failure 
mechanisms, where each failure mechanism induces a renewal process for the 
component involved.  The superposition of the renewal processes from the 
mechanisms allows for the use of an HPP to approximate the failure process for the 
failure mode.  The HPP provides a simplified approach that easily allows for the use 
of component or subsystem data when developing the posterior disrtribution for the 
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mode failure intensity.  The result is also extended to blocks of parallel or K-of-N 
redundancy, where each component follows the HPP and posterior distribution on the 
failure intensity is found by assuming a constant failure intensity at the redundant 
block level.   
 Physics-based modeling results are also used to develop a failure mode 
posterior distribution.  A method is also developed for accounting for additional 
failure mechanisms that may not be accounted for in the mode posterior.  This 
probabilistic scaling is particularly important when using physics-based results or 
other component data that may have been collected in specific environment that does 
not include all potential stressors of the component.  The individual failure mode 
posterior distributions can then be combined using Monte Carlo methods, and the 
posterior is reasonably represented by a Gamma distribution.   
 The results of this approach can be utilized when system-level failure data are 
limited or not yet available.  When viewing the process of reliability assessment 
across the various stages of development of the system, assessment in this manner 
serves as prior information that can be updated with the reliability growth models in 
earlier chapters.  The approach also serves as a method of connecting early 
engineering activities that involve component modeling and characterization to the 
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7 CASE STUDY ON RELIABILITY GROWTH ASSESSMENT 
7.1 Introduction 
7.1.1 Background  
 This chapter presents a case study depicting the application of the 
methodology presented throughout this thesis.  The approach is demonstrated on a 
complex military system that is modified through the addition of specific mission 
equipment.  The methodology in Chapter 6 is utilized to develop a prior distribution 
on the system-level failure intensity.  Historical field failure data are used to 
characterize the components and subsystems that remain unchanged in the 
modification, and a physics-of-failure model is used to estimate the failure intensity 
of a specific component due to fatigue.  The failure intensity for the mission specific 
equipment is considered through Maximum Entropy methods.  The posterior 
distribution is then used along with the reliability growth projection model in Chapter 
3 to update the posterior distribution after a developmental test event.  The results are 
then subsequently updated after an operational test is conducted using the approach in 
Chapter 4. 
7.1.2   Chapter Overview  
 This chapter is organized as follows.  Section 7.2 presents the development of 
the prior distribution on the system-level failure intensity.  Section 7.3 then presents 
the updated posterior after DT.  Section 7.4 further updates the posterior after OT.  
Conclusions are presented in Section 7.5. 
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7.2  Reliability Assessment Prior to DT 
 A combination of information is available for developing the distribution on 
the system-level failure intensity prior to DT.  Historical failure data is available for 
the components and subsystems that are common to both the existing system and the 
modified version.  A stress life model was also developed to model fatigue for the 
driveshaft of the vehicle, as this was an area of concern identified in the existing 
system.  There are nine existing major subsystems within the vehicle, and a tenth 
subsystem is comprised of the additional mission equipment.  The system-level 
reliability block diagram is represented by each of the subsystems connected in a 
series.  The basic reliability block diagram is shown in Figure 7.1. 
 
 
Fig. 7.1. Simplified Reliability Block Diagram of System 
 
Additional detail is also added to consider the contribution of wheel/tire failures 
within the suspension subsystem and driveshaft failures within the driveline 
subsystem.  The failure definition for this example is any loss of an essential function.  
The system is an 8-wheeled vehicle designed to carry troops, with one driveshaft per 
wheel.  This creates redundancy within the driveline and suspension subsystems, 
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where failure is defined by the loss of 5 or more wheels or driveshafts.   The 
reliability block diagram in Figure 7.1 can then be modified to account for the 5-of-8 
failure definition within the driveline and suspension subsystems.  The updated 
detailed representation of the two subsystems is shown in Figure 7.2. 
 
 
Fig. 7.2. Detailed Reliability Block Diagram of System 
 
The methods in Chapter 6 can then be applied to each of the subsystems and blocks 
containing redundancy within the system.   
7.2.1 Historical Failure Data 
 A large amount of reliability data is available on the nine subsystems that are 
common to both versions of the system.  The historical reliability data is in the form 
of operational field failures collected for 3 vehicles over a two-year period.  The 
mileage accrued for each of the vehicles during the two-year period is also collected, 
and this allows for straightforward application of the methods in Chapter 6.  The 
mileage for each vehicle is shown in Table 7.1.  Table 7.2 contains the number of 
failures for each of the subsystems.  Due to the redundancy of the wheels and 
driveshafts, these failures were separated from the data in Table 7.2.  The wheel 
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failures are shown on a separate line to allow for the failure intensity of the 4-of-8 
block to be estimated from the component failures, and the suspension failures do not 
include the driveshaft. 
 The estimator described in Section 6.2.1 can be applied at the subsystem level 
for the data in Table 7.2.  The posterior distribution will be a Gamma(ni,1/T) for ni 
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5000 samples were generated from the Gamma posterior for each of the nine 
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Fig 7.4.  Posterior Distribution on C4ISR Failure Intensity 
 




Fig 7.6.  Posterior Distribution on PowerPack Failure Intensity 
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Fig 7.8.  Posterior Distribution on HVAC Failure Intensity 
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Fig 7.9.  Posterior Distribution on Steering Failure Intensity 
 
 
Fig 7.10.  Posterior Distribution on Suspension Failure Intensity 
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Fig 7.11.  Posterior Distribution on Weapon Failure Intensity 
 
 As stated in Chapter 6, the Gamma posterior for the wheel failures was used 
to calculate the reliability for the 4-of-8 redundant block.  The block reliability was 
then used to develop the corresponding failure intensity for the redundant block.  The 
histogram for the wheel component failure intensity is shown in Figure 7.12, and the 
resulting redundant block failure intensity is shown in Figure 7.13. 
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Fig 7.12.  Posterior Distribution on Wheel Component Failure Intensity  
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7.2.2 Driveshaft Posterior from Fatigue Modeling 
 The driveshaft of the vehicle was previously identified as a candidate for 
fatigue modeling, as the vehicle contains 8 wheels and therefore contains 8 
driveshafts.  The driveshaft is also subject to varying amounts of stress induced 
through torgue applied when the driver accelerates the vehicle.  This presents a 
potential reliability concern for the vehicle, as the repeated stress could cause failure 
of the shaft if the design is not robust to the fatigue created by the stressor. 
 The simple stress-life model in Chapter 6 was used again for the driveshaft.  













.     (1) 
where S is the applied stress, Nf is the cycles-to-failure for the component, and A and 
b are constants specific to the material being considered.  As discussed in Chapter 6, 
Maximum Entropy can be used to develop prior distributions for the material 
constants in the model.  Assuming only the support for each distribution yields a 
uniform distribution over the defined range of the support [87].  The distributions for 
the parameters are shown in (2) and (3). 
  
 
p A( ) = 1
A2 − A1
, A1 < A < A2      (2) 
 
p b( ) = 1
b2 − b1
, b1 < b < b2                             (3) 
For the steel material of the driveshaft the range of A was chosen as (A1, A2) = (1800, 
2200), and the range for b was chosen as (b1, b2) = (-0.12, -0.08).  To account for the 
variable loading of the stress, the Normal distribution method used by Steinberg [95] 
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can be used for variable applied stress on the driveshaft.  The shaft was instrumented 
during limited testing over representative terrain to understand the stress applied to 
the driveshaft during operation.  This approach assumes that the testing is a sufficient 
representation of the operational usage of the system, and that the stressors measured 
from the test are reasonably represented by a Normal distribution.  The 1-σ, 2-σ, and 
3-σ values from the testing were given as 271 MPa, 392 MPa, and 514 MPa.  These 
values were used as the applied stress in (1), and 5000 samples were drawn from the 
distributions in (2) and (3).  For each of the 5000 samples, the resulting cycles-to-
failure Nf,i was calculated for the ith stress value.  The cycles-to-failure for the 
driveshaft was then found by probabilistically combining the results based on the 
underlying Normal distribution.  The 1-σ, 2-σ, and 3-σ values correspond to 0.683, 
0.271, and 0.043 percentages of the total loading, which results in the total cycles to 
failure for the driveshaft of  
 
Nf = 0.683* Nf ,1 + 0.271* Nf , 2 + 0.043* Nf , 3     (4) 
To translate the number of cycles-to-failure into the failure intensity for the 
driveshaft, the result in (4) must be divided by the number of cycles per mile.  This 
value was measured from the test data as 28,660 cycles per mile. 
 The last consideration in developing the driveshaft failure intensity is the 
relative contribution of fatigue to the overall failure of the driveshaft.  Examining data 
on similar systems shows that fatigue accounts for 10-25% of the failure rate on the 
driveshaft.  This information can be used within the scaling approach discussed in 
Chapter 6.  The resulting failure intensity of the driveshaft is found through the 
expression 
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   (5)  
where 
 
ˆ λ i  is the estimated failure intensity after transforming the cycles-to-failure in 




Fig 7.14.  Posterior Distribution on Driveshaft Component Failure Intensity   
 
 To account for the 4-of-8 redundancy of the driveshaft, the approach used for 
the wheels can be applied again to the driveshaft.  The reliability for the 4-of-8 block 
was calculated for each of the 5000 samples, and the resulting failure intensity for the 
block was calculated from the block reliability values.  The histogram of the 
redundant block is shown in Figure 7.15.   
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Fig 7.15.  Posterior Distribution on Driveshaft Redundant Block Failure Intensity   
 
 The use of the stress-life approach is somewhat basic, and more detailed 
analysis is possible using Finite-Element Methods in combination with more detailed 
strain-life models.  The stress-life approach is more than adequate in this context 
though.  The 4-of-8 redundancy for the component within the larger subsystem and 
system reduces the relative contribution of the driveshaft to a second order effect, so 
more detailed modeling is not necessary.  If the driveshaft was a larger relative 
contribution to the overall system level failure intensity, more detailed modeling may 
be appropriate.  The complexity of more detailed models should always be considered 
though, as additional parameters within the model will increase the uncertainty in the 
predicted life and resulting failure intensity. 
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7.2.3 Mission Equipment Posterior 
 The failure intensity for the additional mission equipment on the modified 
system cannot be developed from historical data.  Conservative estimates can be 
made by examining similar equipment on existing systems and applying Maximum 
Entropy to develop the failure intensity distribution.  The mean failure intensity for 
the mission equipment is assumed to 0.01 with a support of (0, 0.03).  Maximum 
Entropy methods will yield a truncated Exponential distribution similar to the 
developed in Chapter 4.  The resulting probability density function is given by  
 
p λ( ) = θe
−θλ
1 − e−0.3*θ
, 0 <λ < 0.3.        (6) 
The θ parameter is determined from the constraint on the mean, which results in the 








.                (7) 
Generating 5000 samples from the distribution in (6) yields the histogram shown in 
Figure 7.16.  The distribution on the mission equipment failure intensity is 
conservative when compared to the other subsystems in the system.  The uncertainty 
is also fairly high, which is desirable.  The performance of the additional mission 
equipment may be different than the other similar types of equipment when it is fully 
integrated into the new system.   
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Fig 7.16.  Posterior Distribution on Mission Equipment Failure Intensity   
7.2.4 System Level Failure Intensity 
 To develop the posterior distribution on the system level failure intensity, the 
reliability block diagram in Figure 7.2 can be used.  The structure defined by Figure 
7.2 allows for summation of the failure intensity posteriors developed in Section 7.2.1 
and 7.2.2.  Summing the 5000 samples from each of the posteriors for the subsystems 
and redundant blocks yields the posterior distribution on the system level failure 
intensity shown in Figure 7.17. 
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Fig 7.17.  Posterior Distribution on System Failure Intensity 
 
Method-of-Moments estimators were used to develop the approximate Gamma 
distribution represented by the dashed line.  The resulting λB and β estimates are 
shown in (6) and (7). 
 
ˆ λ B = 0.01904                      (6) 
 
ˆ β = 0.00442                    (7) 
These values can be used in place of the empirical Bayes estimators within the 
reliability growth model of Chapter 3.  The β value is somewhat large relative to the 
empirical Bayes estimates that generally result from the reliability growth model in 
Chapter 3.  This is a desirable result, as the β value directly impacts the variance of 
the Gamma and hence the uncertainty surrounding the knowledge of the system 
failure intensity.  Larger values indicate higher uncertainty in the system level failure 
intensity, and given that the estimate may not properly account all potential 
integration failure modes, the conservatism is warranted. 
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7.3 Reliability Growth Assessment During DT 
 Developmental reliability growth testing of the vehicle was conducted to 
identify any unknown failure modes that may have been introduced into the system 
through the upgraded design.  Testing was conducted using 2 vehicles with a fixed 
configuration.  The intent of the testing was to make any necessary corrective actions 
at the completion of the test event to improve the system reliability prior to additional 
testing.  Any potential reliability incidents during the testing were recorded and later 
adjudicated prior to assessing the reliability results from the test.  The test identified 
130 failures comprising 31 failure modes.   Cumulative mileage for each vehicle is 
shown in Table 7.3.  The number of occurrences for each failure mode and the 
assigned FEF is shown in Table 7.4.  Due to resource constraints, only the three most 
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TABLE 7.4 
FAILURE MODE DATA 
Mode Number of Occurrences FEF System 1 System 2 
1 2 1 0 
2 1 0 0 
3 3 1 0 
4 5 3 0 
5 1 1 0 
6 1 1 0 
7 5 1 0 
8 1 0 0 
9 1 0 0 
10 1 0 0 
11 2 1 0 
12 2 0 0 
13 1 1 0 
14 11 1 0.7 
15 11 1 0.7 
16 3 2 0 
17 21 8 0.7 
18 2 0 0 
19 1 0 0 
20 3 4 0 
21 3 4 0 
22 4 1 0 
23 0 1 0 
24 0 2 0 
25 0 2 0 
26 0 4 0 
27 0 1 0 
28 0 1 0 
29 0 1 0 
30 0 1 0 
31 0 1 0 
 
 The data were used in the reliability growth projection from Chapter 3.  The 
estimates developed in Section 7.2 were used for the prior parameters.  The posterior 
distribution for the projected MTBF of the system is shown in Figure 7.18.  The mean 
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of the MTBF posterior is found to be 88.8 hrs.  The updated posterior distribution on 
the failure intensity is a Gamma with parameters 
 
˜ α  = 109.044 and 
 
˜ β  = 0.000102.  
These parameters can then be used to update the assessment when OT is completed 
for the system.  The Chi-Squared goodness of fit test from Chapter 3 was also 
applied, and the proportion of statistics greater than the critical value was 
approximately 0.  This indicates that the model provides a reasonable description of 
the failure intensity of the system. 
 
 
Fig 7.18.  Posterior Distribution on System MTBF 
 
7.4 Operational Reliability Assessment 
 OT was conducted in order to demonstrate the level of reliability for the 
upgraded version of the system.  The test was a fixed configuration test involving a 
single vehicle with military operators utilizing the system within the context of the 
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intended operational mission of the vehicle.  Incidents were recorded and later 
adjudicated as to the severity of the incident.  Failure is once again defined as loss of 
an essential function in the system.  The results identified 3 failures with 224 miles.  
Because the reliability growth testing from Section 7.3 was conducted in a rigorous 
environment with a large number of miles accumulated, the reliability degradation 
between the reliability growth test and the operational test was determined to be 
small.  The mean degradation for the uncertainty distribution was therefore chosen to 
be 0.1.   
 Using the posterior Gamma parameters from the reliability growth model 
along with operational test results and the assigned degradation yields the updated 
system level posterior distribution on the MTBF shown in Figure 7.19.   
 
 
Fig 7.19.  Posterior Distribution on System MTBF after OT 
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The mean MTBF is 79.8 hrs, and the 0.80 probability interval is found to be (66 hrs, 
99.5 hrs).  For comparison purposes, using just the operational test results alone 
yields the standard point estimate and 80% confidence interval of 74.7 hrs and (33.5 
hrs, 128.4 hrs) respectively.  The combined Bayesian method reduces the uncertainty 
associated with the estimate considerably.  To demonstrate additional utility of the 
method, the estimate resulting from using a non-informative prior distribution on the 
reliability degradation yields a mean MTBF of 59.5 hrs with a corresponding 80% 
probability interval of (41.3 hrs, 97.9 hrs).  Even when the DT-OT degradation is 
treated as an unknown value, the resulting interval estimate still has less uncertainty 
than the operational assessment alone. 
7.5 Conclusion 
 This chapter has presented a case study depicting the application of the 
methodology presented throughout this thesis.  The approach was demonstrated on a 
complex military system that was modified through the addition of specific mission 
equipment on an existing vehicle.  Historical failure data for nine major subsystems 
was used along with a physics-based fatigue model.  Redundancy was considered for 
two components within the system, and the methodology in Chapter 6 was applied to 
develop a posterior distribution on the system-level failure intensity.   
 The posterior distribution from the lower level data was then updated with test 
data from a system level reliability growth test.  The reliability growth projection 
model in Chapter 3 was used to update the posterior distribution, considering the 
impact of corrective actions for 3 of the failure modes that were observed during the 
test.  The results were then subsequently updated after an operational test by applying 
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the model developed in Chapter 4.  The resulting posterior distribution on the failure 
intensity was shown to have a much lower uncertainty when compared to the 
traditional reliability assessment using the operational test data alone.  The 
uncertainty was still lower even when a non-informative prior distribution was used 
for the DT-OT degradation.  The case study demonstrates how the methodology in 
this thesis can be applied throughout the development of a complex system.
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8 EXTENSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
8.1 Introduction 
8.1.1 Background 
 This chapter contains a discussion of future work that can extend the research 
presented in this thesis.  The development of analogous methodology for discrete 
one-shot type systems is an obvious area where additional work is possible.  An 
outline of a potential discrete version of the reliability growth projection model in 
Chapter 3 is presented here.  A brief discussion of the extension of the approach in 
Chapter 4 to discrete systems is also given.  The last extension discussed involves the 
use of physics-based modeling within the framework for developing estimates of the 
system-level failure intensity. 
8.1.2 Chapter Overview 
 This chapter is organized as follows. Section 8.2 presents a potential 
framework for discrete reliability growth under arbitrary corrective actions, including 
model assumptions and data requirements.  Initial analytic results are presented along 
with empirical Bayes estimates.  Section 8.3 discusses the potential extension of the 
approach to include operational test data, which is a discrete analogue of Chapter 4.  
Section 8.4 contains a brief discussion on additional work in the probabilistic 
modeling of failure mechanisms.  Section 8.5 discusses the potential extension of 
general reliability assessment via failure mode modeling.   
 212 
- CHAPTER 8 - 
8.2 Reliability Growth of One-Shot Devices under Arbitrary Corrective Actions 
8.2.1 Model Assumptions 
 The approach outlined here follows that of [21] and [22], which treats the 
system reliability as a product of reliabilities from independent failure modes.  
Modeling the system as a combination of failure modes in this manner enables the use 
of FEF values, which mathematically quantify the reduction in the mode failure 
probability for a given failure mode after a corrective action has been implemented.  
As with the model in Chapter 3, the approach allows for arbitrary corrective actions 
to be made during the test period.  The assumptions are as follows: 
1. The system is comprised of a large number of failure modes that are serial in 
nature; the occurrence of any failure mode results in failure of the system. 
2. Failure modes generate failures independently of one another. 
3. The failure probability for each mode is constant both before and after a 
corrective action is implemented. 
4. Corrective actions to failure modes do not introduce new failure modes into 
the system. 
5. Testing is conducted under operationally relevant conditions and stressors. 
8.2.2 Posterior Inference for Single Failure Mode 
 To develop the model for the system reliability, start by examining the 
posterior distribution for a single failure mode.  For a given test event of T trials with 
arbitrary corrective actions, assume for the ith failure mode there are ni failures on 
trials t = (ti,1, …, ti,ni) with corrective action on trial vi and FEF di. Further assume 
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that there are ni,1 failures prior to the corrective action.  Denoting the failure mode 
probability of failure as pi, assumptions 2 and 3 result in the likelihood for a failure 
mode given by  
 
l  t | pi ,vi ,di ,T( ) ∝ pi ni, 1 1 − pi( )
vi −ni, 1 1 − pi( )
1−di( ) T −vi − ni −ni, 1( )[ ]1 − 1 − pi( )
1−di[ ]ni −ni, 1     (1) 
Note that the use of the FEF in (1) is slightly different than that used in previous 
discrete reliability growth projection models such as [21] and [22].  The FEF has been 
previously applied by directly scaling the probability of failure for a failure mode.  
The approach used here yields a failure mode reliability after corrective action of  
 
Ri, new = Ri
1−di( ),    (2) 
which provides more consistency between continuous and discrete reliability growth 
projection models.  The continuous models assume a constant failure rate for each 
failure mode, meaning that the reliability can also be expressed using an Exponential 
distribution.  A log-transform will result in the traditional failure rate remaining after 
corrective action.  Log-transforming the Exponential representation of (2) results in  
 
λi, new = 1 − di( )λi ,    (3) 
which fits the usual definition for FEF in the continuous reliability growth projection 
models. 
 For the prior distribution on the mode failure probability pi we assume a Beta 
distribution of the form 
 
p pi( ) =
Γ a + b( )
Γ a( )Γ b( )
pi
a−1 1 − pi( )
b−1
.   (4) 
The posterior distribution for the mode probability of failure is then given by 
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p pi | t( ) =
p pi( )l t | pi ,vi ,di ,T( )




.        (5) 
To solve for the posterior, substitute ni,2 = ni - ni,1 and use a Binomial expansion such 
that 
 
1 − 1 −pi( )










∑ .  (6) 
This yields a failure mode posterior distribution of  
 








 −1( )j pi a+ ni, 1 −1 1 − pi( )












Γ a + ni,1[ ]Γ b + vi − ni,1 + 1 − di( ) T − vi − ni, 2 + j( )[ ]





If all corrective actions are delayed until the end of the test, ni,2 = 0, vi = T, and the 
posterior in (7) will simplify to that of standard Beta-Bernoulli conjugate 
relationships.  Also if the failure mode is unobserved during testing, the posterior in 
(7) reduces to  
 
p pi | t( ) =
pi
a−1 1 − pi( )
b+ T −1
Γ a[ ]Γ b + T[ ]
Γ a + b + T[ ]
=
Γ a + b + T[ ]
Γ a[ ]Γ b + T[ ]
pi
a−1 1 − pi( )
b+ T −1
.  (8) 
We are interested in the posterior reliability for the failure mode, so using (7) we can 
develop the posterior mean reliability as 
( )
( ) ( )( )[ ]( )( )[ ]



















































tpE . (9) 
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For the mean posterior failure mode reliability after corrective action, we similarly 
have  
 
E   1 − pi( )









Γ b + vi −ni,1 + 1 −di( ) T −vi −ni, 2 + j +1( )[ ]











Γ b + vi −ni,1 + 1 −di( ) T −vi −ni, 2 + j( )[ ]





The result in (10) will then be used to construct the posterior mean for the complex 
system.  To support later calculations involving the posterior variance, we also 
calculate the corresponding second moment for the mean in (10).  The second 
moment follows similarly as  
 


















Γ b + vi −ni,1 + 1 −di( ) T −vi −ni, 2 + j + 2( )[ ]











Γ b + vi −ni,1 + 1 −di( ) T −vi −ni, 2 + j( )[ ]
Γ a + b + vi + 1 −di( ) T −vi −ni, 2 + j( )[ ]j =0
ni, 2
∑
.  (11) 
8.2.3 Posterior Inference for Complex System 
 For a complex system consisting of a large number of failure modes, the 
previous results for a single failure mode can be used to develop analogous results for 




- CHAPTER 8 - 
 


















Γ b + vi − ni,1 + 1 − di( ) T − vi − ni, 2 + j +1( )[ ]











Γ b + vi − ni,1 + 1 − di( ) T − vi − ni, 2 + j( )[ ]















−1   (12) 
where K is the total number of failure modes in the system and m is the number of 
failure modes observed during the test.  The expression in (12) can be seen as the 
product of failure mode reliabilities for the entire system, with the left hand term 
representing the observed failure modes and the right hand term representing the 
unobserved failure modes.  Equation (10) is used for the observed modes, and the 
mean of the posterior in (8) is used for the unobserved modes.  The expression in (12) 
assumes that the number of failure modes in the system is known, which is not 
usually practical for complex systems.  For this reason we examine the limit of (12) 
as K becomes large in order to develop an estimate that does not rely on knowing the 
number of failure modes in the system.   
 Prior to taking the limit, reparameterize (12) using the prior mean reliability 
for the system and an additional parameter for the Beta distribution.  First let  
 
˜ n = a + b ,    (13) 
and then let the prior mean reliability for the system be denoted as  
 
RI = 1 −
a
a + bi =1
K
∏ .          (14) 
The a parameter can be expressed using (13) and (14) as 
 
a = ˜ n 1 − RI
1/ K( ),         (15) 
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which can be seen to go to zero as K becomes large.  Reparameterizing (12) in this 
manner yields 
 


















Γ ˜ n − a + vi − ni,1 + 1 − di( ) T − vi − ni, 2 + j +1( )[ ]











Γ ˜ n − a + vi − ni,1 + 1 − di( ) T − vi − ni, 2 + j( )[ ]














− ~1 .             (16) 
Taking the limit of (16) with respect to K requires calculation of the limit of the term 











.      (17) 
























˜ n + T .    (18) 















Γ ˜ n − a + vi − ni,1 + 1 − di( ) T − vi − ni, 2 + j +1( )[ ]











Γ ˜ n − a + vi − ni,1 + 1 − di( ) T − vi − ni, 2 + j( )[ ]
























Γ ˜ n + vi − ni,1 + 1 − di( ) T − vi − ni, 2 + j +1( )[ ]











Γ ˜ n + vi − ni,1 + 1 − di( ) T − vi − ni, 2 + j( )[ ]







˜ n + T
 .   (19) 
 The second moment of the posterior can be developed through techniques 
similar to those for the posterior mean.   Again distinguishing between observed and 
unobserved failure modes, the second moment for the system is  
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Γ b + vi − ni,1 + 1 − di( ) T − vi − ni, 2 + j + 2( )[ ]











Γ b + vi − ni,1 + 1 − di( ) T − vi − ni, 2 + j( )[ ]






b + T +1( ) b + T( )







K −m .  (20) 
Using the same reparameterization in (13)-(15) allows the contribution from 
unobserved failure modes to be expressed as  
 
 
b + T +1( ) b + T( )
































































˜ n + T+1
+
˜ n 
˜ n + T .     (22) 













Γ ˜ n + vi − ni,1 + 1 − di( ) T − vi − ni, 2 + j + 2( )[ ]











Γ ˜ n + vi − ni,1 + 1 − di( ) T − vi − ni, 2 + j( )[ ]







˜ n + T+1
+
˜ n 
˜ n + T
. (23) 
Denoting the second moment in (23) as m2 and the mean in (19) as m, the posterior 
variance for the complex system reliability is then 
 
 
Var R | t[ ] = σ 2 = µ2 −µ 2 .    (24) 
The product of individual Beta random variables does not follow an exact Beta 
distribution, but a Beta distribution can likely be used as a suitable approximation of 
the posterior for the system reliability.  A standard method-of-moments approach can 
be used to determine the parameters of the approximate distribution, which involves 
simultaneously solving the equations in (25) and (26) for the new Beta parameters a1 
and b1. 
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a1 + b1( )
2
a1 + b1 +1( )
.      (26) 
The approximation can be checked by simulating failure modes and corrective actions 
in a complex system. The Beta approximation should be sufficient, but simulation 
should also be used to examine the performance of the approximation under arbitrary 
corrective action strategies. 
8.2.4 Extension to Include Multiple Systems Under Test 
 The results in Section 8.2.3 were developed for a single system being tested.  
It is often the case that more than one system is tested concurrently during a 
reliability growth program though, and this section provides straightforward 
extensions of the results in Section 8.2.3 for multiple systems under test. 
 For q systems under test, assume each system has likelihood as defined in (1).  
Assuming independence between the systems, the total likelihood for the ith failure 
mode is given by 
 
l t | pi ,vi ,di ,T( ) ∝ pi ni, 1, jj=1
q
∑ 1 − pi( )
vi, j −ni, 1, j
j=1
q
∑ 1 − pi( )











 1 − 1 − pi( )






where the subscript j denotes data for the specific system under test.  Examining (27) 
reveals that the likelihood for multiple systems can be found by summing the data 
across the individual systems and substituting the terms into (1).  This indicates that 
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the results in Section 8.2.3 can be extended through the same substitution and require 
no additional model development. 
8.2.5 Empirical Bayes Estimators 
 As with the continuous model in Chapter 3, it is entirely possible to 
parameterize the Beta prior through other means such as historical data or elicitation 
of experts.  While not fully Bayesian in their application, empirical Bayes estimates 
can be developed for the discrete systems approach.    
 First note that the mean in (19) and the variance in (24) are now expressed in 
terms of the prior system-level mean 
 
RI  and the 
 
˜ n parameter.  The empirical Bayes 
estimators for these parameters can be developed by examining the likelihood in (1) 
and the resulting marginal likelihood when all failure modes in the system are 
considered.  The marginal likelihood for a single failure mode is just the denominator 
of the posterior distribution in (5) given by  
 
p ni( ) =
Γ a + b[ ]









Γ a + ni,1[ ]Γ b + vi − ni,1 +τi, j[ ]
Γ a + b + vi +τi, j[ ]j =0
ni, 2
∑ ,  (28) 
where 
 
τi, j = 1 −di( ) T −vi −ni, 2 + j( ) and ni represents the total number of observed 
failures for the ith failure mode as in Section 8.2.3.  From (28) the total likelihood 
over K modes in the system is given by  
 
L n( ) = Γ a + b[ ]









Γ a + ni,1[ ] Γ b + vi − ni,1 +τi, j[ ]





∏ ,  (29) 
and the corresponding log-likelihood is given by  
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
 













Γ a + ni,1[ ] Γ b + vi − ni,1 +τi, j[ ]

















Again assuming that m failure modes are observed during the test, (30) can be 
represented as  

 









Γ a + b[ ]









Γ a + ni,1[ ] Γ b + vi − ni,1 +τi, j[ ]














                                      + K − m( ) log Γ a + b[ ]Γ b + T[ ]







.   (31) 
The expression in (31) is a sum of log-likelihood terms for the m observed failure 








K      (32) 
to account for the possible ways of observing m failure modes from the total 
population of K modes.  Reparameterizing (31) in terms of the prior system-level 
mean 
 
RI  and the 
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.    (33) 
Taking the limit of (33) as K becomes large results in  
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      
 
 + log RI
˜ n ψ ˜ n + T( ) −ψ ˜ n( )[ ]  (34) 
Taking the derivative with respect to the RI and 
 
˜ n  will result in the equations for the 
empirical Bayes estimates.        
8.3 Combining Developmental and Operational Test Data for Discrete Systems 
 For combining developmental and operational test data results for one-shot 
systems, an approach analogous to that of Chapter 4 can be utilized.  A degradation 
factor, γ,  can be employed in the same manner as the FEF value in Section 8.2.  The 
relationship between the DT reliability and the OT reliability can be represented as  
 
RDT = ROT
1−γ      (35) 
This would allow the marginal distribution for the operational reliability to be 
developed in manner analogous to that in Chapter 4.  Note the Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo methods may need to be employed to develop the marginal posterior, as the 
resulting distribution may not be analytically tractable.  
8.4 Developing Prior Information from Physics-based Modeling 
 The results presented in Chapters 6 and 7 for developing posterior 
distributions for mode failure rates are an additional area where much further work is 
possible.  In particular, the Steinberg damage accumulation approach could be further 
explored for situations where the loading does not adhere to the assumption of 
Normality.  Expansion in the area to allow for non-Normal distributions or other 
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means of damage accumulation from complex loading environments would help to 
provide more reasonable life estimates, thereby improving the accuracy of the failure 
mode posterior and the overall system level posterior.  
8.5 General Reliability Assessment 
  The methodology presented throughout this thesis decomposes the reliability 
of a complex system into the various failure modes that exist within the system.  The 
failure intensity of the various failure modes is also assumed to be constant, which is 
justified when a sufficient number of failure mechanisms give rise to the specific 
failure mode.  But the constant failure intensity may not be reasonable when a single 
mechanism causes a failure mode, or in cases when the failure mode results from 
redundancy between components.  Additional work could prove useful in these areas. 
 In particular the use of alternative likelihoods, such as the Weibull distribution 
given in (6) in Chapter 6, could prove useful for modeling these types of failure 
modes.  A common prior distribution could potentially be used to allow for a 
connection between the modes such as the Gamma distribution utilized in this thesis.  
The approach may provide a more general reliability assessment framework that 
allows for different likelihoods while still providing an analytic result with significant 
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9 CONCLUSIONS 
 The methodology presented in this thesis provides a model framework for 
assessing reliability and reliability growth utilizing data from a variety of potential 
sources throughout the development of the system.  The approach addresses the 
differences that may exist in the test environments in which the data are collected, 
while also providing a probabilistic result that indicates the amount of uncertainty in 
the assessed values.  Additional data sources, such as historical information, 
component level test data, and modeling and simulation results are also leveraged to 
provide prior assessments of the system reliability.  The approach provides a flexible 
Bayesian framework that can easily be extended to allow for other information 
sources where appropriate.  The only requirement for inclusion is a suitable 
characterization of the posterior distribution on the failure intensity for the failure 
mode profile underlying the system.  The three main goals of the research were as 
follows: 
1. Provide a reliability growth assessment methodology that utilizes data from 
throughout the development of the system while rigorously accounting for 
differences in the test environments that may exist. 
2. Provide additional management metrics that will provide additional 
information beyond the assessed reliability to program managers in order to 
better inform decision-making. 
3. Provide a methodology for combining early design activities such as modeling 
and simulation and component/subsystem testing to provide a prior 
distribution on the reliability of a system.  The prior distribution can then be 
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updated when reliability growth testing and reliability demonstration testing 
are completed. 
 The research presented in Chapters 3-6 specifically addresses the goals that 
were identified above.   Chapter 2 presented a literature review on reliability growth 
and assessment techniques that established the current state-of-the-art in reliability 
growth models.  Chapter 3 presented a new method for projecting the reliability 
growth of a complex continuously operating system.  The model allows for arbitrary 
corrective action strategies, while using all available data rather than failure mode 
first occurrence times only.  A complete inference framework was also provided via 
the posterior distribution on the system failure intensity.  A unique feature of this 
approach relative to other Bayesian techniques is the analytic expression for the 
failure intensity contribution from unobserved failure modes.  Expressions for the 
estimating the initial failure intensity, growth potential failure intensity, and the 
cumulative number of failure modes expected in future testing are also developed.  
These important metrics provide additional useful reliability information to program 
managers, which can in turn make better informed decisions regarding resource 
management and future reliability initiatives. 
 Chapter 4 presented a new Bayesian reliability assessment model to mitigate 
the problem of reliability demonstration with fixed configuration testing alone.  The 
approach combined the developmental reliability growth approach in Chapter 3 with 
operational reliability test data within a Bayesian probabilistic framework.  The 
resulting model reduces the uncertainty in the assessed reliability below that 
associated with reliability assessment using operational test data alone.  Differences 
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in the test environments and stressors are explicitly considered when combining the 
data from different test events.  The approach developed in Chapter 4 is also used as 
the basis for the reliability growth planning model in Chapter 5. 
 Chapter 6 presents a general methodology for combining lower level 
information that may be available before full system-level testing has been conducted.  
System-level data collected under operationally relevant testing is the most desirable 
information source for assessing system reliability, but during early stages of 
development this type of information may be unavailable.  There are often other 
sources of reliability related information that are available in the early stages of 
development of the system though, and in these cases it is possible to utilize these 
information sources to develop an early assessment of the system reliability.  When 
viewing the process of reliability assessment across the various stages of development 
of the system, assessment in this manner serves as prior information that can be 
updated with the reliability growth models in Chapters 3 and 4 when system-level test 
data are available.  
 Uncertainty distributions are developed for each failure mode using data for 
the individual components or those within a redundant block.  Bayesian posterior 
distributions are used when component data are available, and a more general 
uncertainty distribution is developed when only physics-of-failure model results are 
available.   When the component information that is available does not accurately 
represent the reliability of the component within the new system (e.g. benign testing, 
historical data from similar system, etc.), a probabilistic technique is provided to 
account for the degraded reliability and additional uncertainty that is present due to 
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additional failure modes or mechanisms that are not accounted for in the data or 
modeling.  
 Chapter 7 provides a case study demonstrating the application of the 
overarching model framework to a complex military system.  Historical data is used 
to develop posterior distributions for the major subsystems within the system.  The 
data are also used to develop a posterior distribution on the failure intensity for the 4-
of-8 configuration for the wheels of the vehicle.  Physics-based fatigue modeling is 
used to develop a posterior distribution on the driveshaft of the vehicle, and the 
results are combined to form an overall posterior on the system level failure intensity.   
 The resulting posterior is then used to form the prior distribution for the 
reliability growth model in Chapter 3, and the system reliability is assessed after 
corrective action of 3 failure modes observed during reliability growth testing.  The 
resulting posterior distribution after reliability growth testing is then updated after OT 
by applying a degradation factor between the two test events. 
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APPENDIX A: DERIVATIONS 
 This section contains derivations of the limiting results for the posterior 
variance and the expected number of failure modes observed in follow on testing 
from Chapter 3. 
Posterior Variance: 
 From Section 3.2 we write the system level posterior variance as the sum of 
the variances for the individual failure mode failure intensities.     
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Reparameterizing allows us to express the variance as  
 
 
Var λs | n[ ] =
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Taking the limit of (2) as K becomes large while holding the prior mean and the 
β parameter constant yields the expression shown in (10) in Chapter 3.  
Expected Number of Failure Modes Observed in Follow-On Testing: 
Reparameterizing (20) in Chapter 3 results in 
 
E Ii t( )
i =m+1
K



























































































    (3) 
The second term multiplying the m in (3) will go to zero as K becomes large.  For the 


















































































































           (4) 
The denominator of the exponent in (4) will go to zero as K becomes large.  The limit 
of the numerator is by definition just 
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,      (5) 
which yields the desired result in Chapter 3. 
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APPENDIX B: MATHEMATICA CODE FOR RELIABILITY GROWTH 
MODELS OF CHAPTERS 3 & 4 
 The results in Chapters 3 and 4 utilize a Mathematica simulation to generate 
test data for comparing the proposed approach with those currently in the literature.  
The simulation begins by simulating mode failure rates from a Gamma distribution.  
Each failure rate is then used to simulate failures within the desired length of testing.  
Corrective actions are applied with the test according to a probabilistic strategy that 
allows for certain modes to be corrected immediately, while others have corrective 
actions delayed until the end of the test.  The individual mode failure rates were 
reduced by the corresponding FEF when the corrective action occurs in the 
simulation.  The resulting failures and associated FEF values are then used within the 
reliability growth model.  The model results can then be compared to the true values 
that were used to generate the random failures.   
 The failure rates remaining after the reliability growth test were then scaled 
according to the amount of reliability degradation that was assumed for the 
simulation.  The scaled mode failure rates were then used to generate failures for the 
operational test in the same manner as for the reliability growth test.  No corrective 
actions were employed during the OT though, as the model approach assumes a 
constant configuration.  The resulting OT failures were then used within the model 
approach in Chapter 4, and the results can again be compared to the true values 
underlying the simulated failure times.  The simulation code is as follows, with 
comment descriptions presented in-line within the code to explain the various 
calculations that are performed. 
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